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Series  of  dDofcern  pbilosopbers 

Edited  by  £.  Hershey  Sneath,  Ph.D. 

THE 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE 

IN   EXTRACTS    FROM 

THE  ESSAY 
CONCERNING    HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING 

ARRANGED,  WITH  INTRODUCTORY  NOTES, 
BY 

JOHN    E.  RUSSELL,  A.M. 

Mark  Hopkins  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Williams  College 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY  HOLT  AND   COMPANY 

1891 


£3; 

129  / 


COPYRIGHT,  1891% 

BY 
HENRY    HOLT    &    CO. 


EDITOR'S   PROSPECTUS. 

THIS  book,  containing  extracts  from  the  Philosophy 
of  Locke,  is  the  first  of  a  series  to  be  published  under 
my  editorial  supervision,  for  the  purpose  of  presenting 
the  substance  of  the  representative  systems  of  modern 
philosophy  in  selections  from  the  original  works.  Each 
volume  is  to  be  prefaced  by  a  short  biographical  sketch 
of  the  author,  a  statement  of  the  historical  position  of 
the  system,  a  brief  exposition  of  the  system,  and  a 
bibliography. 

Eight  volumes  have  been  arranged  for,  as  follows  : 
Des  Cartes,  by  Professor  Torrey,  of  the  University 
of  Vermont  ;  Spinoza,  by  Professor  Fullerton,  of  the 
University  of  Pennsylvania ;  Locke,  by  Professor 
Russell,  of  Williams  College  ;  Berkeley,  by  ex-Presi- 
dent Porter,  of  Yale  University  ;  Hume,  by  Professor 
Aikins,  of  Trinity  College,  N.  C.  ;  Reid,  by  the  editor 
of  the  series  ;  Kant,  by  Professor  Watson,  of  Queen's 
University,  Canada  ;*  Hegel,  by  Professor  Royce,  of 
Harvard  University.  If  sufficient  encouragement  is 
given,  volumes  representing  Leibnitz,  Jacobi,  Fichte, 
Herbart,  Schelling,  Schopenhauer,  Hartmann,  and 
Spencer  will  probably  follow. 

*  The  publishers  have  purchased  an  edition  of  Professor  Wat- 
son's excellent  book,  entitled  "  Extracts  from  the  Philosophy  of 
Kant,"  and  include  it  in  this  series, 

m 


IV  EDITOR  S    PROSPECTUS. 

The  object  of  the  series  is  primarily  to  facilitate  the 
study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  in  our  colleges. .  In 
many  colleges  that  course  is  gradually  being  enlarged, 
and  a  mere  text-book  on  the  subject  is  inadequate  to 
meet  the  wants  of  the  department.  One  simply  fur- 
nishes a  brief  exposition  of  the  various  systems,  which, 
it  must  be  remembered,  is  merely  an  interpretation.  It 
is  especially  desirable,  however,  to  put  the  student  in 
direct  contact  with  the  text  of  the  author,  permitting  him 
to  make  his  own  interpretation.  This  cannot  be  done 
by  resorting  to  the  complete  works  of  the  various  au- 
thors, because,  if  a  number  of  systems  is  to  be  studied, 
in  the  majority  of  cases  the  books  are  too  elaborate, 
and,  in  German  Philosophy,  too  expensive.  This  series 
provides  for  this  difficulty  by  giving  the  substance  of 
each  system  in  selections  from  the  author's  works,  and 
in  a  form  involving  little  expense  on  the  part  of  the 
student. 

A  secondary  object  of  the  series  is  to  meet  the  wants 
of  a  large  number  of  professional  men,  especially  cler- 
gymen, who  are  desirous  of  a  wider  acquaintance  with 
philosophy  ;  but,  not  having  time  to  read  the  complete 
works,  still  desire  something  more  than  a  brief  inter- 
pretation— such  as  may  be  found  in  works  on  the 
History  of  Philosophy. 

E.  HERSHEY   SNEATH. 

YALE  UNIVERSITY,  October ;  1891. 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

JOHN  LOCKE  was  born  at  Wrington,  a  village  in  Som- 
ersetshire, August  29,  i6jf2  ;  and  he  died  at  Gates,  in  u 
Essex,  a  town  about  twenty  miles  from  London, 
October  28,  1704.  His  life  period,  seventy-two  years, 
coincided  with  one  of  the  stormiest  and  most  event- 
ful epochs  in  the  political  and  religious  history  of 
England,  and  in  the  most  important  movements  of 
this  epoch  Locke  had  an  influential  part. 

Of  Locke's  ancestors  we  have  little  certain  informa- 
tion. His  father  claimed  a  sort  of  cousinship  with  one 
John  Locke,  who  was  mayor  of  Bristol  in  1642,  and  who  |% 
was  descended  from  an  earlier  John  Locke,  a  sheriff  of 
London  in  1460.  Our  John  Locke's  great-grandfather 
was  Edward  Locke,  a  younger  member  of  a  branch  that 
had  settled  in  Dorsetshire  in  the  sixteenth  century. 

Locke's  mother,  it  is  probable,  died  when  he  was 
very  young.  The  only  positive  information  we  have 
about  her  from  Locke  himself  is  a  single  sentence  of 
Lady  Masham's,  **  What  I  remember  him  to  have  said 
of  his  mother  expressed  her  to  be  a  very  pious  woman 
and  affectionate  mother."  Of  his  father  Locke  has 
given  quite  explicit  information  ;  and  it  was  doubtless 
to  him  that  Locke  was  most  indebted  for  the  favoring 
circumstances  of  his  early  life,  and  Locke  speaks  of 
him  with  the  warmest  appreciation  and  respect.  Lady 
Masham  says,  "  From  Mr.  Locke  I  have  often  heard 


BIo6tfAi>HtCAL    SKETCH. 

of  his  f ather  that-  He  was  a  man  of  parts.  Mr.  Locke 
never  mentioned  him  but  with  great  respect  and  affec- 
tion." Locke's  father  was  an  attorney,  and  appears 
to  have  had  a  successful  practice  until  the  breaking 
out  of  the  civil  war  terminated  his  peaceful  career. 
He  joined  the  cause  of  the  Parliament,  and  served  as 
captain  under  his  friend  and  legal  associate,  Alexander 
Popham,  who  held  the  rank  of  colonel.  The  civil 
war  nearly  ruined  Locke's  father  financially,  though 
he  retrieved  his  fortunes  in  a  considerable  degree,  and 
at  his  death  in  1661  he  left  a  comfortable  estate  to 
his  two  sons.  The  older  son,  Thomas,  dying  shortly 
after  his  father,  John  Locke  was  left  in  sole  posses- 
sion of  the  family  estate. 

Locke's  student  life  began  at  Westminster  School, 
then  under  the  charge  of  the  famous  Dr.  Busby. 
Locke  was  admitted  to  this  school  as  a  king's  scholar, 
through  the  influence  of  Colonel  Popham,  in  1646, 
and  here  he  remained  probably  six  years,  when  he 
entered  Christ's  College,  Oxford,  as  Westminster  stu- 
dent. His  matriculation  bears  the  date  of  November 
27,  1652,  and  he  began  his  residence  in  the  Michael- 
mas term,  December  22  of  the  same  year. 

Locke's  connection  with  Oxford  continued  for 
thirty-two  years,  though  his  residence  there  was  con- 
fined for  the  most  part  to  the  ten  years  following  his 
matriculation.  He  received  his  Bachelor's  degree  in 
1656,  his  Master's  degree  in  1658.  In  1660  he  was 
made  Greek  Lecturer;  Rhetorical  Reader  in  1663; 
and  Censor  of  Moral  Science  in  1664.  These,  with 
the  senior  studentship  at  Christ's  College,  were  the 
only  academic  positions  that  Locke  held. 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH.  3 

In  1666  Locke  appears  to  have  made  his  final  de- 
cision not  to  take  orders,  as  his  father  had  designed  ; 
he  chose  medicine,  and,  though  he  should  properly 
have  forfeited  his  studentship, — that  being  an  eccle- 
siastical one, — by  a  royal  dispensation,  which  is  still 
preserved  and  bears  the  date"  of  November  14,  1666, 
he  was  permitted  to  retain  the  senior  studentship  in 
Christ's  College,  and  this  fellowship  he  continued  to 
hold  until  his  expulsion  from  Oxford  by  the  mandate 
of  Charles  II.  in  1684. 

Oxford,  when  Locke  entered  it,  was  under  Puritan 
control.  Cromwell  was  chancellor  ;  Dr.  John  Owen, 
the  most  distinguished  Independent,  was  vice-chan- 
cellor and  dean  of  Christ  Church.  During  the  civil 
wars  the  university  had  suffered  greatly  ;  its  discipline 
had  been  greatly  relaxed,  and  general  disorder  pre- 
vailed, but  at  the  time  when  Locke  was  a  student 
there  the  discipline  of  the  university  had  been  much 
improved, — the  university  was  suffering,  in  fact,  from 
the  opposite  extreme, — the  closest  religious  censorship 
was  exercised  over  the  students  ;  to  quote  from  the 
records  of  the  time — "  frequent  preaching  in  every 
house  was  the  chief  matter  aimed  at.  In  June,  1653, 
it  was  ordered  that  all  Bachelors  of  Arts  and  under- 
graduates in  colleges  and  in  halls  be  required,  every 
Lord's  Day,  to  give  an  account,  to  some  person  of 
known  ability  and  piety,  of  the  sermons  they  had 
heard,  and  their  attendance  on  other  religious  exer- 
cises on  that  day."  Nor  were  such  exercises  limited 
to  Sundays  ;  in  most,  if  not  all  the  colleges,  two  or 
more  such  services  were  held  during  the  week,  at 
which  all  members  of  the  university  were  required  to 


4  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

be  present.  Such  rigorous  and  narrow  discipline  was 
doubtless  irksome  to  such  a  nature  as  Locke's,  but  he 
nowhere  speaks  of  it  with  dissatisfaction.  The  influ- 
ence, however,  which  he  did  deprecate,  and  from  which 
his  mind  reacted  strongly,  was  the  scholastic  form  of 
teaching  then  prevalent  at  Oxford. 

Lady  Masham  says:  "I  have  often  heard  him  say, 
in  reference  to  his  first  years  spent  in  the  university, 
that  he  had  so  small  satisfaction  there  from  his 
studies,  as  finding  very  little  light  there  brought  to  his 
understanding — that  he  became  discontented  with  his 
manner  of  life,  and  wished  his  father  had  rather 
designed  him  for  anything  else  that  what  he  was  des- 
tined to.  This  discouragement  kept  him  from  being 
a  very  hard  student." 

It  would  hardly  be  correct  to  conclude,  even  from 
Locke's  own  statements,  that  he  derived  from  these 
earlier  years  at  Oxford  no  really  important  benefit; 
even  the  scholastic  training  was  not  without  a  strong 
and  permanent  influence  upon  Locke's  mental  de- 
velopment, as  is  evinced  in  his  chief  work,  the  "  Essay 
Concerning  Human  Understanding" — a  book  that 
would  hardly  have  been  written  if  he  had  not  passed 
such  years  at  Oxford. 

.  There  were  two  influences  which  later  in  Locke's 
student-life  at  Oxford  contributed  powerfully  to  mould 
the  development  of  his  mind  and  to  determine  the 
direction  of  his  life;  (one  of  these  influences  was  that 
of  the  new  philosophy  of  free  inquiry  determined  by 
experience.  This  influence  sprung  both  from  Des 
Cartes  and  Bacon,  and  reached  Locke  indirectly,  but 
which,  according  to  his  testimony,  awakened  him  to 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH.  5 

new  life.  It  was,  however,  to  Des  Cartes  rather  thantif  I 
to  his  English  predecessors,  Bacon  and  Hobbes,  that 
Locke  was  the  more  indebted  for  this  early  quicken- 
ing and  direction  of  his  mind.  "  He  often  told  me," 
says  Lady  Masham,  "  that  the  first  books  that  gave 
him  a  relish  for  philosophical  reading  were  those  of 
Des  Cartes." 

^  The  other  strong  influence  upon  Locke  at  this  time  A" 
was  a  religious  one,  and  came  from  his  intimate  asso- 
ciation with  the  dean  of  his  college,  Dr.  John  Owen. 
Locke's  debt  to  this  large  and  liberal  mind  is  a  large 
one;  he  learned  from  him  to  take  liberal  and  tolerant 
views  of  religious  differences;  the  doctrine  of  tolera- 
tion, which  Locke  so  profoundly  taught  and  illustrated, 
had  its  inception  in  no  slight  degree  from  the  influ- 
ence of  John  Owen. 

The  year  1666  marks  a  turning-point  in  the  career 
of  Locke.  In  the  autumn  of  the  previous  year  he 
had,  as  secretary,  accompanied  Sir  Walter  Vane,  who 
had  been  sent  on  an  embassy  to  the  Elector  of  Bran- 
denburg. On  his  return,  in  the  spring  of  1666,  Locke 
was  tendered  the  post  of  secretary  to  the  Earl  of 
Sandwich,  then  about  to  set  out  for  Spain  as  embassa- 
dor.  This  offer,  after  considerable  hesitation,  he 
declined,  remarking  that  he  may  "have  let  slip  the 
minute  that  they  say  every  man  has  once  in  his  life  to 
make  himself." 

In  the  same  year  Locke  met  for  the  first  time,  and 
became  the  friend  of,  Lord  Ashley,  afterwards  the 
Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  and  the  most  powerful  nobleman 
of  his  time.  This  acquaintance  with  Lord  Ashley, 
due  to  the  most  casual  circumstance,  was  of  decisive 


6  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

import  to  Locke's  subsequent  life;  almost  with  the 
beginning  of  this  connection,  Locke  entered  upon  a 
new  career,  and  began  to  participate  in  and  to  influ- 
ence public  affairs.  In  the  following  year  he  became 
a  member  of  Lord  Ashley's  family,  and  from  that 
time  he  shared  the  varying  fortunes  of  his  patron.  In 
the  household  of  Lord  Ashley,  Locke  appears  to  have 
discharged  miscellaneous  duties  ;  he  was  medical 
adviser,  tutor  to  Ashley's  son,  and  secretary  and  con- 
fidential adviser  to  Lord  Ashley. 

Locke's  circumstances  at  this  time  were  happy  and 
favorable  to  his  chosen  pursuits.  Outside  of  Ashley's 
family  he  practised  medicine  but  little,  but  he  had 
leisure  for  study,  and  opportunities  for  acquaintance 
with  the  most  distinguished  men  in  learning  and  in 
public  life.  In  1668  Locke  was  elected  a  Fellow  of 
the  Royal  Society,  which  had  been  founded  not  long 
before  by  Boyle.  In  1669  and  in  1672  he  was  a  mem- 
ber of  a  council  belonging  to  this  society,  but  he 
never  took  an  active  part  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
society. 

In  1672  Lord  Ashley  was  created  Earl  of  Shaftes- 
bury,  and  a  little  later  he  was  appointed  Lord  Chan- 
cellor of  England.  Locke  was  then  made  Secretary 
of  Presentations,  with  a  salary  of  three  hundred 
li  , pounds.  He  had  previously,  in  1667,  been  made,  in 
an  informal  way,  chief  secretary  and  manager  of  the 
Company  known  as  Lords  Proprietors  of  Carolina. 
This  informal  but  onerous  office  he  held  till  the 
autumn  of  1672,  and  in  the  discharge  of  his  multi- 
farious duties  he  evinced  those  talents  and  versatility 
of  powers  that  so  distinguished  him  in  later  years. 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH.  7 

In  November,  1673,  Shaftesbury  incurred  the  king's 
displeasure  and  was  dismissed  from  office,  and  Locke 
lost  his  secretaryship.  He  had,  however,  been  ap- 
pointed secretary  for  the  Council  of  Trade,  with  a  3. 
salary  of  five  hundred  pounds,  and  this  office  he  con- 
tinued to  hold  until  the  dissolution  of  the  council  in 
March,  1674,  though  in  fact  the  salary  was  never  paid. 

In  1674-5  Locke  received  the  degree  of  Bachelor 
of  Medicine,  and  in  the  January  following  he  was  ap- 
pointed to  one  of  the  two  medical  studentships  in 
Christ's  College.  The  income  from  this  studentship, 
together  with  an  annuity  of  one  hundred  pounds 
granted  him  by  Shaftesbury,  and  the  revenue  from  his 
small  estates  in  Somersetshire,  secured  to  him  a  com- 
fortable maintenance. 

One  circumstance  belonging  to  this  period,  from  its 
connection  with  Locke's  philosophical  career,  should 
not  be  passed  over  ;  it  was  the  historical  occasion  of 
the  "  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding," 
spoken  of  by  him  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Reader.  This 
memorable  meeting  occurred  probably  in  1670-71. 

In  1675  Locke's  health,  which  had  been  precarious 
for  some  time,  was  now  so  seriously  impaired  that  he 
resolved  to  make  a  sojourn  in  France.  He  left  Eng- 
land the  same  year,  and  on  Christmas  Day  he  reached 
Montpellier,  the  place  he  had  selected  for  his  resi- 
dence, and  there  he  remained  for  the  most  of  the  time 
till  the  spring  of  1677. 

The  chief  occupation  of  Locke  during  the  period 
of  his  residence  in  France  was  the  Essay,  the  few 
scattered  notes  for  which  he  had  prepared  in  England. 
It  is  probable  that  before  he  returned  to  England,  in 


8  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

1679,  he  had  advanced  the  work  upon  the  Essay  well 
toward  its  completion.  In  a  letter  to  Thonyard,  in 
1679,  he  speaks  of  the  work  as  "completed,"  adding 
that  "  he  thought  too  well  of  it  to  let  it  go  from  his 
hands." 

Locke  returned  to  London  on  April  30,  1679,  to 
J7  find  Shaftesbury  again  in  royal  favor  and  president  of 
the  newly  formed  council.  Shaftesbury  had  need  of 
Locke's  services  only  for  a  short  time  ;  he  was  soon 
in  opposition  again,  and  his  tenure  of  office  quickly 
came  to  an  end. 

Shaftesbury's  political  career  was  soon  terminated. 
In  July,  1681,  he  was  arrested  on  a  charge  of  high 
treason  and  confined  in  the  Tower  ;  he  was  indicted 
by  a  special  commission,  November  24th,  but  on  De- 
>  cember  ist  the  Grand  Jury  threw  out  the  bill,  and 
Shaftesbury  was  acquitted,  but  only  to  enjoy  a  brief 
triumph.  In  the  spring  of  1682-3  he  was  implicated 
in  a  scheme  to  effect  a  general  uprising  against  the 
king  ;  the  scheme  failed,  and  Shaftesbury  for  safety 
took  refuge  in  Holland,  where  he  died  in  January, 
1683.  Shaftesbury's  fall  rendered  Locke's  situation 
unpleasant  and  somewhat  dangerous ;  and,  though 
there  was  no  evidence  to  implicate  him  in  Shaftes- 
bury's designs,  he  was  suspected  and  watched.  Partly 
for  this  reason  and  partly  on  account  of  his  disgust  at 
the  turn  affairs  were  taking  in  England,  he  determined 
upon  what  he  regarded  as  voluntary  exile.  He  left 
England  some  time  in  1683,  and  arrived  in  Holland 
late  in  the  same  year. 

v       The  five  years   Locke  passed   in   Holland,  though 
not  the  happiest,  were  probably  the  most  favorable  to 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH.  9 

his  aims  and  the  most  fruitful  of  results  of  any  period 
in  his  lifetime.  In  these  years  he  matured  the  prep- 
aration of  his  most  important  works,  and  it  was  in 
Holland  that  he  began  to  give  to  the  world  the  fruit 
of  his  many  years  of  profound  study  and  wide  experi- 
ence ;  it  was  in  Holland  that  he  formed  some  of  the 
friendships  he  valued  most  highly, — with  Limborch, 
the  distinguished  theologian  of  the  Remonstrants,  and 
with  whom  he  maintained  the  closest  and  most  affec- 
tionate intercourse  during  the  remainder  of  his  life  ; 
and  also  with  Le  Clerc,  whose  acquaintance  he  formed 
in  1685-6,  and  to  whom  Locke  was  indebted  for  the 
first  distinctive  impulse  to  authorship.  Le  Clerc  was 
just  projecting  the  "  Bibliotheque  Universelle,"  and  by 
his  instigation  Locke  published  in  this  periodical  the 
epitome  of  the  "  Essay  Concerning  Human  Under- 
standing" in  1688. 

During  his  stay  in  Holland  Locke  had  no  perma- 
nent residence  ;  he  resided  principally  in  Amsterdam, 
Utrecht,  and  Rotterdam.  The  winter  of  1683-4  he 
probably  passed  in  Amsterdam.  In  1684  he  made  a 
tour  through  Holland,  and  he  appears  to  have  re- 
turned to  Amsterdam  the  following  winter. 

After  the  death  of  Charles  II.  in  February,  1684-5, 
Locke,  being  suspected  of  complicity  in  the  attempt 
to  set  the  Duke  of  Monmouth  on  the  English  throne, 
was  included  among  those  persons  deemed  dangerous 
and  whom  the  government  of  Holland  was  requested 
to  deliver  up.  Locke  was  compelled  for  a  time  to  be 
in  hiding  and  to  assume  a  fictitious  name.  He  stayed 
for  some  time  in  the  house  of  Dr.  Veen,  in  Amster- 
dam, and  as  Dr.  Van  der  Linden  he  made  a  brief 


10  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

sojourn  in  Cleves.     This   political  danger,   however, 
passed  away  in  1686. 

The  winter  of  1686-7  was  spent  in  Amsterdam,  and 
after  a  brief  sojourn  at  Utrecht  in  the  following  sum- 
mer, Locke  took  up  his  residence  with  Mr.  Benjamin 
Furly  in  Rotterdam,  at  whose  house  he  continued  to 
reside  till  the  winter  of  1687-8,  and  for  whom  he 
formed  a  strong  personal  attachment. 
y  In  November,  1688,  William  of  Orange  set  out  on 
his  expedition  to  England.  Locke  followed  in  Feb- 
ruary of  the  next  year,  and  on  the  i2th  of  February 
he  was  back  in  London,  and  at  once  he  entered  upon 
the  most  active  and  laborious  periods  of  his  life.  Two 
positions  were  offered  him  by  King  William, — the 
post  of  ambassador  to  Frederick,  the  first  Elector  of 
Brandenburg,  and  a  like  position  at  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  Locke  declined  both  honors  on  the  ground 
of  poor  health  and  unfitness  for  such  responsibilities  ; 
rbiit  at  his  own  suggestion  he  was  made  Commissioner 
of  Appeals,  an  office  which  he  retained  during  the 
remainder  of  his  life. 

The  years  that  followed  immediately  upon  Locke's 
return  to  England  were  crowded  with  arduous  and 
responsible  labors.  It  was  the  period  of  the  publica- 
tion of  all  his  more  important  writings,  and  during 
these  six  years  he  took  a  most  active  interest  in  politi- 
cal affairs,  and,  directly  or  indirectly,  did  more,  it  is 
probable,  to  shape  the  policy  of  the  new  government 
than  any  single  mind  of  his  generation.  His  hand  is 
traceable  in  the  most  important  measures  of  William's 
government ;  his  direct  assistance  or  counsel  was 
sought  by  the  king  himself  or  by  his  advisers  on  all 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH.  II 

matters  of  importance.  The  Toleration  Bill,  which 
effected  important  religious  changes  ;  the  measure  £ 
for  reorganizing  the  currency  and  restoring  a  proper 
standard  of  value — perhaps  the  most  important  meas- 
ure of  William's  reign — were  largely  Locke's  work; 
and  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  which  had  in  charge  the 
economic  and  industrial  interests  of  the  country, 
Locke  was  for  years  the  "  presiding  genius." 

Locke's    authorship    during    these   years    was    pro-  /. 
digious.      "  The   Essay   Concerning    Human    Under- 
standing" was  published  in    1690.      "The   Epistola 
Tolerantia  "  preceded  it  by  a  few  months.     The  two 
treatises   on    Government    appeared    the   same   year. 
Two   subsequent   Letters  on  Toleration.      A  second 
and  third  edition  of  the  Essay,  and  a  number  of  lesser 
publications  on  economic  subjects,  and  an  "  Essay  on  <t 
the  Reasonableness  of  Christianity"  were    published 
during  these  years. 

In  1700  Locke  was  compelled  by  feeble  health  to  £ 
abandon  all  political  service.  He  had  some  years  be- 
fore made  his  home  in  the  family  of  Sir  Francis  and 
Lady  Masham  at  their  country  seat  at  Gates,  in 
Essex.  Here  Locke  passed  the  closing  years  of  his 
life,  and  these  years  were  most  happy  and  tranquil. 
The  last  important  literary  work  of  his  was  the  pub- 
lication of  the  fourth  edition  of  the  Essay,  which 
appeared  in  1700.  Four  years  later,  on  October  28, 
Locke  passed  away,  and  his  body  was  buried  in  the 
churchyard  at  High  Laver. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE,  AND  THE  POSITION 

IT   OCCUPIES    IN    THE   HISTORY  OF 

MODERN    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  position  which  Locke  occupies  in  the  develop- 
ment of  modern  philosophy  can  be  best  determined  by 
an  examination  of  his  chief  philosophical  work,  "  The 
Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding." 

The  design  of  the  Essay,  as  Locke  states  it,  is  "  To 
inquire  into  the  original,  certainty,  and  extent  of 
human  knowledge,  together  with  the  grounds  and 
degrees  of  belief,  opinion  and  assent,"  and  the  method 
Locke  proposes  is^^ist,  to  inquire  into  the  original 
of  these  ideas,  notions,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to 
call  them,  which  a  man  observes  and  is  conscious  to 
himself  he  has  in  his  mind,  and  the  ways  whereby  the 
understanding  comes  to  be  furnished  with  them;  2d, 
to  show  what  knowledge  the  understanding  hath  by 
those  ideas,  and  the  certainty,  evidence  and  extent  of 
it." 

Accordingly  the  Essay  falls  into  two  natural  di- 
visions, the  first  three  books  making  the  first  divi- 
sion, and  Book  IV.  constituting  the  second  division. 
Locke's  theory  of  knowledge  is  contained  essentially 
in  Books  II.  and  IV.,  Book  I.  being  hardly  more  than 
a  negative  answer  to  the  fundamental  question  of 
Book  II.;  and  Book  III.,  in  relation  to  the  main 
design  of  the  Essay,  is  an  explanation  of  Book  II. 


LOCKE  S    POSITION    IN    MODERN    PHILOSOPHY.       13 

Locke's  theory  of  knowledge  may  be  comprehended 
in  the  answer  to  two  questions:  ist.  How  does  the 
individual  mind  come  to  have  knowledge  ?  and  2d. 
What  certain  and  real  knowledge  is  possible  to  the 
individual  mind  ?  or,  put  more  simply,  What  is  it  that 
the  mind  does  in  knowing,  and  consequently,  What  is 
it  that  the  mind  can  certainly  know  ? 

Following  now  Locke's  method,  namely,  "  looking 
into  one's  own  understanding  to  see  how  it  works," 
we  may  epitomize  Locke's  account  of  human  knowl- 
edge in  this  way:  If  I  look  into  my  mind  to  see  what 
it  is  that  I  do  in  knowing,  or  how  my  knowledge 
comes  to  me,  I  find,  first,  that  all  knowledge  consists 
in  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 
ideas, — ideas  being  whatever  object  the  mind  has 
immediately  before  it  when  it  thinks  or  feels  or  wills; 
when,  therefore,  I  analyze  any  act  of  knowledge,  or 
any  knowledge  I  am  supposed  to  possess,  I  reach 
those  simple  elements  of  meaning  which  are  not  capa- 
ble of  further  analysis  ;  these  are  what  I  mean  by 
simple  ideas  as  the  beginnings  and  materials  of 
knowledge. 

My  first  inquiry  is,  therefore,  How  do  we  come  by 
these  ideas  ;  that  is,  How  does  there  come  to  be 
meaning  for  my  understanding  ?  I  answer  :  These 
elements  of  all  possible  knowledge  come  from  experi- 
ence and  from  experience  only;  they  are  not  innate ; 
by  which  I  mean  the  mind  is  not  in  actual  possession 
of  any  of  them  at  our  birth,  but  acquires  them  subse- 
quently. 

I  do  not  deny  that  the  mind  has  certain  powers 
proper  to  it,  and  that  it  exerts  them  in  the  formation 


14      LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  knowledge  nay,  in  the  having  of  its  simple  ideas;  I 
mean  only  that,  prior  to  the  awakening  of  the  mind  by 
the  action  of  things  upon  the  senses,  there  are  no 
ideas  in  the  understanding.  Knowledge  in  a  temporal 
respect  begins  with  sensation.  This  experience, 
which  is  the  source  and  beginning  of  knowledge,  is  of 
two  kinds,  external  and  internal;  external  experience 
is  sensation,  by  which  I  mean  "  such  an  impression  or 
motion  made  in  some  part  of-  the  body  as  produces 
some  perception  in  the  understanding;"  internal  ex- 
perience is  reflection,  by  which  term  I  mean  "that 
notice  the  mind  takes  of  its  own  states  and  operations, 
by  which  it  has  ideas  of  the  same." 

Now  since  in  the  order  of  time  external  experience 
comes  first,  the  proposition  is  true  that  ideas  are 
coeval  with  sensation.  But  experience  is  not  only 
the  origin  in  time  of  knowledge  ;  I  find  I  am  abso- 
lutely dependent  upon  experience  for  the  kind  of 
ideas  I  can  have  and  the  manner  in  which  I  have 
them.  Simple  ideas  are  the  data^  for  knowledge  ;  in 
respect  to  these  data  my  mind  is  passive  and  recep- 
tive rather  than  spontaneous  and  originative  ;  I  can- 
not create  these  single  ideas  at  will  ;  I  am  bound  to 
have  them,  and  to  have  them  as  they  are  determined 
by  my  experience  ;  andrin  relation  to  that  experience 
my  mind  is  a  tabuta  raira^Tlpon  which  there  can  be  no 
characters  until  there  is  the  action  of  something  upon 
it,  or  like  a  cabinet  that  remains  dark  until,  through 
the  openings  in  it,  light  is  admitted  and  the  reflection 
of  objects  is  made  within  it.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  formation  of  complex  ideas — they  being  those 
ideas  that  are  made  by  modifying  or  compounding 


LOCKE  S    POSITION    IN    MODERN    PHILOSOPHY.        15 

simple  ideas  in  various  ways — my  mind  is  relatively 
free  and  originative  ;  it  can  even  proceed  arbitrarily, 
since  there  need  be  no  conformity  of  such  ideas  to 
the  nature  of  objects  extrinsic  to  the  mind  ;  but  with 
-&H*gfr~ideas  such  conformity  or  correspondence  exists 
necessarily  ;  and  hence  all  simple  ideas  are  true  and 
adequate,  while  complex  ideas  may  be,  but  are  not 
necessarily,  true  or  adequate. 

Knowledge,  as  we  have  seen,  consisting  in  the  con- 
nection of  ideas,  depends  for  its  certainty  and  extent 
upon  the  clearness,  truth,  and  adequacy  of  our  ideas. 
Knowledge  can  extend  no  further  than  we  have  ideas, 
and  no  further  than  we  can  perceive  the  relations  be- » 
tween  ideas.y'Knowledge  is  certain  when  that  connec- 
tion of -ideas  is  clearly  and  certainly  perceived,  and 
knowledge  is  both  certain  and  real  when,  as  in  the 
case  of  material  objects,  there  is  both  the  idea  in  our 
mind  and  the  assurance  or  certainty  that  something , 
doth  exist  to  which  the  idea  in  some  way  corresponds. 
/This  assurance  or  conviction,  though  it  is  not  knowl- 
edge in  the  strict  sense  of  the  .definition,  as  it  is  more 
than  belief  or  probability,  may  be  included  in  knowl- 
edge. We  have  accordingly  three  degrees  of  knowl- 
edge :  i.  Intuitive,  knowledge,  where  the  connection 
between  ideas  is  immediately  and  necessarily  per- 
ceived. 2.  DejnojisJxatWe  knowledge,  where  the  con- 
nection of  ideas  is  certain,  but  is  perceived  indirectly 
by  means  of  an  intermediate  idea.  And  3.  Sensitive  t 
knowledge,  being  the  assurance  or  perfect  conviction 
we  have  that  some  object  extrinsic  to  the  mind 
actually  exists  when  we  have  the  idea  of  such  an  ob- 


1 6      LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ject  as  has  existed  at  those  times  when  we  had  such 
ideas  in  the  past. 

Again,  knowledge  in  respect  to  its  possible  objects 
is  of  three  sorts  :  i,  of  identity  or  diversity  :  2,  of  co- 
existence and  of  other  relations  ;  3,  of  real  existence. 
But  these  objects  of  knowledge  reduce  to  two  classes 
abstract  ideas  and  matters  of  fact. 

To  the  knowledge  relating  to  ideas  merely  belong 
all  abstract  thinking  and  such  sciences  as  logic  and 
mathematics,  since  mathematics  concerns  things  only 
so  far  as  they  conform  to  our  ideas.  To  the  knowl- 
edge of  matters  of  fact  belong,  i,  the  knowledge  of 
existences,  our  own  existence,  which  we  know  by  in- 
tuition, and  the  existence  of  God,  which  we  know  by 
demonstration,  and  the  existence  of  external  .objects, 
which  we  know  by  the  testimony  of  our  senses  and 
by  our  memory.  To  this  class  of  knowable  objects 
belong,  2,  the  knowledge  of  the  co-existence  of  quali- 
ties in  objects  perceived  by  our  senses,  and  some  few 
other  connections  between  objects  and  between  quali- 
ties of  the  same  object.  But  all  knowledge  relating 
to  matters  of  fact  is  particular,  not  general  ;  hence 
there  is  no  science  of  matters  of  fact,  no  "  science  of 
bodies  ;"  or,  to  put  the  matter  in  another  way,  we 
can  make  certain  and  universal  propositions  only 
where  the  connection  of  the  ideas  asserted  by  the 
proposition  is  clearly  and  infallibly  perceived  ;  but  it 
is  only  in  the  case  of  such  ideas  as  the  mind  forms 
itself  in  abstraction  from  existences  that  such  certain 
and  universal  connection  can  be  perceived  ;  with 
matters  of  fact,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  no  certain 
knowledge  going  beyond  existences,  and  we  can  make 


LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.     17 

only  particular  propositions  ;  and,  since  there  can  be 
scientific  knowledge  only  where  we  can  make  uni- 
versal propositions,  there  is  no  science  of  nature. 

The  reason  for  this  limited  extent  of  our  Knmvledge 
relating  to  matters  of  fact  is  the  empirical  origin  and 
conditions  of  human  knowledge.  Since  simple  ideas 
are  the  ultimate  elements  and  beginning  of  our  knowl- ' 
edge,  and  we  are  absolutely  dependent  upon  experi- 
ence in  having  these  ideas,  knowledge  itself  is  de- 
pendent very  largely  upon  experience  for  its  validity 
and  extent.  Take,  for  example,  our  knowledge  of 
substance.  What  knowledge  do  we  actually  possess, 
either  of  material  substance,  or  immaterial  or  think-' 
ing  substance  ?  The  true  account  of  our  idea  of 
material  substance  appears  to  be  this  :  the  mind  takes 
notice  that  a  certain  number  of  those  simple  ideas 
it  has  by  sensation  go  constantly  together,  "  and,  not 
imagining  how  these  simple  ideas  can  subsist  of  them- 
selves, we  accustom  ourselves  to  suppose  some  sub- 
stratum wherein  they  do  subsist,  and  from  which  they 
result ;"  but  now  of  this  substratum  what  idea  have 
we  but  the  confused  idea  of  a  something,  we  know 
not  what  support  of  qualities  ?  and  though  to  that 
complex  of  ideas,  or  to  those  co-existing  qualities  of 
which  we  have  ideas,  we  do  and  must  add  this  sup- 
position of  a  substratum  or  support,  our  actual  knowl- 
edge reaches  no  farther  than  the  qualities  themselves,, 
and  the  relations  we  have  learned  by  experience  as 
existing  between  them. 

Again,  what  is  our  knowledge  of  cause,  or  of  the 
connection  of  things  as  cause  and  effect  ?  I  know 
with  intuitive  certainty  that  whatever  comes  to  be  % 


i8      LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

must  have  a  cause.  I  may  know  from  internal  expe- 
rience that  a  cause  is  power  or  efficiency,  but  beyond 
the  particular  connections  of  cause  and  effect  which 
I  have  observed  and  now  perceive,  what  knowledge 
of  causation  do  I  possess  that  is  certain  and  universal  ? 
And  of  objects  themselves,  is  not  our  certain  knowl- 
edge limited  to  experience  ?  Since  I  do  not  know  on 
what  those  qualities  which  make  my  idea  of  a  thing — 
say  a  piece  of  gold — depend,  and  since  the  existence 
of  those  qualities  now  does  not  necessarily  follow 
from  their  existence  in  the  past,  nor  does  it  make 
necessary  their  continued  existence  ;  and  further, 
since  the  qualities  whose  co-existence  constitute  the 
piece  of  gold  as  known,  have,  so  far  as  I  can  perceive, 
no  necessary  connection  with  each  other,  nor  do  I 
know  that  other  qualities  may  not  co-exist  with  them, 
my  actual  knowledge  of  the  particular  substance  is 
narrowly  limited  :  all  that  I  certainly  know  is,  that 
this  particular  group  of  qualities  has  existed  at  such 
times  in  the  past  as  I  or  others  can  remember,  and 
exists  now  while  I  or  others  are  having  perceptions 
of  it. 

Once  more,  let  me  instance  our  idea  of  God.  Of 
the  existence  of  such  a  being  I  am  certain  ;  it  is  de- 
monstrable that  God  exists  from  the  fact  that  I  exist. 
But  what  is  our  possible  knowledge  of  God,  unaided 
by  revelation  ?  What  do  we  know  of  the  nature  and 
mode  of  existence  of  such  a  being  ?  "  If  we  examine 
the  idea  we  have  of  this  incomprehensible  Supreme 
Being,  we  shall  find  that  the  complex  idea  we  have  of 
God  is  made  of  simple  ideas  we  receive  from  reflec- 
tion ;  namely,  having  from  what  we  experience  in  our- 


LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY,     it) 

selves  got  the  ideas  of  existence  and  duration,  of 
knowledge  and  power,  of  pleasure  and  happiness,  and 
of  several  other  qualities  and  powers,  when  we  would 
frame  an  idea  the  most  suitable  we  can  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  we  enlarge  every  one  of  these  with  our  idea  of 
infinity,  and  so  make  our  complex  idea  of  God." 


If  we  have  succeeded  in  exhibiting  in  its  essential 
features  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge,  we  are  in  a/ 
position  to  form  a  judgment  respecting  the  influence 
Locke  has  exerted  upon  subsequent  philosophy,  and 
to  determine  the  direction  in  which  Locke's  philoso- 
phy legitimately  leads.  It  is  obvious  that  this  theory 
of  knowledge  holds  in  solution  elements  not  readily 
adjusted,  if  they  are  indeed  not  radically  opposed. 

The  only  question  is,  whether  Locke's  explanation 
of  human  knowledge,  if  made  consistent,  does  not 
issue  in  the  philosophical  skepticism  of  Hume,  and 
perhaps,  as  consistently,  in  the  sensualistic  doctrine 
of  Condillac  and  his  followers.  The  prevailing  judg- 
ment is,  no  doubt,  that  Hume  is  the  true  successor  of 
Locke,  —  Berkeley's  immaterialism  forming  a  transition 
stage. 

We  cannot  share  this  view  of  Locke's  position  in 
the  development  of  modern  philosophy.  We  by  no 
means  wish  to  deny  Locke's  profound  influence  upon 
the  philosophers  who  trace  their  lineage  to  him  ;  but 
we  do  not  think  the  only  consistent  interpretation  of 
Locke's  teaching  leads  to  the  philosophy  of  Hume  or 
to  that  of  the  French  materialistic  school.  Hume's 
reduction  of  mind  to  the  series  of  fleeting  states  and 
their  fading  copies  as  ideas,  with  a  denial  of  all 


20     /LOCKE'S  POSITION  IN  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  self,  and  of  an  exter- 

^r(al  world,  and  of  an  Absolute  Being,  is  no  legitimate 
outcome  of  Locke's  empiricism  ;  such  a  nihilism  is 
reached  only  by  ignoring  or  distorting  the  psycholog- 
ical basis  of  Locke's  system.  I  Locke  at  the  outset 

.  clearly  presupposes  and  recogmzes  the  reality  of  mind 
as  something  which  is  not  the  product  of  experience. 
Of  the  existence  of  the  self  as  a  thinking  being,  we 
have,  according  to  Locke,  intuitive  arid  necessary 
knowledge.  Locke  could  well  assent  to  Des  Cartes' 
"  cogito,  ergo  sum."  And  likewise,  in-  respect  to  the 
reality  of  an  external  world  or  a  not-self,  despite  his 
naive  and  indefensible  realism,  Locke  remains  true  to 
the  psychological  fact  that  we  do  not  and  cannot  rest 
satisfied  with  our  merely  suggestive  states — the  sense 

,  data  ;  but  we  postulate  a  reality  that4&  independent 
of  our  ideas,  and  to  which  our  ideas  must  correspond 
if  they  are  to  be  anything  more  than  fictions  of  the 
imagination.  Locke  teaches  that  the  existence  of  an 

.  external  world  is  inseparable  from  thejdeas  we  have 
of  it,  and  therein  he  is  true  to  a  fundamental  d£liver,- 
ance  of  consciousness.  \fa6Qw83  ^M^T^Ji 

It  is  this  basis  of  psychological  fact  thatHume 
does  not  accept  in  its  integrity,  but  takes  merely  the 
conscious  state  or  feeling  without  its  implicate  of  a 
subject  and  a  something  not  the  psychical  state  as 
the  object.  Now  Locke,  notwithstanding  his  limita- 
tion of  knowledge  respecting  the  self  and  external 
objects,  teaches  plainly  that  both  subject  and  object 
are  implicated  as  real  existences  in  the  simplest  act 
of  knowledge.  It  cannot,  we  think,  be  opposed  to 
this  interpretation  of  Locke,  that  he  reduces  the  work 


I 


LOCKE  S    POSITION    IN    MODERN    PHILOSOPHY.       21 

of  mind  to  the  passive  reception  of  impressions  and 
the  mere  uniting  of  ideas  to  form  knowledge.  Such 
an  interpretation  of  Locke's  doctrine  of  ideas  is  pos- 
sible only  by  converting  Locke's  metaphors  into  facts.1 
What  Locke  teaches  in  this  direction  is  the  fact  that 
the  individual  mind  is  absolutely  dependent  upon 
sense  experience  for  its  earliest  ideas  as  the  beginning 
and  elements  of  knowledge.  If  in  this  part  of  the 
Essay  Locke  represents  the  mind  as  passive  and  re- 
ceptive only,  such  language  should  be  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  abundant  and  explicit  statement 
elsewhere,  that  the  mind  exercises  powers  peculiar  t 
itself  and  is  in  all  actual  knowledge  original  an 
creative. 

Should  it  be  urged  that  such  functions  of  mind  are 
not  possible  if  Locke's  empirical  explanation  of  knowl- 
edge is  to  be  taken  in  earnest  and  carried  to  its  con- 
sistent issue,  it  may  with  more  justice  to  him  be  re- 
plied, we  are  bound  to  make  Locke's  empiricism  con- 
sistent with  his  explicit  recognition  of  essentially  a 
priori  or  non-empirical  factors  in  knowledge  ;  and,  if 
so,  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge  may  lead  us  in  quite  / 
a  different  direction  from  that  taken  by  Hume.  We 
suggest  that  the  direction  in  which  we  may  seek  a 
more  consequent  issue  of  Locke's  philosophy,  when 
interpreted  from  its  aim  and  prevailing  spirit,  is  the 
critical  philosophy  of  Kant. 

The  problem  of  Kant's  philosophy  was  really  an- 
ticipated by  Locke.  Kant's  more  special  problem,  to! 
determine  the  possibility,  the  conditions,  and  the  ex-| 
tent  of  knowledge  that  is  independent  of  exp^r'*"™^ 
becomes,  in  Kant's  solution  of  it,  the  more  general 


22        LOCKE  S   POSITION    IN    MODERN    PHILOSOPHY. 

problem  of  Locke,  viz.,  to  determine  the  certainty 
and  the_  extent  of  human  knowledge.  And  however 
widely  Kant's  method  departs  from  the  method  of 
Locke,  and  however  profound  the  differences  are  that 
separate  in  some  respects  the  critical  idealism  of 
Kant  from  the  nai've  and  hardly  consistent  realism  of 
Locke,  the  two  philosophers  reach  conclusions  so 
much  in  agreement  respecting  the  empirical  condi- 
tions and  limits  of  human  knowledge,  as  to  justify 
the  assertion  that  it  is  toward  Kant  and  critical  phil- 
osophy, rather  than  toward  Hurne  and  his  successors, 
that  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge  legitimately  tends. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


We  present  the  bibliography  relating  to  Locke's  life 
and  his  writings  in  the  following  scheme  : 

A.— LOCKE'S  WRITINGS. 

/.  Philosophical  Writings. 

1.  "An  Epitome  of  the  Essay  Concerning  Human  Un- 
derstanding," prepared  at  the  request  of  Le  Clerc,  in  the 
autumn  of  1687,  and  published  in  the  "  Bibliotheque  Uni- 
verselle  "   for  June,   1688.     The  original   manuscript  of 
this  "  Epitome  "  is  still  in  existence.     A  number  of  copies 
of  the  "  Epitome  "  were  printed  separately  for  friends  of 
Locke,  but  only  one  of  these  is  extant. 

2.  "  The   Essay  Concerning   Human   Understanding. 
Locke's  manuscript  of  the  first  edition  was  sent  to  the 
press  in  May,  1689,  and  the  work  was  issued  from  the 
press  probably  in  March  of  the  following  year.     Three 
subsequent  editions  were  published  during  the  lifetime 
of   Locke ;   the  second  edition,  containing  a  number  of 
changes,  was  issued  in   1694 ;  the  third  edition  in  1695, 
and  the  fourth  in  the  autumn  of  1699.     This  last  edition 
contained   two   additional   chapters:   the   chapter  upon 
Enthusiasm  and  the  one  upon  Association  of  Ideas  ;  and 
besides  these  additions  the  chapter  upon  Power  had  been 
rewritten.     A  F~~nch  version  of  the  Essay  was  executed 
by  Pierre  Costa,  a  friend  of  Le  Clerc  and  of  Locke,  and 
published  at  Amsterdam  in  1700,  with  the  title,  "Essai 
Philosophique  concernant  1'Entendement,  ou  Ton  mon- 
tre  quelle  est  1'Entendue  de  nos  Connaissances  certaines 
et  la  Maniere  dont  nous  y  parvenons."     In  1701  a  Latin 
version  of  the   Essay,  which  had  been  begun  by  Bur- 

23 


24  BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

bridge  in  1695,  was  published  in  London  under  the  title, 
"  De  Intellectu  Humano." 

Subsequent  editions  of  the  Essay  appeared  in  1723, 
1729,  1742,  1750,  1755,  1758,  1774.  Up  to  the  present  time 
upwards  of  forty  editions  of  the  Essay  have  been  pub- 
lished, besides  numerous  translations  in  French,  German, 
and  Dutch. 

3.  "  Essay  on  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding."     A 
writing  intended  by  Locke  to  form  a  chapter  in  the  fourth 
edition  of  the  Essay,  but  left  by  him  incomplete,  and  pub- 
lished probably  by  his  cousin,  Peter  King,  in  1706. 

4.  "  Letters   in   Reply  to   Stillingfleet,    the  Bishop  of 
Worcester."     There  were  three  of  these  letters,  and  they 
were  a  vindication   of   Locke's   doctrine  of  knowledge 
against  the  criticisms  that  the  Bishop  of  Worcester  had 
directed  against  the  Essay ;  these  letters  were  published 
between  the  years  1692  and  1699,  and  two  of  them  have 
been  incorporated  in  some  editions  of  the  Essay. 

II.  Ethical  and  Theological  Writings. 

1.  Small  essay  in  Latin,  written  in  1661. 

2.  An  unpublished  essay  on  Toleration,  1666. 

3.  "  Epistola  de  Tolerantia,"  written  in  Holland,  1685, 
addressed  to  Locke's  friend  Limborch,  and  published  at 
London  in  1689. 

4.  Three  writings,  under  the  same  English  title,  were 
published  in  1690,  1692,  and  1706;  the  last  is  only  a  frag- 
ment. 

5.  "  The  Reasonableness  of  Christianity  as  delivered  in 
the  Scriptures,"  published  in  1695.     Two  vindications  of 
this  treatise  were  published  in  the  years  1695  and  1697. 

6.  "  A  discourse  on  Miracles,"  1706. 

7.  "  Paraphrases  and  Notes  on  the  Epistles  of  St.  Paul 
to  the  Galatians,  First  and  Second  Corinthians,  Romans, 
and  Ephesians,"  1705-7. 

\JlIL  Political  Writings. 

1.  Two  Treatises  on  Government,  1690. 

2.  "The  Fundamental  Constitutions  of  Carolina,"  1720. 

3.  "  Some  Considerations  on  the  Economy  of  Lowering 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  25 

the  Rate  of  Interest  and  Raising  the  Value  of  Money," 
1691. 

4.  "  For  Encouraging  the  Coining  of  Silver  Money," 
1695. 

3.  "  Further  Considerations  Concerning  Raising  the 
Value  of  Money,"  1695. 

IV.   Miscellaneous  Writings. 

1.  "Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Education,"  1693. 

2.  "  Memoirs  Relating  to   the   Life  of  Anthony,  first 
Earl  of  Shaftesbury,"  1720. 

3.  "  Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Reading,"  1720. 

V.  Correspondence. 

1.  "Some   Familiar   Letters   between   Mr.  Locke  and 
Several  of  his  Friends ;  Containing  Forty-three  Letters 
from  Locke  to  Limborch." 

2.  "  Letters  from  Locke  ;  "  in  Remonstrants'  Library, 
Amsterdam,  nearly  all  written  in  Latin. 

3.  "  Original  Letters  of  Locke,  Algernon  Sidney,  and 
Anthony.    Earl   of   Shaftesbury."     A  second   edition   of 
these  Letters  was  published  in   1847,  but  they  are  not 
known  to  be  extant. 

4.  "  Letters  from  Relations  and  Friends."    Containing 
letters  of  Locke  to  Estha  Masham.     Letters  now  in  pos- 
session of  Miss  Palmer. 

5.  "  Letters  to  Lord  King." 

6.  "Collection  Letters."     In  possession  of  Mr.  Sanford 
Nynehead. 

7.  "  Correspondence."     In  possession  of  Lord  Lovelace. 

B. — ON  THE  LIFE  AND  WRITINGS  OF  LOCKE. 
/.  Biographical. 

i.  Earliest  account  of  Locke's  life,  "  Eloge  de  Monsieur 
Locke."  Published  by  his  friend,  Jean  Le  Clerc,  in  the 
Biblioth&que  Choisie,  in  1705.  This  Eloge  was  little 
more  than  a  translation  of  two  letters  that  had  been,  sent 
to  Le  Clerc,  one  written  by  the  third  Earl  of  Shaftesbury, 


26  BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

the  other  by  Lady  Masham.  A  version  of  the  Eloge  was 
published  in  London  in  1706.  This  brief  account  of 
Locke's  life  was  re-written  by  Bishop  Low,  with  some  ad- 
ditions, for  the  edition  of  "  Locke's  Works,"  edited  and 
published  by  him  in  1777. 

2.  "  The  Life  of  John  Locke,  with  Extracts  from  His 
Correspondence,  Journals,  and  Commonplace  Books,"  by 
Lord  King,  in  1830.     This  work  contains  hardly  any  bio- 
graphical matter  not  contained  in  Le  Clerc's  Eloge. 

3.  "The  Life  of  John  Locke,"  by  Fox  Bourne,  in  two 
volumes.     New  York:  Harper  &  Brothers,   1876.     This 
work  is  the  first  attempt  at  a  full  and  systematic  biog- 
raphy of  Locke. 

4.  "  Locke,"  by  Thomas  Fowler.     English  Men  of  Let- 
ters Series.     New  York:  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1883;  an  ad- 
mirable account  of  Locke's  life  and  his  principal  writings. 

5.  "  Locke,"   by   Alexander   Campbell    Fraser,    Black- 
wood's  Philosophical  Classics.      Philadelphia:  J.  B.  Lip- 
pincott  Company.   1890.     Article  by  the  same  author  in 
"Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  vol.  XIV. 

//.  Lacke's  Collected  Writings. 

There  is  as  yet  no  adequate  edition  of  Locke's  works. 
The  edition  published  by  Bishop  Low  in  1771  is  still  the 
best. 

Upon  the  Essay  the  following  references  are  given  : 
T.  H.  Green's  "  Philosophical  Works,"  Vol.  I.  "  Intro- 
duction to  Hume's  Philosophical  Works,"  by  the  same 
author.  The  two  volumes  already  referred  to  upon 
"  Locke,"  the  one  by  Thomas  Fowler,  and  the  other  by 
Campbell  Fraser.  A  chapter  in  Cousin's  "  Histoire  de  la 
Philosophic,  au  XVIII.  siecle,  Ecole  sensualiste,  systeme 
de  Locke."  Webb's  "  Intellectualism  of  Locke."  Leib- 
nitz's "  Nouveaux  Essais  sur  1'Entendement  Humain." 
Sections  relating  to  Locke  in  the  following  Histories  of 
Philosophy:  Ueberweg,  "Geschichte  der  Philosophic;" 
Erdmann,  "Geschichte  der  Philosophic;"  Falconberg, 
"  Geschichte  der  Neuen  Philosophic  ;  "  Kuno  Fischer, 
"  Bacon  und  seine  Nachfolger,'' 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE  AS  CONTAINED 

IN   THE    "ESSAY   CONCERNING 

HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING." 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE. 


EPISTLE  TO  THE  READER  AND  INTRODUCTION. 

Occasion,  Purpose,  and  Plan  of  the  Essay. 

WERE  it  fit  to  trouble  thee  with  the  history  of  this 
Essay,  I  should  tell  thee,  that  five  or  six  friends,  meet- 
ing at  my  chamber,  and  discoursing  on  a  subject  very 
remote  from  this,  found  themselves  quickly  at  a  stand 
by  the  difficulties  that  rose  on  every  side.  After  we 
had  awhile  puzzled  ourselves,  without  coming  any 
nearer  a  resolution  of  those  doubts  which  perplexed 
us,  it  came  into  my  thoughts,  that  we  took  a  wrong 
course  ;  and  thatj  before  we  set  ourselves  upon  in- 
quiries of  that  nature,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  our 
own  abilities,  and  see  what  objects  our  understandings 
were  or  were  not  fitted  to  deal  with.  This  I  proposed 
to  the  company,  who  all  readily  assented  ;  and  there- 
upon it  was  agreed,  that  this  should  be  our  first  in- 
quiry. Some  hasty  and  undigested  thoughts,  on  a 
subject  I  had  never  before  considered,  which  I  set 
down  against  our  next  meeting,  gave  the  first  entrance 
into  this  discourse,  which,  having  been  thus  begun  by 
chance,  was  continued  by  entreaty  ;  written  by  inco- 
herent parcels  ;  and,  after  long  intervals  of  neglect, 
resumed  again,  as  my  humor  or  occasions  permitted  ; 
and  at  last,  in  a  retirement,  where  an  attendance  on 

29 


30  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE. 

my  health  gave  me  leisure,  it  was  brought  into  that 
order  thou  now  seest  it. 

This  was  that  which  gave  the  first  rise  to  this  Essay 
concerning  the  Understanding.  For  I  thought  that 
the  first  step  towards  satisfying  several  inquiries  the 
mind  of  man  was  very  apt  to  run  into,  was,  to  take  a 
survey  of  our  own  understandings,  examine  our  own 
powers,  and  see  to  what  things  they  were  adapted. 

2.  Design. — This,  therefore,  being  my  purpose,  to 
inquire  into  the  original,  certainty,  and  extent  of 
human  knowledge,  together  with  the  grounds  and  de- 
grees of  belief,  opinion  and  assent,  I  shall  not  at  pres- 
ent meddle  with  the  physical  consideration  of  the 
mind,  or  trouble  myself  to  examine  wherein  its  essence 
consists,  or  by  what  motions  of  our  spirits,  or  altera- 
tions of  our  bodies,  we  come  to  have  any  sensation 
by  our  organs,  or  any  ideas  in  our  understandings  ; 
and  whether  those  ideas  do,  in  their  formation,  any  or 
all  of  them,  depend  on  matter  or  no  ;  these  are  spec- 
ulations which,  however  curious  and  entertaining,  I 
shall  decline,  as  lying  out  of  my  way  in  the  design  I 
am  now  upon.  It  shall  suffice  to  my  present  purpose, 
to  consider  the  discerning  faculties  of  a  man  as  they 
are  employed  about  the  objects  which  they  have  to 
do.  In  order  whereunto,  I  shall  pursue  this  following 
method  : — 

i  First,  I  shall  inquire  into  the  original  of  those  ideas, 
notions,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to  call  them, 
which  a  man  observes,  and  is  conscious  to  himself  he 
has  in  his  mind,  and  the  ways  whereby  the  under- 
standing comes  to  be  furnished  with  them. 

Secondly,  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  what  knowledge 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  31 

the  understanding  hath  by  those  ideas,  and  the  cer- 
L  \  tainty,  evidence,  and  extent  of  it. 

Thirdly,  I  shall  make  some  inquiry  into  the  nature 
and  grounds   of  faith   or  opinion  ;  whereby  I  mean, 
;      that  assent  which  we  give  to  any  proposition  as  true, 
)  •  of  whose  truth  yet  we  have  no  certain  knowledge : 
and  here  we  shall  have  occasion  to  examine  the  rea- 
sons and  degrees  of  assent. 


'UNI7ERSIT7, 

&4f'T«m«lri\V£ 


32  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  I. 


THE    ORIGIN     OF    IDEAS    AS    THE    ELEMENTS    OR 
MATERIALS    OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE. 

Before  I  proceed  on  to  what  I  have  thought  on  this 
subject,  I  must  here,  in  the  entrance,  beg  pardon  of 
my  reader  for  the  frequent  use  of  the  word  "  idea" 
which  he  will  find  in  the  following  treatise.  It  being 
that  term  which,  I  think,  serves  best  to  stand  for  what- 
soever is  the  object  of  the  understanding  when  a  man 
thinks,  I  have  used  it  to  express  whatever  is  meant  by 
phantasm,  notion,  species,  or  whatever  it  is  which  the 
mind  can  be  employed  about  in  thinking  ;  and  I  could 
not  avoid  frequently  using  it. 

I  presume  it  will  be  easily  granted  me,  that  there 
are  such  ideas  in  men's  minds.  Every  one  is  conscious 
of  them  in  himself  ;  and  men's  words  and  actions  will 
satisfy  him  that  they  are  in  others. 

Our  first  inquiry,  then,  shall  be,  how  they  come  into 
the  mind. 

Our  Ideas  not  Innate. 

It  is  an  established  opinion  among  some  men,  that 
there  are  in  the  understanding  certain  innate  princi- 
ples ;  some  primary  notions,  KOivai  evvoiai,  charac- 
ters, as  it  were,  stamped  upon  the  mind  of  man,  which 
the  soul  receives  in  its  very  first  being,  and  brings  into 
the  world  with  it.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  convince 


CH.  I.,  II.]        THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  33 

unprejudiced  readers  of  the  falseness  of  this  supposi- 
tion, if  I  should  only  show  (as  I  hope  I  shall  in  the 
following  parts  of  this  discourse)  how  men,  X^irely  by 
the  use  of  their  natural  faculties,  may  attain  to  alj  the 
knowledge  they  have,  without- the  help  of  any  innate 
impressions,  and  may  arrive  at  certainty  without  any 
such  original  notions  or  principles.  There  is  nothing 
more  commonly  taken  for  granted,  than  that  there  are 
certain  principles,  both  speculative  and  practical  (for 
they  speak  of  both),  universally  agreed  upon  by  all 
mankind  ;  which  therefore,  they  argue,  must  needs  be 
constant  impressions  which  the  souls  of  men  receive 
in  their  first  beings,  and  which  they  bring  into  the 
world  with  them,  as  necessarily  and  really  as  they  do 
any  of  their  inherent  faculties. 

This  argument,  drawn  from  universal  consent,  has 
this  misfortune  in  it,  that  if  it  were  true  in  matter  of 
fact,  that  there  were  certain  truths  wherein  all  man- 
kind agreed,  it  would  not  prove  them  innate,  if  there 
can  be  any  other  way  shown,  how  men  may  come  t© 
that  universal  agreement  in  the  things  they  do  consent 
in;  which  I  presume  may  be  done. 

But  yet  I  take  liberty  to  say,  that  these  propositions 
are  so  far  from  having  an  universal  assent,  that  there 
are  a  great  part  of  mankind  to  whom  they  are  not  so 
much  as  known. 

No  proposition  can  be  said  to  be  in  the  mind  which 
it  never  yet  knew,  which  it  was  never  yet  conscious  of. 
For  if  any  one,  may,  then,  by  the  same  reason,  all  pro- 
positions that  are  true,  and  the  mind  is  capable  ever 
of  assenting  to,  may  be  said  to  be  in  the  mind,  and  to 
be  imprinted. 


34  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  I. 

To  avoid  this,  it  is  usually  answered,  that  all  men 
know  and  assent  to  them,  when  they  come  to  the  use 
of  reason  ;  I  answer,  If  reason  discovered  them,  that 
would  not  prove  them  innate. 

But  how  can  men  think  the  use  of  reason  necessary 
to  discover  principles  that  are  supposed  to  be  innate, 
when  reason  (if  we  may  believe  them)  is  nothing  else 
but  the  faculty  of  deducing  unknown  truths  from 
principles  or  propositions  that  are  already  known  ? 
That  certainly  can  never  be  thought  innate  which 
we  have  need  of  reason  to  discover,  unless,  as  I  have 
said,  we  will  have  all  the  certain  truths  that  reason 
ever  teaches  us  to  be  innate.  There  is  this  farther 
argument  in  it  against  these  ideas  being  innate  that 
these  characters,  if  they  were  native  and  original  im- 
pressions, should  appear  fairest  and  clearest  in  those 
persons  in  whom  yet  we  find  no  footsteps  of  them  ; 
and  it  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  strong  presumption  that 
they  are  not  innate,  since  they  are  least  known  to 
those  in  whom,  if  they  were  innate,  they  must  needs 
exert  themselves  with  most  force  and  vigor.  For  chil- 
dren, idiots,  savages,  and  illiterate  people,  being  of 
all  others  the  least  corrupted  by  custom  or  borrowed 
opinions  ;  learning  and  education  having  not  cast 
their  native  thoughts  into  new  moulds,  nor  by  super- 
inducing foreign  and  studied  doctrines  confounded 
those  fair  characters  nature  had  written  there  ;  one 
might  reasonably  imagine,  that  in  their  minds  these 
innate  notions  should  be  open  fairly  to  every  one's 
view,  as  it  is  certain  the  thoughts  of  children  do. 


BK.  II.— CH.  I.]   THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  35 


THE  SOURCE  OF  OUR  IDEAS. 

Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind  to  be,  as  we  say,  white 
paper,  void  of  all  characters,  without  any  ideas;  how 
comes  it  to  be  furnished  ?  Whence  comes  it  by  that 
vast  store,  which  the  busy  and  boundless  fancy  of 
man  has  painted  on  it  with  an  almost  endless  variety  ? 
Whence  has  it  all  the  materials  of  reason  and  knowl- 
ledge  ?  To  this  I  answer,  in  one  word,  From  experi- 
ence: in  that  all  our  knowledge  is  founded,  and  from 
that  it  ultimately  derives  itself.  Our  observation, 
employed  either  about  external  sensible  objects,  or 
about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  perceived 
and  reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  that  which  supplies 
our  understandings  with  all  the  materials  of  thinking. 
These  two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge,  from 
whence  all  the  ideas  we  have,  or  can  naturally  have, 
do  spring. 

First.  Our  senses,  conversant  about  particular  sen- 
sible objects,  do  convey  into  the  mind  several  distinct 
perceptions  of  things,  according  to  those  various  ways 
wherein  those  objects  do  affect  them;  and  thus  we 
come  by  those  ideas  we  have  of  yellow,  white,  heat, 
cold,  soft,  hard,  bitter,  sweet,  and  all  those  which  we 
call  sensible  qualities;  which  when  I  say  the  senses 
convey  into  the  mind,  I  mean,  they  from  external  ob- 
jects convey  into  the  mind  what  produces  there  those 
perceptions.  This  great  source  of  most  of  the  ideas 


36  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

we  have,  depending  wholly  upon  our  senses,  and  de- 
rived by  them  to  the  understanding,  I  call  "  sensation." 
/  Secondly.  The  other  fountain,  from  which  experi- 
ence furnisheth  the  understanding  with  ideas,  is  the 
perception  of  the  operations  of  our  own  minds  within 
us,  as  it  is  employed  about  the  ideas  it  has  g£rt;  which 
operations,  when  the  soul  comes  to  reflect  on  and  con- 
sider, do  furnish  the  understanding  with  another  set 
of  ideas  which  could  not  be  had  from  things  without; 
and  such  are  perception,  thinking,  doubting,  believing,  / 
reasoning,  knowing,  willing,  and  all  the  different 
actings  of  our  own  minds  which  we,  being  conscious 
of,  and  observing  in  others,  do  from  these  receive  into 
our  understandings  as  distinct  ideas,  as  we  do  from 
bodies  affecting  our  senses.  This  source  of  ideas 
tvery  man  has  wholly  in  himself;  and  though  it  be 
not  sense  as  having  nothing  to  do  with  external  ob- 
jects, yet  it  is  very  like  it,  and  might  properly  enough 
be  called  "  internal  sense."  But  as  I  call  the  other 
"  sensation,"  so  I  call  this  "  reflection,"  the  ideas  it 
affords  being  such  only  as  the  mrncTgets  by  reflecting 
on  its  own  operations  within  itself.  By  reflection, ;.  • 
then,  in  the  following  part  of  this  discourse,  I  would 
be  understood  to  mean  that  notice  which  the  mind 
takes  of  its  own  operations,  and  the  manner  of  them, 
by  reason  whereof  there  come  to  be  ideas  of  these 
operations  in  the  understanding.  These  two,  I  say, 
viz.,  external  material  things  as  the  objects  of  sensa- 
tion, and  the  operations  of  our  own  minds  within  as 
the  objects  of  reflection,  are,  to  me,  the  only  originals 
from  whence  all  our  ideas  take  their  beginnings.  The 
term  "operations"  here,  I  use  in  a  large  sense,  as 


CH.  I.,  II.]        THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  37 

comprehending  not  barely  the  actions  of  the  mind 
about  its  ideas,  but  some  sort  of  passions  arising  some- 
times from  them,  such  as  is  the  satisfaction  or  uneasi- 
ness arising  from  any  thought. 

I  see  no  reason  therefore  to  believe  that  the  soul 
thinks  before  the  senses  have  furnished  it  with  ideas 
to  think  on;  and  as  those  are  increased  and  retained, 
so  it  comes  by  exercise  to  improve  its  faculty  of 
thinking  in  the  several  parts  of  it;  as  well  as  after- 
wards, by  compounding  those  ideas  and  reflecting  on 
its  own  operations,  it  increases  its  stock,  as  well  as 
facility  in  remembering,  imagining,  reasoning,  and 
other  modes  of  thinking. 

Thus  the  first  capacity  of  human  intellect  is,  that 
the  mind  is  fitted  to  receive  the  impressions  made  on 
it,  either  through  the  senses  by  outward  objects,  or  by 
its  own  operations  when  it  reflects  on  them.  This  is 
the  first  step  a  man  makes  towards  the  discovery  of 
any  thing,  and  the  ground-work  whereon  to  build  all 
those  notions  which  ever  he  shall  have  naturally  in 
this  world. 

All  those  sublime  thoughts  which  tower  above  the 
clouds  and  reach  as  high  as  heaven  itself,  take  their 
rise  and  footing  here:  in  all  that  great  extent  wherein 
the  mind  wanders  in  those  remote  speculations  it  may 
seern  to  be  elevated  with,  it  stirs  not  one  jot  beyond 
those  ideas  which  sense  or  reflection  have  offered  for 
its  contemplation. 

In  this  part  the  understanding  is  merely  passive; 
and  whether  or  no  it  will  have  these  beginnings  and, 
as  it  were,  materials  of  knowledge,  is  not  in  its  own 
power.  For  the  objects  of  our  senses  do  many  of 


38  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

them  obtrude  their  particular  ideas  upon  our  minds 
whether  we  will  or  no,  and  the  operations  of  our 
minds  will  not  let  us  be  without  at  least  some  obscure, 
notions  of  them.  When  the  understanding  is  once 
stored  with  these  simple  ideas,  it  has  the  power  to 
repeat,  compare,  and  unite  them,  even  to  an  almost 
infinite  variety,  and  so  can  make  at  pleasure  new  com- 
plex ideas.  But  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  most 
exalted  wit  or  enlarged  understanding,  by  any  quick- 
ness or  variety  of  thoughts,  to  invent  or  frame  one 
new  simple  idea  in  the  mind,  not  taken  in  by  the  ways 
before  mentioned;  nor  can  any  force  of  the  under- 
standing destroy  those  that  are  there, 


CH.  II.,  XII.]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  39 


CLASSIFICATION    OF   IDEAS. 

The  better  to  understand  the  nature,  manner,  and 
extent  of  our  knowledge,  one  thing  is  carefully  to  be 
observed  concerning  the  ideas  we  have  ;  and  that  is, 
that  some  of  them  are  simple,  and  some  complex. 

Though  the  qualities  that  affect  our  senses  are,  in> 
the  things  themselves,  so  united  and  blended  that  • 
there  is  no  separation,  no  distance  between  them;  yet 
it  is  plain  the  ideas  they  produce  in  the  mind  enter  by 
the  senses  simple  and  unmixed.  For  though  the  sight 
and  touch  often  take  in  from  the  same  object  at  the 
same  time  different  ideas — as  a  man  sees  at  once  mo- 
tion and  color,  the  hand  feels  softness  and  warmth  in 
the  same  piece  of  wax — yet  the  simple  ideas  thus 
united  in  the  same  subject  are  as  perfectly  distinct  as 
those  that  come  in  by  different  senses  ;  the  coldness 
and  hardness  which  a  man  feels  in  a  piece  of  ice  being 
as  distinct  ideas  in  the  mind  as  the  smell  and  white- 
ness of  a  lily,  or  as  the  taste  of  sugar  and  smell  of  a 
rose  :  and  there  is  nothing  can  be  plainer  to  a  man 
than  the  clear  and  distinct  perception  he  has  of  those 
simple  ideas  ;  which,  being  each  in  itself  uncom- 
pounded,  contains  in  it  nothing  but  one  uniform  ap- 
pearance or  conception  in  the  mind,  and  is  not  distin- 
guishable into  different  ideas. 

As  simple  ideas  are  observed  to  exist  in  several 
combinations  united  together,  so  the  mind  has  a 


4O  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

power  to  consider  several  of  them  united  together  as 
One  idea  ;  and  that  not  only  as  they  are  united  in 

•— — ^. 

external  object,  but  as  itself  has  joined  them.  Ideas 
thus  made  up  of  several  simple  ones  put  together  I 
call  "  complex  ;"  such  as  are  beauty,  gratitude,  a  man, 
an  army,  the  universe  ;  which,  though  complicated  of 
various  simple  ideas  or  complex  ideas  made  up  of  sim- 
ple ones,  yet  are,  when  the  mind  pleases,  considered 
each  by  itself  as  one  entire  thing,  and  signified  by  one 
name. 

The  better  to  conceive  the  ideas  we  receive  from 
sensation,  it  may  not  be  amiss  for  us  to  consider  them 
in  reference  to  the  different  ways  whereby  they  make 
their  approaches  to  our  minds,  and  make  themselves 
perceivable  by  us. 

First,  then,  there  are  some  which  come  into  our 
minds  by  one  sense  only. 

Secondly.  There  are  others  that  convey  themselves 
into  the  mind  by  more  senses  than  one. 

Thirdly.     Others  that  are  had  from  reflection  only. 

Fourthly.  There  are  some  that  make  themselves 
way,  and  are  suggested  to  the  mind,  by  all  the  ways  of 
sensation  and  reflection, 


CH.  III.,  IV.]    THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  41 


SOME  OF  OUR  SIMPLE   IDEAS  CONSIDERED, 
i.  Idea  of  Solidity. 

I  think  it  will  be  needless  to  enumerate  all  the  par- 
ticular simple  ideas  belonging  to  each  sense.  Nor 
indeed  is  it  possible  if  we  would,  there  being  a  great 
many  more  of  them  belonging  to  most  of  the  senses 
than  we  have  names  for. 

I  shall  therefore,  in  the  account  of  simple  ideas  I 
am  here  giving,  content  myself  to  set  down  only  such 
as  are  most  material  to  our  present  purpose,  or  are  in 
themselves  less  apt  to  be  taken  notice  of,  though  they 
are  very  frequently  the  ingredients  of  our  complex 
ideas  ;  amongst  which  I  think  I  may  well  account 
"  solidity,"  which  therefore  I  shall  treat  of  in  the  next 
chapter. 

There  is  no  idea  which  we  receive  more  constantly 
from  sensation  than  solidity.  Whether  we  move  or 
rest,  in  what  posture  soever  we  are,  we  always  feel 
something  under  us  that  supports  us,  and  hinders  our 
farther  sinking  downwards  ;  and  the  bodies  which 
we  daily  handle  make  us  perceive  that  whilst  they 
remain  between  them,  they  do,  by  an  insurmountable 
force,  hinder  the  approach  of  the  parts  of  our  hands 
that  press  them.^ 

This,  of  all  others,  seems  the  idea  most  intimately 
connected  with  and  essential  to  body,  so  as  nowhere 
else  to  be  found  or  imagined  but  only  in  matter. 

This  is  the  idea  belongs  to  body,  whereby  we  con- 
ceive it  to  fill  space.  The  idea  of  which  filling  of 


42  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IT. 

space  is,  that  where  we  imagine  any  space  taken  up 
by  a  solid  substance,  we  conceive  it  so  to  possess  it 
that  it  excludes  all  other  solid  substances,  and  will 
for  ever  hinder  any  two  other  bodies,  that  move 
towards  one  another  in  a  straight  line,  from  coming  to 
touch  one  another,  unless  it  removes  from  between 
them  in  a  line  not  parallel  to  that  which  they  move 
in.  This  idea  of  it,  the  bodies  which  we  ordinary 
handle  sufficiently  furnish  us  with. 

This  resistance,  whereby  it  keeps  other  bodies  out 
of  the  space  which  it  possesses,  is  so  great  that  no 
force,  how  great  soever,  can  surmount  it.  All  the 
bodies  in  the  world,  pressing  a  drop  of  water  on  all 
sides,  will  never  be  able  to  overcome  the  resistance 
which  it  will  make,  as  soft  as  it  is,  to  their  approach- 
ing one  ano'her,  till  it  be  removed  out  of.  their  way  : 
whereby  our  idea  of  solidity  is  distinguished  both 
from  pure  space,  whkhjs_c^pablejQ£jiihej  .of  resistance 
nor  motion,  and  from  the  ordinary  idea  of  hardness. 

Solidity  is  hereby  also  differenced  from  hardness, 
in  that  solidity  consists  in  repletion,  and  so  an  utter 
exclusion  of  other  bodies  out  of  the  space  it  possesses  ; 
but  hardness  in  a  firm  cohesion  of  the  parts  of  matter, 
making  up  masses  of  a  sensible  bulk,  so  that  the 
whole  does  not  easily  change  its  figure. 

2.  Ideas  of  Perception  and  Willing. 

The  idea  of  perception,  and  idea  of  willing,  we  have 
from  reflection. — The.  two  great  and  principal  actions 
of  the  mind,  which  are  most  frequently  considered, 
and  which  are  so  frequent  that  every  one  that  pleases 
may  take  notice  of  them  in  himself,  are  these  two  : 


CH.  VI  ,VII.]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  43 

perception  or  thinking,  and  volition  or  willing.  The 
power  of  thinking  is  called  "  the  understanding,"  and 
the  power  of  volition  is  called  "  the  will  ;"  and  these 
two  powers  or  abilities  in  the  mind  are  denominated 
"  f acjiliifis. "  Of  some  of  the  modes  of  these  simple 
ideas  of  reflection,  such  as  are  remembrance,  discern- 
ing, reasoning,  judging,  knowledge,  faith,  etc.,  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  speak  hereafter. 

3.  Ideas  of  Pleasure  and  Pain. 

There  be  other  simple  ideas  which  convey  them- 
selves into  the  mind  by  all  the  ways  of  sensation  ai,d 
reflection  ;  viz.,  pleasure  or  delight,  and  its  opposite, 
pain  or  uneasiness  ;  power,  existence,  unity. 

Delight  or  uneasiness,  one  or  other  of  them,  join 
themselves  to  almost  all  our  ideas  both  of  sensation 
and  reflection  ;  and  there  is  scarce  any  affection  of 
our  senses  from  without,  any  retired  thought  of  our 
mind  within,  which  is  not  able  to  produce  in  us 
pleasure  or  pain.  By  "  pleasure  "  and  "  pain  "  I 
would  be  understood  to  signify  whatsoever  delights 
or  molests  us  ;  whether  it  arises  from  the  thoughts  of 
our  minds,  or  any  thing  operating  on  our  bodies.  For 
whether  we  call  it  "  satisfaction,  delight,  pleasure, 
happiness,"  etc.,  on  the  one  side  ;  or  "  uneasiness, 
trouble,  pain,  torment,  anguish,  misery,"  etc.,  on  the 
other  ;  they  are  still  but  different  degrees  of  the  same 
thing,  and  belong  to  the  ideas  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
delight  or  uneasiness  ;  which  are  the  names  I  shall 
most  commonly  use  for  those  two  sorts  of  ideas. 


44  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

4.  Ideas  of  Existence  and  Unity. 

Existence  and  unity  are  two  other  ideas  that  are 
suggested  to  the  understanding  by  every  object  with- 
out, and  every  idea  within.  When  ideas  are  in  our 
minds,  we  consider  them  as  being  actually  there,  as 
well  as  we  consider  things  to  be  actually  without  us  : 
which  is,  that  they  exist,  or  have  existence  :  and 
whatever  we  can  consider  as  one  thing,  whether  a 
real  being  or  idea,  suggests  to  the  understanding  the 

idea  of  unity. 

5.  Idea  of  Power. 

Power  also  is  another  of  those  simple  ideas  which 
we  receive  from  sensation  and  reflection.  For,  ob- 
serving in  ourselves  that  we  can  at  pleasure  move 
several  parts  of  our  bodies  which  were  at  rest,  the 
effects  also  that  natural  bodies  are  able  to  produce  in 
one  another  occurring  every  moment  to  our  senses, 
we  both  these  ways  get  the  idea  of  power. 

6.  Idea  of  Succession. 

Besides  these  there  is  another  idea,  which  though 
suggested  by  our  senses,  yet  is  more  constantly  offered 
us  by  what  passes  in  our  own  minds  ;  and  that  is  the 
idea  of  succession.  For  if  we  look  immediately  into 
ourselves,  and  reflect  on  what  is  observable  there,  we 
shall  find  our  ideas  always,  whilst  we  are  awake  or 
have  any  thought,  passing  in  train,  one  going  and 
another  coming  without  intermission. 

More  Particular  Examination  of  Some  of  the  Simple     J 
Ideas  from  Sensation. 

Concerning  the  simple  ideas  of  sensation  it  is  to  be 
considered,  that  whatsoever  is  so  constituted  in  nature 


CH.  VIII.]          THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  45 

as  to  be  able  by  affecting  our  senses  to  cause  any 
perception  in  the  mind,  doth  thereby  produce  in  the 
understanding  a  simple  idea  ;  which,  whatever  be  the 
external  cause  of  it,  when  it  comes  to  be  taken  notice 
of  by  our  discerning  faculty,  it  is  by  the  mind  looked 
on  and  considered  there  to  be  a  real  positive  idea  in 
the  understanding,  as  much  as  any  other  whatsoever  ; 
though  perhaps  the  cause  of  it  be  but  a  privation  in 
the  subject. 

Thus  the  ideas  of  heat  and  cold,  light  and  dark- 
ness, white  and  black,  motion  and  rest,  are  equally 
clear  and  positive  ideas  in  the  mind  ;  though  perhaps 
some  of  the  causes  which  produce  them  are  barely 
privations  in  those  subjects  from  whence  our  senses 
derive  those  ideas.  These  the  understanding,  in  its 
view  of  them,  considers  all  as  distinct  positive  ideas 
without  taking  notice  of  the  causes  that  produce 
them  ;  which  is  an  inquiry  not  belonging  to  the  idea 
as  it  is  in  the  understanding,  but  to  the  nature  of  the 
thing  existing  without  us.  These  are  two  very  differ- 
ent things,  and  carefully  to  be  distinguished  ;  it  being 
one  thing  to  perceive  and  know  the  idea  of  white  or 
black,  and  quite  another  to  examine  what  kind  of 
particles  they  must  be,  and  how  ranged  in  the  super- 
ficies, to  make  any  object  appear  white  or  black. 

To  discover  the  nature  of  our  ideas  the  better,  and 
to  discourse  of  them  intelligibly,  it  will  be  convenient 
to  distinguish  them,  as  they  are  ideas  or  perceptions  \ 
in  ourjninds,  and  as  they  are  modifications  of  matter  <y 
in  the  bodies  that  cause  such  perceptions  in  us  ;  that 
so  we  may  not  think  (as  perhaps  usually  is  done)  that 
they  are  exactly  the  images  and  resemblances  of  some- 


46  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

thing  inherent  in  the  subject  ;  most  of  those  of  sen- 
sation being  in  the  mind  no  more  the  likeness  of 
something  existing  without  us  than  the  names  that 
stand  for  them  are  the  likeness  of  our  ideas,  which 
yet  upon  hearing  they  are  apt  to  excite  in  us. 

Thus  a  snowball  having  the  power  to  produce  in  us 
the  ideas  of  white,  cold,  and  round,  the  powers  to 
produce  those  ideas  in  us  as  they  are  in  the  snowball, 
I  call  "  qualities  ;"  and  as  they  are  sensations  or  per- 
ceptions in  our  understandings,  I  call  them  "  ideas  ;" 
which  ideas,  if  I  speak  of  them  sometimes  as  in  the 
things  themselves,  I  would  be  understood  to  mean 
those  qualities  in  the  objects  which  produce  them 
in  us. 

Qualities  thus  considered  in  bodies  are,  First,  such 
as  are  utterly  inseparable  from  the  body,  in  what 
es^te  soever  it  be  ;  such  as,  in  all  the  alterations  and 
changes  it  suffers,  all  the  force  can  be  used  upon  it,  it 
constantly  keeps  ;  and  such  as  sense  constantly  finds 
in  every  particle  of  matter  which  has  Ikilk  enough  to 
be  perceived,  and  the  mind  finds  inseparable*  from 
every  particle  of  matter,  though  less  than  to  make 
itself  "singly  be  perceived  by  our  senses  :  v.  g.y  take  a 
grain  of  wheat,  divide  it  into  two  parts,  each  part  has 
still  solidity,  extension,  figure,  and  mobility;  divide \ 
.it  again,  and  it  retains  still  the  same  qualities  :  and 
so  divide  it  on  till  the  parts  become  insensible,  they 
must  retain  still  each  of  them  all  those  qualities. 
For,  division  (which  is  -all  that  a.  mill*  or  pestle  or 
any  other  body  does  upon  another,  in. reducing  it  to 
insensible  parts)  can  never  take  away  either  solidity, 
extension,  figure,  or  mobility  from  any  body,  but  only 
makes  two  or  more  distinct  separate  masses  of  matter 


CH.  VIII.]          THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  47 

of  that  which  was  but  one  before  ;  all  which  distinct 
masses,  reckoned  as  so  many  distinct  bodies,  after 
division,  make  a  certain  number*  These  I  call  orig- 
inal or  primary  qualities  of  body,  which  I  think  we 
may  observe  to  produce  simple  ideas  in  us,  viz.,  solid- 
ity, extension,  figure,  motion  or  rest,  and  number. 

Secondary  qualities.  —  Secondly.  Such  qualities, 
which  in  truth  are  nothing  in  the  objects  themselves, 
but  powers  to  produce  various  sensations  in  us  by 
their  primary  qualities,  /.  e.,  by  colors,  sounds,  tastes, 
etc.,  these  I  call  secondary  qualities.  To  these  might 
be  added  a  third  sort,  which  are  allowed  to  be  barely 
powers,  though  they  are  as  much  real  qualities  in  the 
subject  as  those  which  I,  to  comply  with  the  common 
way  of  speaking,  call  qualities,  but,  for  distinction, 
secondary  qualities.  For,  the  power  in  fire  to  produce 
a  new  color  or  consistence  in  wax  or  clay  by  its  pri- 
mary qualities,  is  as  much  a  quality  in  fire  as  the 
power  it  has  to  produce  in  me  a  new  idea  or  sensa- 
tion of  warmth  or  burning,  which  I  felt  not  before,  by 
the  same  primary  qualities,  viz.,  the  bulk,  texture, 
and  motion  of  its  insensible  parts. 

The  next  thing  to  be  considered  is  how  bodies  pro- 
duce  ideas  in  us ;  and  that  is  manifestly  by  impulse, 
the  only  way  which  we  can  conceive  bodies  operate  in. 

If,  then,  external  objects  be  not  united  to  our 
minds  when  they  produce  ideas  in  it,  and  yet  we  per- 
ceive these  original  qualities  in  such  of  them  as  singly 
fall  under  our  senses,  it  is  evident  that  some  motion 
must  be  thence  continued  by  our  nerves  or  animal 
spirits,  by  some  parts  of  our  bodies,  to  the  brain  or 
the  seat  of  sensation,  there  to  produce  in  our  minds 
the  particular  ideas  we  have  of  them. 


48  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

After  the  same  manner  that  the  ideas  of  these 
original  qualities  are  produced  in  us,  we  may  con- 
ceive that  the  ideas  of  secondary  qualities  are  also 
producedjjvi^by  the  operation  of  insensible  particles 
on  our  senses!  Let  us  suppose  at  present  trTaT  the' 
different  motions  and  figures,  bulk  and  number,  of 
such  particles,  affecting  the  several  organs  of  our 
senses,  produce  in  us  those  different  sensations  which 
we  have  from  the  colors  and  smells  of  bodies,  v.  g., 
that  a  violet,  by  the  impulse  of  such  insensible  par- 
ticles of  matter  of  peculiar  figures  and  bulks,  and  in 
different  degrees  and  modifications  of  their  motions, 
causes  the  ideas  of  the  blue  color  and  sweet  scent  of  r* 
that  flower  to  be  produced  in  our  minds.  From 
whence  I  think  it  is  easy  to  draw  this  observation, 
that  the  ideas  of  primary  qualities  of  bodies  are  re- 
semblances of  them,  and  their  patterns  do  really  exist 
in  the  bodies  themselves  ;  but  the  ideas  produced  in 
us  by  these  secondary  qualities  have  no  resemblance 
of  them  at  all.  There  is  nothing  like  our  ideas  exist- 
ing in  the  bodies  themselves.  They  are,  in  the  bodies 
we  denominate  from  them,  only  a  power  to  produce  ^ 
those  sensations  in  us  ;  and  what  is  sweet,  blue,  or 
warm  in  idea,  is  but  the  certain  bulk,  figure,  and  mo- 
tion of  the  insensible  parts  in  the  bodies  themselves, 
which  we  call  so.  fj 

&\,s  The  particular  bulk,  number,  figure,  and  motion  of 
w    the  parts  of  fire  or  snow  are  really  in  them,  whether 
any  one's  senses  perceive  them  or  no  ;  and  therefore 
they  may  be  called  real  qualities,  because  they  really 
exist  in  those  bodies.     But  light,  heat,  whiteness,  or 
oC       coldness,  are  no  more  really  in  them  than  sickness  or 
pain  is  in  manna.     Take  away  the  sensation  of  them ; 


CH.  VIII. ]         THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  49 

let  not  the  eyes  see  light  or  colors,  nor  the  ears  hear 
sounds  ;  let  the  palate  not  taste,  nor  the  nose  smell ; 
and  all  colors,  tastes,  odors,  and  sounds,  as  they  are 
such  particular  ideas,  vanish  and  cease,  and  are  re- 
duced to  their_causes,  /.  e.,  bulk,  figure,  and  motion 
of  parts. 

Let  us  consider  the  red  and  white  colors  in  por- 
phyry  :  hinder  light  but  from  striking  on  it,  and  its 
colors  vanish  ;  it  no  longer  produces  any  such  ideas 
in  us.  Upon  the  return  of  light,  it  produces  these 
appearances  on  us  again. 

The  qualities  then  that  are  in  bodies,  rightly  con- 
sidered, are  of  three  sorts  : 

First.  The  bulk,  figure,  number,  situation,  and 
motion  or  rest  of  their  solid  parts  ;  those  are  in  them 
whether  we  perceive  them  or  no  ;  and  when  they  are 
of  that  size  that  we  can  discover  them,  we  have  by 
these  an  idea  of  the  thing  as  it  is  in  itself,  as  is  plain 
in  artificial  things.  These  I  call  primary  qualities. 

Secondly.  The  power  that  is  in  any  body,  by  rea- 
son of  its  insensible  primary  qualities,  to  operate  after 
a  peculiar  manner  on  any  of  our  senses,  and  thereby 
produce  in  us  the  different  ideas  of  several  colors,  d^ 
sounds,  smells,  tastes,  etc.  These  are  usually  called 
sensible  qualities. 

Thirdly.  The  power  that  is  in  any  body,  by  reason 
of  the  particular  constitution  of  its  primary  qualities, 
to  make  such  a  change  in  the  bulk,  figure,  texture, 
and  motion  of  another  body,  as  to  make  it  operate  on 
our  senses  differently  from  what  it  did  before.  Thus 
the  sun  has  a  power  to  make  wax  white,  and  fire,  to 
make  lead  fluid.  These  are  usually  called  "  powers," 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 


SOME   FUNCTIONS    OF   MIND    INVOLVED   IN 
HAVING   SIMPLE   IDEAS. 

/.  Perception. 

What  perception  is,  every  one  will  know  better  by 
reflecting  on  what  he  does  himself,  when  he  sees, 
hears,  feels,  etc.,  or  thinks,  than  by  any  discourse  of 
mine.  Whoever  reflects  on  what  passes  in  his  own 
mind,  cannot  miss  it  ;  and  if  he  does  not  reflect,  all 
the  words  in  the  world  cannot  make  him  have  any 
notion  of  it. 

This  is  certain,  that  whatever  alterations  are  made 
in  the  body,  if  they  reach  not  the  mind  ;  whatever 
impressions  are  made  on  the  outward  parts,  if  they 
are  not  taken  notice  of  within  ;  there  is  no  perception. 
Fire  may  burn  our  bodies  with  no  other  effect  than  it 
does  a  billet,  unless  the  motion  be  continued  to  the 
brain,  and  there  the  sense  of  heat  or  idea  of  pain  be 
produced  in  the  mind. 

We  are  farther  to  consider  'concerning  perception, 
that  the  ideas  we  receive  by  sensation  are  often  in 
grown  people  altered  by  the  judgment  without  our 
taking  notice  of  it.  When  we  set  before  our  eyes  a 
round  globe  of  any  uniform  color,  v.  g.,  gold,  alabas- 
ter, or  jet,  it  is  certain  that  the  idea  thereby  imprinted 
in  our  mind  is  of  a  flat  circle  variously  shadowed, 
with  several  degrees  of  light  and  brightness  coming 
to  our  eyes.  But  we  having  by  use  been  accustomed 
to  perceive  what  kind  of  appearance  convex  bodies 


CH.  IX.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  5 1 

are  wont  to  make  in  us,  what  alterations  are  made  in 
the  reflections  of  light  by  the  difference  of  the  sensi- 
ble figures  of  bodies,  the  judgment  presently,  by  an 
habitual  custom,  alters  the  appearances  into  their 
causes  :  so  that,  from  that  which  truly  is  variety  of 
shadow  or  color  collecting  the  figure,  it  makes  it  pass 
for  a  mark  of  figure,  and  frames  to  itself  the  percep- 
tion of  a  convex  figure  and  an  uniform  color  ;  when 
the  idea  we  receive  from  thence  is  only  a  plane 
variously  colored,  as  is  evident  in  painting. 

This,  in  many  cases,  by  a  settled  habit  in  things 
whereof  we  have  frequent  experience,  is  performed  so 
constantly  and  so  quick,  that  we  take  that  for  the 
perception  of  our  sensation  which  is  an  idea  formed 
by  our  judgment  ;  so  that  one,  viz.,  that  of  sensation, 
serves  only  to  excite  the  other,  and  is  scarce  taken 
notice  of  itself  ;  as  a  man  who  reads  or  hears  with 
attention  and  understanding,  takes  little  notice  of  the 
characters  or  sounds,  but  of  the  ideas  that  are  excited 
in  him  by  them. 

Nor  need  we  wonder  that  this  is  done  with  so  little 
notice,  if  we  consider  how  very  quick  the  actions  of 
the  mind  are  performed  :  for  as  itself  is  thought  to 
take  up  no  space,  to  have  no  extension,  so  its  actions 
seem  to  require  no  time,  but  many  of  them  seem  to 
be  crowded  into  an  instant.  I  speak  this  in  compari- 
son to  the  actions  of  the  body.  Any  one  may  easily 
observe  this  in  his  own  thoughts  who  will  take  the 
pains  to  reflect  on  them. 

Perception,  then,  being  the  first  step  and  degree 
towards  knowledge,  and  the  inlet  of  all  the  materials 
of  it,  the  fewer  senses  any  man  as  well  as  any  other 


52  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

creature  hath,  and  the  fewer  and  duller  the  impressions 
are  that  are  made  by  them,  and  the  duller  the  facul- 
ties are  that  are  employed  about  them,  the  more  re- 
mote are  they  from  that  knowledge  which  is  to  be 
found  in  some  men.  But  this,  being  in  great  variety 
of  degrees  (as  may  be  perceived  amongst  men), 
cannot  certainly  be  discovered  in  the  several  species 
of  animals,  much  less  in  their  particular  individuals. 


2.  Retention  and  Memory. 

The  next  faculty  of  the  mind,  whereby  it  makes  a 
farther  progress  towards  knowledge,  is  that  which  I 
call  retention  or  the  keeping  of  those  simple  ideas 
which  from  sensation  or  reflection  it  hath  received. 
This  is  done  two  ways.  First,  by  keeping  the  idea 
which  is  brought  into  it  for  some  time  actually  in 
view,  which  is  called  contemplation. 

The  other,  way  of  retention  is  the  power  to  revive 
again  in  our  minds  those  ideas  which  after  imprint- 
ing have  disappeared,  or  have  been  as  it  were  laid 
aside  out  of  sight  ;  and  thus  we  do,  when  we  con- 
ceive heat  or  light,  yellow  or  sweet,  the  object  being 
removed.  This  is  memory,  which  is,  as  it  were,  the 
storehouse  of  our  ideas.  For  the  narrow  mind  of 
man,  not  being  capable  of  having  many  ideas  under 
view  and  consideration  at  once,  it  was  necessary  to 
have  a  repository  to  lay  up  those  ideas,  which  at  an- 
other time  it  might  have  use  of.  But  our  ideas  being 
nothing  but  actual  perceptions  in  the  mind,  which 
cease  to  be  anything  when  there  is  no  perception  of 
them,  this  laying  up  of  our  ideas  in  the  repository  of 


CH.  X.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  53 

the  memory  signifies  no  more  but  this, — that  the 
mind  has  a  power,  in  many  cases,  to  revive  percep- 
tions which  it  has  once  had,  with  this  additional  per- 
ception annexed  to  them, — that  it  has  had  them  be- 
fore. And  in  this  sense  it  is  that  our  ideas  are  said 
to  be  in  our  memories,  when  indeed  they  are  actually 
nowhere,  but  only  there  is  an  ability  in  the  mind 
when  it  will  to  revive  them  again,  and,  as  it  were, 
paint  them  anew  on  itself,  though  some  with  more, 
some  with  less,  difficulty  ;  some  more  lively,  and 
others  more  obscurely.  Attention  and  repetition 
help  much  to  the  fixing  any  ideas  in  the  memory ; 
but  those  which  naturally  at  first  make  the  deepest 
and  most  lasting  impression,  are  those  which  are  ac- 
companied with  pleasure  or  pain. 

Ideas  fade  in  the  memory. — Concerning  the  several 
degrees  of  lasting  wherewith  ideas  are  imprinted  on 
the  memory,  we  may  observe,  that  some  of  them  have 
been  produced  in  the  understanding  by  an  object 
affecting  the  senses  once  only,  and  no  more  than  once  ; 
others,  that  have  more  than  once  offered  themselves 
to  the  senses,  have  yet  been  little  taken  notice  of  ;  the 
mind  either  heedless  as  in  children,  or  otherwise  em- 
ployed as  in  men,  intent  only  on  one  thing,  not  set- 
ting the  stamp  deep  into  itself  ;  and  in  some,  where 
they  are  set  to  with  care  and  repeated  impressions,, 
either  through  the  temper  of  the  body  or  some  other 
default,  the  memory  is  very  weak. 

This  farther  is  to  be  observed  concerning  ideas 
lodged  in  the  memory,  and  upon  occasion  revived  by 
the  mind, — that  they  are  not  only  (as  the  word  "  re- 
vive "  imports)  none  of  them  new  ones,  but  also  that 


54  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

the  mind  takes  notice  of  them  as  of  a  former  impres- 
sion, and  renews  its  acquaintance  with  them  as  with 
ideas  it  had  known  before.  So  that  though  ideas 
formerly  imprinted  are  not  all  constantly  in  view,  yet 
in  remembrance  they  are  constantly  known  to  be  such 
as  have  been  formerly  imprinted,  /'.  e.,  in  view,  and 
taken  notice  of  before  by  the  understanding, 

3.  Discerning. 

Another  faculty  we  may  take  notice  of  in  our  minds, 
is  that  of  discerning  and  distinguishing  between  the 
several  ideas  it  has.  It  is  not  enough  to  have  a  con- 
fused perception  of  something  in  general  :  unless  the 
mind  had  a  distinct  perception  of  different  objects 
and  their  qualities,  it  would  be  capable  of  very  little 
knowledge  ;  though  the  bodies  that  affect  us  were  as 
busy  about  us  as  they  are  now,  and  the  mind  were 
continually  employed  in  thinking.  On  this  faculty  of 
distinguishing  one  thing  from  another,  depends  the 
evidence  and  certainty  of  several  even  very  general 
propositions,  which  have  passed  for  innate  truths  ; 
because  men,  overlooking  the  true  cause  why  those 
propositions  find  universal  assent,  impute  it  wholly  to 
native  uniform  impressions  :  whereas  it  in  truth  de- 
pends upon  this  clear  discerning  faculty  of  the  mind, 
whereby  it  perceives  two  ideas  to  be  the  same  or 
different. 

4.  Comparing. 

The  comparing  them  one  with  another,  in  respect 
of  extent,  degrees,  time,  place,  or  any  other  circum- 
stances, is  another  operation  of  the  mind  about  its 


CH.  XI.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  55 

ideas,  and  is  that  upon  which  depends  all  that  large 
tribe  of  ideas  comprehended  under  relation  ;  which 
of  how  vast  an  extent  it  is,  I  shall  have  occasion  to 
consider  hereafter. 

How  far  brutes  partake  in  this  faculty  is  not  easy 
to  determine  ;  I  imagine  they  have  it  not  in  any  great 
degree  :  for  though  they  probably  have  several  ideas 
distinct  enough,  yet  it  seems  to  me  to  be  the  preroga- 
tive of  human  understanding,  when  it  has  sufficiently 
distinguished  any  ideas  so  as  to  perceive  them  to  be 
perfectly  different,  and  so  consequently  two,  to  cast 
about  and  consider  in  what  circumstances  they  are 
capable  to  be  compared.  And  therefore,  I  think, 
beasts  compare  not  their  ideas  farther  than  some 
sensible  circumstances  annexed  to  the  objects  them- 
selves. 

5.  Compounding. 

The  next  operation  we  may  observe  in  the  mind 
about  its  ideas  is  composition  ;  whereby  it  puts  to- 
gether several  of  those  simple  ones  it  has  received 
from  sensation  and  reflection,  and  combines  them 
into  complex  ones.  Under  this  of  composition  may 
be  reckoned  also  that  of  enlarging  ;  wherein  though 
the  composition  does  not  so  much  appear  as  in  more 
complex  ones,  yet  it  is  nevertheless  as  putting  several 
ideas  together,  though  of  the  same  kind.  Thus,  by 
adding  several  units  together  we  make  the  idea  of  a 
dozen,  and  putting  together  the  repeated  ideas  of 
several  perches  we  frame  that  of  a  furlong. 


56  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

Conclusion. 

And  thus  I  have  given  a  short  and,  I  think,  true 
history  of  the  first  beginnings  of  human  knowledge, 
whence  the  mind  has  its  first  object,  and  by  what 
steps  it  makes  its  progress  to  the  laying  in  and  stor- 
ing up  those  ideas  out  of  which  is  to  be  framed  all 
the  knowledge  it  is  capable  of ;  wherein  I  must  ap- 
peal to  experience  and  observation  whether  I  am  in 
the  right. 

These  are  my  guesses  concerning  the  means  where 
by  the  understanding  comes  to  have  and  retain  simple 
ideas  and  the  modes  of  them,  with  some  other  opera- 
tions about  them.  I  proceed  now  to  examine  some 
of  these  simple  ideas  and  their  modes  a  little  more 
particularly. 


CH.  XII.]  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE. 


COMPLEX   IDEAS— GENERAL  ACCOUNT. 

We  have  hitherto  considered  those  ideas,  in  the  re- 
ception whereof  the  mind  is  only  passive,  which  are 
those  simple  ones  received  from  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion before  mentioned,  whereof  the  mind  cannot  make 
one  to  itself,  nor  have  any  idea  which  does  not  wholly 
consist  of  them.  But  as  the  mind  is  wholly  passive 
in  the  reception  of  all  its  simple  ideas,  so  it  exerts 
several  acts  of  its  own,  whereby  out  of  its  simple 
ideas,  as  the  materials  and  foundations  of  the  rest, 
the  other  are  framed.  The  acts  of  the  mind  wherein 
it  exerts  its  power  over  its  simple  ideas  are  chiefly 
these  three  :  (i.)  Combining  several  simple  ideas 
into  one  compound  one  ;  and  thus  all  complex  ideas 
are  made.  (2.)  The  second  is  bringing  two  ideas, 
whether  simple  or  complex,  together,  and  setting 
them  by  one  another,  so  as  to  take  a  view  of  them  at 
once,  without  uniting  them  into  one  ;  by  which  it  gets 
all  its  ideas  of  relations.  (3.)  The  third  is  separating 
them  from  all  other  ideas  that  accompany  them  in 
their  real  existence;  this  is  called  "abstraction:" 
and  thus  all  its  general  ideas  are  made.  This  shows 
man's  power  and  its  way  of  operation  to  be  much- 
what  the  same  in  the  material  and  intellectual  world. 
For,  the  materials  in  both  being  such  as  he  has  no 
power  over,  either  to  make  or  destroy,  all  that  man 
can  do  is  either  to  unite  them  together,  or  to  set  them 
by  one  another,  or  wholly  separate  them.  I  shall 


(|[g>  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

here  begin  with  the  first  of  these  in  the  consideration 
of  complex  ideas,  and  come  to  the  other  two  in  their 
due  places. 

Complex  ideas,  however  compounded  and  decom- 
pounded, though  their  number  be  infinite,  and  the 
variety  endless  wherewith  they  fill  and  entertain  the 
thoughts  of  men,  yet  I  think  they  may  be  all  reduced 
under  these  three  heads  :  i.  Modes.  2.  Substances. 
3.  Relations. 

First.  "  Modes"  I  call  such  complex  ideas  which, 
however  compounded,  contain  not  in  them  the  sup- 
position of  subsisting  by  themselves,  but  are  consid- 
ered as  dependences  on  or  affections  of  substances  ; 
such  are  the  ideas  signified  by  the  words,  "  triangle, 
gratitude,  murder,"  etc. 

Of  these  modes  there  are  two  sorts  which  deserve 
distinct  consideration.  First.  There  are  some  which 
are  only  variations  or  different  combinations  of  the 
same  simple  idea,  without  the  mixture  of  any  other, 
as  a  dozen,  or  score  ;  which  are  nothing  but  the  ideas 
of  so  many  distinct  units  added  together  :  and  these 
I  call  "  simple  modes,"  as  being  contained  within  the 
bounds  of  one  simple  idea.  Secondly.  There  are 
others  compounded  of  simple  ideas,  of  several  kinds, 
put  together  to  make  one  complex  one  ;  v.  g.,  beauty, 
consisting  of  a  certain  composition  of  color  and  fig- 
ure, causing  delight  in  the  beholder  ;  theft,  which, 
being  the  concealed  change  of  the  possession  of  any 
thing,  without  the  consent  of  the  proprietor,  contains, 
as  is  visible,  a  combination  of  several  ideas  of  several 
kinds  :  and  these  I  call  "mixed  modes." 

Secondly.    The  ideas  of  substances  are  such  com- 


CH.  XII.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE. 

binations  of  simple  ideas  as  are  taken  to  represent 
distinct  particular  things  subsisting  by  themselves,  in 
which  the  supposed  or  confused  idea  of  substance, 
such  as  it  is,  is  always  the  first  and  chief.  Thus,  if 
to  substance  be  joined  the  simple  idea  of  a  certain 
dull,  whitish  color  with  certain  degrees  of  weight, 
hardness,  ductility,  and  fusibility,  we  have  the  idea  of 
lead  ;  and  the  combination  of  the  ideas  of  a  certain 
sort  of  figure,  with  the  powers  of  motion,  thought, 
and  reasoning,  joined  to  substance,  make  the  ordinary 
idea  of  a  man.  Now  of  substances  also  there  are 
two  sorts  of  ideas,  one  of  single  substances,  as  they 
exist  separately,  as  of  a  man  or  a  sheep  ;  the  other  of 
several  of  those  put  together,  as  an  army  of  men  or 
flock  of  sheep  ;  which  collective  ideas  of  several  sub- 
stances thus  put  together,  are  as  much  each  of  them 
one  single  idea  as  that  of  a  man  or  an  unit. 

Thirdly.  The  last  sort  of  complex  ideas  is  that  we 
call  "  Relation,"  which  consists  in  the  consideration 
and  comparing  one  idea  with  another.  Of  these  sev- 
eral kinds  we  shall  treat  in  their  order. 


60  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 


A    MORE    PARTICULAR    ACCOUNT    OF    SOME    OF 
OUR   COMPLEX    IDEAS. 

I.   The  Idea  of  Space. 

I  shall  begin  with  the  simple  idea  of  space.  I  have 
showed  above  (chap,  iv.),  that  we  get  the  idea  of 
space  both  by  our  sight  and  touch  :  which  I  think  is 
so  evident  that  it  would  be  as  needless  to  go  to  prove 
that  men  perceive  by  their  sight  a  distance  between 
bodies  of  different  colors,  or  between  the  parts  of  the 
same  body,  as  that  they  see  colors  themselves  ;  nor  is 
it  less  obvious  that  they  can  do  so  in  the  dark  by 
feeling  and  touch. 

This  space  considered  barely  in  length  between  any 
two  beings,  without  considering  any  thing  else  between 
them,  is  called  "  distance  ;  "  if  considered  in  length, 
breadth,  and  thickness,  I  think  it  may  be  called  "  ca- 
pacity ;"  the  term  "  extension  "  is  usually  applied  to 
it,  in  what  manner  soever  considered. 

Each  different  distance  is  a  different  modification 
of  space,  and  each  idea  of  any  different  distance  or 
space  is  a  simple  mode  of  this  idea. 

There  is  another  modification  of  this  idea,  which  is 
nothing  but  the  relation  which  the  parts  of  the  ter- 
mination of  extension  or  circumscribed  space  have 
amongst  themselves.  This  the  touch  discovers  in 
sensible  bodies,  whose  extremities  come  within  our 
reach  ;  and  the  eye  takes  both  from  bodies  and  colors, 


CH.  XIII.]         THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  6l 

whose  boundaries  are  within  its  view  :  where,  observ- 
ing how  the  extremities  terminate  either  in  straight 
lines  which  meet  at  discernible  angles,  or  in  crooked 
lines  wherein  no  angles  can  be  perceived,  by  consider- 
ing these  as  they  relate  to  one  another  in  all  parts  of 
the  extremities  of  any  body  or  space,  it  has  that  idea 
we  call  "  figure." 

Another  idea  coming  under  this  head  and  belong- 
ing to  this  tribe,  is  that  we  call  "  place."  As  in  sim- 
ple space  we  consider  the  relation  of  distance  between 
any  two  bodies  or  points,  so  in  our  idea  of  place  we 
consider  the  relation  of  distance  betwixt  any  thing  and 
any  two  or  more  points,  which  are  considered  as 
keeping  the  same  distance  one  with  another,  and  so 
considered  as  at  rest ;  for  when  we  find  any  thing  at 
the  same  distance  now  which  it  was  yesterday  from 
any  two  or  more  points,  which  have  not  since  changed 
their  distance  one  with  another,  and  with  which  we 
then  compared  it,  we  say  it  hath  kept  the  same  place  ; 
but  if  it  hath  sensibly  altered  its  distance  with  either 
of  those  points,  we  say  it  hath  changed  its  place  ; 
though,  vulgarly  speaking  in  the  common  notion  of 
place,  we  do  not  always  exactly  observe  the  distance 
from  precise  points,  but  from  large  portions  of  sensible 
objects  to  which  we  consider  the  thing  place  to  bear 
relation,  and  its  distance  from  which  we  have  some 
reason  to  observe. 

There  are  some  that  would  persuade  us  that  body 
and  extension  are  the  same  thing  ;  who  either  change 
the  signification  of  words,  which  I  would  not  suspect 
them  of,  they  having  so  severely  condemned  the  phi- 
losophy of  others  because  it  hath  been  too  much  placed 


62  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

in  the  uncertain  meaning  or  deceitful  obscurity  of 
doubtful  or  insignificant  terms.  If  therefore  they 
mean  by  body  and  extension,  the  same  that  other 
people  do,  viz.,  by  body,  something  that  is  solid  and 
extended,  whose  parts  are  separable  and  movable 
different  ways ;  and  by  extension  only  the  space  that 
lies  between  the  extremities  of  these  solid  coherent 
parts,  and  which  is  possessed  by  them,  they  confound 
very  different  ideas  one  with  another.  For  I  appeal 
to  every  man's  own  thoughts,  whether  the  idea  of 
space  be  not  as  distinct  from  that  of  solidity,  as  it  is 
from  the  idea  of  scarlet  color?  It  is  true,  solidity 
cannot  exist  without  extension,  neither  can  scarlet 
cplor  exist  without  extension  ;  but  this  hinders  not 
but  that  they  are  distinct  ideas.  Many  ideas  require 
others  as  necessary  to  their  existence  or  conception, 
which  yet  are  very  distinct  ideas. 

Body,  then,  and  extension,  it  is  evident,  are  two 
distinct  ideas.  For, 

First.  Extension  includes  no  solidity  nor  resist- 
ance to  the  motion  of  body,  as  body  does. 

Secondly.  The  parts  of  pure  space  are  inseparable 
one  from  the  other  ;  so  that  the  continuity  cannot  be 
separated,  neither  really  nor  mentally.  For  I  demand 
of  any  one  to  remove  any  part  of  it  from  another  with 
which  it  is  continued,  even  so  much  as  in  thought. 

Thirdly.  The  parts  of  pure  space  are  immovable, 
which  follows  from  their  inseparability  ;  motion  being 
nothing  but  change  of  distance  between  any  two 
things  :  but  this  cannot  be  between  parts  that  are  in- 
separable ;  which  therefore  must  needs  be  at  perpetual 
rest  one  amongst  another. 


CH.  XIII. -XIV.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  63 

But  the  question  being  here,  whether  the  idea  of 
space  or  extension  be  the  same  with  the  idea  of  body, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  the  real  existence  of 
a  vacuum,  but  the  idea  of  it  ;  which  it  is  plain  men 
have  when  they  inquire  and  dispute  whether  there  be 
a  vacuum  or  no.  For  if  they  had  not  the  idea  of 
space  without  body,  they  could  not  make  a  question 
about  its  existence  ;  and  if  their  idea  of  body  did  not 
include  in  it  something  more  than  the  bare  idea  of 
space,  they  could  have  no  doubt  about  the  plenitude 
of  the  world  ;  and  it  would  be  as  absurd  to  demand 
whether  there  were  space  without  body,  as  whether 
there  were  space  without  space,  or  body  without  body, 
since  these  were  but  different  names  of  the  same  idea. 

2.    The  Idea  of  Duration. 

To  understand  time  and  eternity  aright,  we  ought 
with  attention  to  consider  what  idea  it  is  we  have  of 
duration,  and  how  we  came  by  it.  It  is  evident  to 
any  one  who  will  but  observe  what  passes  in  his  own 
mind,  that  there  is  a  train  of  ideas  which  constantly 
succeed  one  another  in  his  understanding  as  long  as 
he  is  awake.  Reflection  on  these  appearances  of 
several  ideas  one  after  another  in  our  minds,  is  that 
which  furnishes  us  with  the  idea  of  succession  ;(and 
the  distance  between  any  parts  of  that  succession,  or 
between  the  appearance  of  any  two  ideas  in  our 
minds,  is  that  we  call  duration}  For  whilst  we  are 
thinking,  or  whilst  we  receive  successively  several 
ideas  in  our  minds,  we  know  that  we  do  exist  ;  and  so 
we  call  the  existence  or  the  continuation  of  the  exist- 
ence of  ourselves  or  any  thing  else  commensurate  to 


64  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  it. 

the  succession  of  any  ideas  in  our  minds,  the  duration 
of  ourselves,  or  any  such  other  thing  co-existing  with 
our  thinking. 

That  we  have  our  notions  of  succession  and  dura- 
tion from  this  original,  viz.,  from  reflection  on  the 
train  of  ideas  which  we  find  to  appear  one  after 
another  in  our  own  minds,  seems  plain  to  me,  in  that 
we  have  no  perception  of  duration  but  by  considering 
the  train  of  ideas  that  take  their  turns  in  our  under- 
standings. When  that  succession  of  ideas  ceases,  our 
perception  of  duration  ceases  with  it ;  which  every 
one  clearly  experiments  in  himself  whilst  he  sleeps 
soundly,  whether  an  hour,  or  a  day,  or  a  month,  or  a 
year  ;  of  which  duration  of  things  whilst  he  sleeps  or 
thinks  not  he  has  no  perception  at  all,  but  it  is  quite 
lost  to  him  ;  and  the  moment  wherein  he  leaves  off  to 
think  till  the  moment  he  begins  to  think  again,  seems 
to  him  to  have  no  distance,  by  which  it  is  to  me  very 
clear  that  men  derive  their  ideas  of  duration  from 
their  reflection  on  the  train  of  the  ideas  they  observe 
to  succeed  one  another  in  their  own  understandings  ; 
without  which  observation  they  can  have  no  notion  of 
duration,  whatever  may  happen  in  the  world. 

Thus,  by  reflecting  on  the  appearance  of  various 
ideas  one  after  another  in  our  understandings,  we  get 
the  notion  of  succession  ;  which  if  any  one  should 
think  we  did  rather  get  from  our  observation  of  mo- 
tion by  our  senses,  he  will  perhaps  be  of  my  mind, 
when  he  considers  that  even  motion  produces  in  his 
mind  an  idea  of  succession  no  otherwise  than  as  it 
produces  there  a  continued  train  of  distinguishable 
ideas,  and  we  have  as  clear  an  idea  of  succession  and 


CH.  XIV.]          THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  65 

duration  by  the  train  of  other  ideas  succeeding  one 
another  in  our  minds  without  the  idea  of  any  motion, 
as  by  the  train  of  ideas  caused  by  the  uninterrupted 
sensible  change  of  distance  between  two  bodies  which 
we  have  from  motion  ;  and  therefore  we  should  as  well 
have  the  idea  of  duration,  were  there  no  sense  of 
motion  at  all. 

But  the  distinction  of  days  and  years  having  de- 
pended on  the  motion  of  the  sun,  it  has  brought  this 
mistake  with  it, — that  it  has  been  thought  that  mo- 
tion and  duration  were  the  measure  one  of  another. 

\Time  is  duration  set  out  by  measures. — Having  thus 
got  the  idea  of  duration,  the  next  thing  natural  for 
the  mind  to  do  is,  to  get  some  measure  of  this  com- 
mon duration,  whereby  it  might  judge  of  its  different 
lengths,  and  consider  the  distinct  order  wherein  sev- 
eral things  exist  ;  without  which  a  great  part  of  our 
knowledge  would  be  confused,  and  a  great  part  of 
history  be  rendered  very  useless.  This  consideration 
of  duration,  as  set  out  by  certain  periods,  and  marked 
by  certain  measures  or  epochs,  is  that,  I  think,  which 
most  properly  we  call  "  time." 

Nothing  then  could  serve  well  for  a  convenient 
measure  of  time  but  what  has  divided  the  whole 
length  of  its  duration  into  apparently  equal  portions 
by  constantly  repeated  periods.  What  portions  of 
duration  are  not  distinguished  or  considered  as  dis- 
tinguished and  measured  by  such  periods  come  not 
so  properly  under  the  notion  of  time,  as  appears  by 
such  phrases  as  these,  viz.,  "before  all  time,"  and 
"when  time  shall  be  no  more."  Whereas  any  con- 
stant periodical  appearance  or  alteration  of  ideas  in 


66  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

seemingly  equidistant  spaces  of  duration,  if  constant 
and  universally  observable,  would  have  as  well  distin- 
guished the  intervals  of  time  as  those  that  have  been 
made  use  of. 

We  must  therefore  carefully  distinguish  betwixt 
duration  itself  and  the  measures  we  make  use  of  to 
judge  of  its  length.  Duration  in  itself  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  going  on  in  one  constant,  equal,  uniform 
course.  But  none  of  the  measures  of  it  which  we 
make  use  of  can  be  known  to  do  so  :  nor  can  we  be 
assured  that  their  assigned  parts  or  periods  are  equal 
in  duration  one  to  another  ;  for  two  successive  lengths 
of  duration,  however  measured,  can  never  be  demon- 
strated to  be  equal.  All  that  we  can  do  for  a  meas- 
ure of  time,  is  to  take  such  as  have  continual  succes- 
sive appearances  at  seemingly  equidistant  periods  ;  of 
which  seeming  equality  we  have  no  other  measure 
but  such  as  the  train  of  our  own  ideas  have  lodged 
in  our  memories,  with  the  concurrence  of  other 
probable  reasons,  to  persuade  us  of  their  equality. 

By  the  same  means,  therefore,  and  from  the  same 
original,  that  we  come  to  have  the  idea  of  time,  we 
have  also  that  idea  which  we  call  "  eternity,"  viz., 
having  got  the  idea  of  succession  and  duration,  by 
reflecting  on  the  train  of  our  own  ideas,  caused  in  us 
either  by  the  natural  appearances  of  those  ideas 
coming  constantly  of  themselves  into  our  waking 
thoughts,  or  else  caused  by  external  objects  succes- 
sively affecting  our  senses  ;  and  having  from  the  revo- 
lutions of  the  sun  got  the  ideas  of  certain  lengths  of 
duration,  we  can  in  our  thoughts  add  such  lengths  of 
duration  to  one  another  as  often  as  we  please,  and 


CH.  XIV.,  XV.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  67 

apply  them,  so  added,  to  durations  past  or  to  come  : 
and  this  we  can  continue  to  do  on,  without  bounds  or 
limits,  and  proceed  in  infinitum,  and  apply  thus  the 
length  of  the  annual  motion  of  the  sun  to  duration, 
supposed  before  the  sun's  or  any  other  motion  had 
its  being. 

And  thus  I  think  it  is  plain,  that  from  those  two 
fountains  of  all  knowledge  before  mentioned,  viz., 
reflection  and  sensation,  we  get  the  ideas  of  duration, 
and  the  measures  of  it. 

For,  First,  by  observing  what  passes  in  our  minds, 
how  our  ideas  there  in  train  constantly  some  vanish, 
and  others  begin  to  appear,  we  come  by  the  idea  of 
succession. 

Secondly.  By  observing  a  distance  in  the  parts  of 
this  succession,  we  get  the  idea  of  duration. 

Thirdly.  By  sensation  observing  certain  appear- 
ances, at  certain  regular  and  seeming  equidistant 
periods,  we  get  the  ideas  of  certain  lengths  or  meas- 
ures of  duration,  as  minutes,  hours,  days,  years,  etc. 

Fourthly.  By  being  able  to  repeat  those  measures 
of  time,  or  ideas  of  stated  length  of  duration  in  our 
minds,  as  often  as  we  will,  we  can  come  to  imagine 
duration  where  nothing  does  really  endure  or  exist  ; 
and  thus  we  imagine  to-morrow,  next  year,  or  seven 
years  hence. 

Fifthly.  By  being  able  to  repeat  any  such  idea  of 
any  length  of  time,  as  of  a  minute,  a  year,  or  an  age, 
as  often  as  we  will  in  our  own  thoughts,  and  add 
them  one  to  another,  without  ever  coming  to  the  end 
of  such  addition,  any  nearer  than  we  can  to  the  end 
of  number,  to  which  we  can  always  add,  we  come  by 


68  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

the  idea  of  eternity,  as  the  future  eternal  duration  of 
our  souls,  as  well  as  the  eternity  of  that  infinite  Being 
which  must  necessarily  have  always  existed. 

Sixthly.  By  considering  any  part  of  infinite  dura- 
tion, as  set  out  by  periodical  measures,  we  come  by 
the  idea  of  what  we  call  "time  "  in  general. 

Time  in  general  is  to  duration  as  place  to  expan- 
sion. They  are  so  much  of  those  boundjess  oceans 
of  eternity  and  immensity,  as  is  set  out  and  distin- 
guished from  the  rest  as  it  were  by  land-marks  ;  and 
so  are  made  use  of  to  denote  the  position  of  finite 
real  beings,  in  respect  one  to  another,  in  those  uniform 
infinite  oceans  of  duration  and  space. 

There  is  one  thing  more  wherein  space  and  dura- 
tion have  a  great  conformity ;  and  that  is,  though 
they  are  justly  reckoned  amongst  our  simple  ideas, 
yet  none  of  the  distinct  ideas  we  have  of  either  is 
without  all  manner  of  composition  ;  it  is  the  very 
nature  of  both  of  them  to  consist  of  parts  :  but  their 
parts  being  all  of  the  same  kind,  and  without  the 
mixture  of  any  other  idea,  hinder  them  not  from  hav- 
ing a  place  amongst  simple  ideas.  Could  the  mind, 
as  in  number,  come  to  so  small  a  part  of  extension  or 
duration  as  excluded  divisibility,  that  would  be,  as  it 
were,  the  indivisible  unit  or  idea  ;  by  repetition  of 
which,  it  would  make  its  more  enlarged  ideas  of 
extension  and  duration.  But  since  the  mind  is  not 
able  to  frame  an  idea  of  any  space  without  parts, 
instead  thereof  it  makes  use  of  the  common  measures, 
which  by  familiar  use  in  each  country  have  imprinted 
themselves  on  the  memory. 

Expansion  and  duration  have  this  farther  agree- 
ment, that  though  they  are  both  considered  by  us  as 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  69 

having  parts,  yet  their  parts  are  not  separable  one 
from  another,  no,  not  even  in  thought ;  though  the 
parts  of  bodies  from  whence  we  take  our  measure  of 
the  one,  and  the  parts  of  motion,  or  rather  the  suc- 
cession of  ideas  in  our  minds,  from  whence  we  take 
the  measure  of  the  other,  may  be  interrupted  and 
separated,  as  the  one  is  often  by  rest,  and  the  other 
is  by  sleep,  which  we  call  rest  too. 

But  yet  there  is  this  manifest  difference  between 
them,  that  the  ideas  of  length  which  we  have  of  ex- 
pansion are  turned  every  way,  and  so  make  figure, 
and  breadth,  and  thickness ;  but  duration  is  but  as  it 
were  the  length  of  one  straight  line  extended  in 
infinitum,  not  capable  of  multiplicity,  variation,  or 
figure,  but  is  one  common  measure  of  all  existence 
whatsoever,  wherein  all  things,  whilst  they  exist, 
equally  partake. 

To  conclude  :  expansion  and  duration  do  mutually 
embrace  and  comprehend  each  other ;  every  part  of 
space  being  in  every  part  of  duration,  and  every  part 
of  duration  in  every  part  of  expansion.  Such  a  com- 
bination of  two  distinct  ideas  is,  I  suppose,  scarce  to 
be  found  in  all  that  great  variety  we  do  or  can  con- 
ceive, and  may  afford  matter  to  farther  speculation. 

3.   The  Idea  of  Number. 

Amongst  all  the  ideas  we  have,  as  there  is  none 
suggested  to  the  mind  by  more  ways,  so  there  is  none 
more  simple,  than  that  of  unity,  or  one. 

By  repeating  this  idea  in  our  minds,  and  adding  the 
repetitions  together,  we  come  by  the  complex  ideas 
of  the  modes  of  it.  Thus  by  adding  one  to  one  we 
have  the  complex  idea  of  a  couple  :  by  putting  twelve 


70  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

units  together  we  have  the  complex  idea  of  a  dozen  ; 
and  a  score,  or  a  million,  or  any  other  number. 

This  is  not  so  in  other  sfmple  modes,  in  which  it  is 
not  so  easy,  nor  perhaps  possible,  for  us  to  distinguish 
betwixt  two  approaching  ideas,  which  yet  are  really 
different.  For  who  will  undertake  to  find  a  differ- 
ence between  the  white  of  this  paper  and  that  of  the 
next  degree  to  it  ?  or  can  form  distinct  ideas  of  even 
the  least  excess  in  extension  ? 

The  clearness  and  distinctness  of  each  mode  of 
number  from  all  others,  even  those  that  approach 
nearest,  makes  me  apt  to  think  that  demonstrations 
in  numbers,  if  they  are  not  more  evident  and  exact 
than  in  extension,  yet  they  are  more  general  in  their 
use,  and  more  determinate  in  their  application.  Be- 
cause the  ideas  of  numbers  are  more  precise  and 
distinguishable  than  in  extension,  where  every  equal- 
ity and  excess  are  not.  so  easy  to  be  observed  or 
measured. 

4.   The  Idea  of  Infinity. 

He  that  would  know  what  kind  of  idea  it  is  to 
which  we  give  the  name  of  "  infinity,"  cannot  do  it 
better  than  by  considering  to  what  infinity  is  by  the 
mind  more  immediately  attributed,  and  then  how  the 
mind  comes  to  frame  it. 

Finite  and  infinite  seem  to  me  to  be  looked  upon 
by  the  mind  as  the  modes  of  quantity,  and  to  be 
attributed  primarily  in  their  first  designation  only  to 
those  things  which  have  parts,  and  are  capable  of  in- 
crease or  diminution  by  the  addition  or  subtraction 
of  any  the  least  part ;  and  such  are  the  ideas  of  space, 
duration,  and  number,  which  we  have  considered  in 


CH.  XVII.]        THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  71 

the  foregoing  chapters.  But  yet  when  we  apply  to 
that  first  and  supreme  Being  our  idea  of  infinite,  in 
our  weak  and  narrow  thoughts,  we  do  it  primarily  in 
respect  of  his  duration  and  ubiquity  ;  and,  I  think, 
more  figuratively  to  his  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness, 
and  other  attributes,  which  are  properly  inexhaust- 
ible and  incomprehensible,  etc.  For  when  we  call 
them  infinite,  we  have  no  other  idea  of  this  infinity 
but  what  carries  with  it  some  reflection  on  and  inti- 
mation of  that  number  or  extent  of  the  acts  or  objects 
of  God's  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  which  can 
never  be  supposed  so  great  or  so  many,  which  these 
attributes  will  not  always  surmount  and  exceed,  let 
us  multiply  them  in  our  thoughts  as  far  as  we  can, 
with  all  the  infinity  of  endless  number. 

As  for  the  idea  of  finite,  there  is  no  great  diffi- 
culty. The  obvious  portions  of  extension  that  affect 
our  senses  carry  with  them  into  the  mind  the  idea 
of  finite.  The  difficulty  is,  how  we  come  by  those 
boundless  ideas  of  eternity  and  immensity,  since  the 
objects  which  we  converse  with  come  so  much  short 
of  any  approach  or  proportion  to  that  largeness. 

Every  one  that  has  any  idea  of  any  stated  lengths 
of  space,  as  a  foot,  finds  that  he  can  repeat  that  idea  ; 
and,  joining  it  to  the  former,  make  the  idea  of  two 
feet,  and,  by  the  addition  of  a  third,  three  feet,  and 
so  on,  without  ever  coming  to  an  end.  of  his  additions, 
whether  of  the  same  idea  of  a  foot,  or,  if  he  pleases, 
of  doubling  it,  or  any  other  idea  he  has  of  any  length, 
as  a  mile,  or  diameter  of  the  earth,  or  of  the  orbis 
magnus ;  for  whichsoever  of  these  he  takes,  and  how 
often  soever  he  doubles  or  any  otherwise  multiplies 
jt,  he  finds  that,  after  he  has  continued  this  doubling 


72  THfc    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

in  his  thoughts  and  enlarged  his  idea  as  much  as  he 
pleases,  he  has  no  more  reason  to  stop,  nor  is  one  jot 
nearer  the  end  of  such  addition  than  he  was  at  first 
setting  out  :  the  power  of  enlarging  his  idea  of  space 
by  farther  additions  remaining  still  the  same,  he  hence 
takes  the  idea  of  infinite  space. 

I  think  it  is  not  an  insignificant  subtilty  if  I  say 
that  we  are  carefully  to  distinguish  between  the  idea 
of  the  infinity  of  space  and  the  idea  of  a  space  infinite  ; 
the  first  is  nothing  but  a  supposed  endless  progression 
of  the  mind  over  what  repeated  ideas  of  space  it 
pleases  ;  but  to  have  actually  in  the  mind  the  idea  of 
a  space  infinite,  is  to  suppose  the  mind  already  passed 
over,  and  actually  to  have  a  view  of  all  those  repeated 
ideas  of  space  which  an  endless  repetition  can  never 
totally  represent  to  it :  which  carries  in  it  a  plain 
contradiction  ;  for  of  any  space,  duration,  or  number, 
let  them  be  never  so  great,  they  are  still  finite  ;  but 
when  we  suppose  an  inexhaustible  remainder,  from 
which  we  remove  all  bounds,  and  wherein  we  allow 
the  mind  an  endless  progression  of  thought,  without 
ever  completing  the  idea,  there  we  have  our  idea  of 
infinity  ;  which  though  it  seems  to  be  pretty  clear 
when  we  consider  nothing  else  in  it  but  the  negation 
of  an  end,  yet  when  we  would  frame  in  our  minds 
the  idea  of  an  infinite  space  or  duration,  that  idea  is 
very  obscure  and  confused,  because  it  is  made  up  of 
two  parts  very  different,  if  not  inconsistent. 

Though  it  be  hard,  I  think,  to  find  any  one  so  ab- 
surd as  to  say  he  has  the  positive  idea  of  an  actual 
infinite  number,  yet  there  be  those  who  imagine  they 
have  positive  ideas  of  infinite  duration  and  space.  It 
would,  I  think,  be  enough  to  destroy  any  such  posi- 


CH.  XVII. ]        THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  73 

tive  idea  of  infinite  to  ask  him  that  has  it,  whether  he 
could  add  to  it  or  no  ?  which  would  easily  show  the 
mistake  of  such  a  positive  idea.  We  can,  I  think, 
have  no  positive  idea  of  any  space  or  duration  which 
is  not  made  up  of,  and  commensurate  to,  repeated 
numbers  of  feet  or  yards,  or  days  and  years  ;  which 
are  the  common  measures  whereof  we  have  the  idea 
in  our  minds,  and  whereby  we  judge  of  the  greatness 
of  these  sort  of  quantities.  And  therefore,  since  an 
idea  of  infinite  space  or  duration  must  needs  be  made 
up  of  infinite  parts,  it  can  have  no  other  infinity  than 
that  of  number,  capable  still  of  farther  addition  ;  but 
not  an  actual  positive  idea  of  a  number  infinite. 

The  idea  of  infinite  has,  I  confess,  something  of 
positive  in  all  those  things  we  apply  it  to.  When  we 
would  think  of  infinite  space  or  duration,  we  at  first 
step  usually  make  some  very  large  idea,  as,  perhaps, 
of  millions  of  ages  or  miles,  which  possibly  we  double 
and  multiply  several  times.  All  that  we  thus  amass 
together  in  our  thoughts  is  positive,  and  the  assem- 
blage of  a  great  number  of  positive  ideas  of  space  or 
duration.  But  what  still  remains  beyond  this,  we 
have  no  more  a  positive,  distinct  notion  of,  than  a 
mariner  has  of  the  depth  of  the  sea,  where,  having  let 
down  a  large  portion  of  his  sounding-line,  he  reaches 
no  bottom  :  whereby  he  knows  the  depth  to  be  so 
many  fathoms,  and  more  ;  but  how  much  that  more 
is,  he  hath  no  distinct  notion  at  all  :  and  could  he 
always  supply  new  line,  and  find  the  plummet  always 
sink  without  ever  stopping,  he  would  be  something  in 
the  posture  of  the  mind  reaching  after  a  complete 
and  positive  idea  of  infinity. 


74  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK    II 


SOME    OTHER    SIMPLE    MODES    CONSIDERED. 

i.  Modes  of  Thinking. 

When  the  mind  turns  its  view  inwards  upon  itself, 
and  contemplates  its  own  actions,  thinking  is  the  first 
that  occurs.  In  it  the  mind  observes  a  great  variety 
of  modifications,  and  from  thence  receives  distinct 
ideas.  Thus  the  perception  which  actually  accom- 
panies and  is  annexed  to  any  impression  on  the  body 
made  by  an  external  object,  being  distinct  from  all 
other  modifications  of  thinking,  furnishes  the  mind 
with  a  distinct  idea  which  we  call  "  sensation  ;  "  which 
is,  as  it  were,  the  actual  entrance  of  any  idea  into  the 
understanding  by  the  senses.  The  same  idea,  when 
it  again  recurs  without  the  operation  of  the  like  object 
on  the  external  sensory,  is  "  remembrance  :  "  if  it  be 
sought  after  by  the  mind,  and  with  pain  and  endeavor 
found,  and  brought  again  in  view,  it  is  "  recollection  :  " 
if  it  be  held  there  long  under  attentive  consideration, 
it  is  "  contemplation"  :  when  ideas  float  in  our  mind 
without  any  reflection  or  regard  of  the  understanding, 
it  is  that  which  the  French  call  re'verie ;  our  language 
has  scarce  a  name  for  it :  when  the  ideas  that  offer 
themselves  (for,  as  I  have  observed  in  another  place, 
whilst  we  are  awake  there  will  always  be  a  train  of 
ideas  succeeding  one  another  in  our  minds)  are  taken 
notice  of,  and,  at  it  were,  registered  in  the  memory, 
it  is  "attention." 


CH.  XIX.,  XXI.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  75 

These  are  some  few  instances  of  those  various 
modes  of  thinking  which  the  mind  may  observe  in 
itself,  and  so  have  as  distinct  ideas  of  as  it  hath  of 
white  and  red,  a  square  or  a  circle.  I  do  not  pretend 
to  enumerate  them  all,  nor  to  treat  at  large  of  this 
set  of  ideas  which  are  got  from  reflection  ;  that  would 
be  to  make  a  volume.  It  suffices  to  my  present  pur- 
pose to  have  shown  here,  by  some  few  examples,  of 
what  sort  these  ideas  are,  and  how  the  mind  comes 
by  them  ;  especially  since  I  shall  have  occasion  here- 
after to  treat  more  at  large  of  reasoning,  judging, 
volition,  and  knowledge,  which  are  some  of  the  most 
considerable  operations  of  the  mind,  and  modes  of 
thinking. 

2.   The  Idea  of  Power. 

The  mind  being  every  day  informed,  by  the  senses, 
of  the  alteration  of  those  simple  ideas  it  observes  in 
things  without,  and  taking  notice  how  one  comes  to 
an  end  and  ceases  to  be,  and  another  begins  to  exist 
which  was  not  before  ;  reflecting  also,  on  what  passes 
within  itself,  and  observing  a  constant  change  of  its 
ideas,  sometimes  by  the  impression  of  outward  objects 
on  the  senses,  and  sometimes  by  the  determination 
of  its  own  choice  ;  and  concluding  from  what  it  has 
so  constantly  observed  to  have  been,  that  the  like 
changes  will  for  the  future  be  made  in  the  same  things 
by  like  agents,  and  by  the  like  ways  ;  considers  in  one 
thing  the  possibility  of  having  any  of  its  simple  ideas 
changed,  ard  in  another  the  possibility  of  making 
that  change  ;  and  so  comes  by  that  idea  which  we 
call  "  power." 


76  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

Power  thus  considered  is  twofold  ;  viz.,  as  able  to 
make,  or  able  to  receive,  any  change  :  the  one  may 
be  called  "  active,"  and  the  other  "  passive,"  power. 

I  confess  power  includes  in  it  some  kind  of  rela- 
tion,— a  relation  to  action  or  change  ;  as,  indeed, 
which  of  our  ideas,  of  what  kind  soever,  when  atten- 
tively considered,  does  not  ?  For  our  ideas  of  exten- 
sion, duration,  and  number,  do  they  not  all  contain 
in  them  a  secret  relation  of  the  parts  ?  Figure  and 
motion  have  something  relative  in  them  much  more 
visibly.  And  sensible  qualities,  as  colors  and  smells, 
etc.,  what  are  they  but  the  powers  of  different  bodies 
in  relation  to  our  perception,  etc.  ? 

3.  Mixed  Modes. 

That  the  mind,  in  respect  of  its  simple  ideas,  is 
wholly  passive,  and  receives  them  all  from  the  exist- 
ence and  operations  of  things,  such  as  sensation  or 
reflection  offers  them,  without  being  able  to  make  any 
one  idea,  experience  shows  us.  But  if  we  attentively 
consider  these  ideas  I  call  "  mixed  modes  "  we  are 
now  speaking  of,  we  shall  find  their  original  quite 
different.  The  mind  often  exercises  an  active  power 
in  making  these  several  combinations :  for,  it  being 
once  furnished  with  simple  ideas,  it  can  put  them 
together  in  several  compositions,  and  so  make  variety 
of  complex  ideas,  without  examining  whether  they 
exist  so  together  in  nature.  And  hence,  I  think,  it 
is  that  these  ideas  are  called  "  notions  ; "  as  if  they 
had  their  original  and  constant  existence  more  in  the 
thoughts  of  men,  than  in  the  reality  of  things  ;  and  to 
form  such  ideas  it  sufficed  that  the  mind  puts  the 


CH.  XXII.]        THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  77 

parts  of  them  together,  and  that  they  were  consistent 
in  the  understanding,  without  considering  whether 
they  had  any  real  being :  though  I  do  not  deny  but 
several  of  them  might  be  taken  from  observation,  and 
the  existence  of  several  simple  ideas  so  combined  as 
they  are  put  together  in  the  understanding. 


78  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 


THE  IDEA  OF  SUBSTANCE. 

The  mind  being,  as  I  have  declared,  furnished  with 
a  great  number  of  the  simple  ideas  conveyed  in  by 
the  senses,  as  they  are  found  in  exterior  things,  or  by 
reflection  on  its  own  operations,  takes  notice,  also, 
that  a  certain  number  of  these  simple  ideas  go  con- 
stantly together  ;  which  being  presumed  to  belong  to 
one  thing,  and  words  being  suited  to  common  appre- 
hensions, and  made  use  of  for  quick  dispatch,  are 
called,  so  united  in  one  subject,  by  one  name  ;  which, 
by  inadvertency,  we  are  apt  afterward  to  talk  of  and 
consider  as  one  simple  idea,  which  indeed  is  a  com- 
plication of  many  ideas  together  :  because,  as  I  have 
said,  not  imagining  how  these  simple  ideas  can  sub- 
sist by  themselves,  we  accustom  ourselves  to  suppose 
some  substratum  wherein  they  do  subsist,  and  from 
which  they  do  result ;  which  therefore  we  call  "sub- 
stance." 

f  But  if  any  one  will  examine  himself  concerning  his 
notion  of  pure  substance  in  general,  he  will  find  he 
has  no  other  idea  of  it  at  all,  but  only  a  supposition 
of  he  knows  not  what  support  of  such  qualities  which 
are  capable  of  producing  simple  ideas  in  us ;  which 
qualities  are  commonly  called  "accidents^  If  any 
one  should  be  asked,  "  What  is  the  subject  wherein 
color  or  weight  inheres  ? "  he  would  have  nothing  to 
say  but,  "  The  solid  extended  parts."  And  if  he  were 
demanded,  "What  is  it  that  solidity  and  extension 
inhere  in/'  he  would  not  be  in  a  much  better  case 


CH.  XXIII.]      THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE. 

than  the  Indian  before  mentioned,  who,  saying  that 
the  world  was  supported  by  a  great  elephant,  was 
asked,  what  the  elephant  rested  on  ?  to  which  his 
answer  was,  "  A  great  tortoise : "  but  being  again 
pressed  to  know  what  gave  support  to  the  broad- 
backed  tortoise,  replied, — something,  he  knew  not 
what. 

An  obscure  and  relative  idea  of  substance  in  gen- 
eral being  thus  made,  we  come  to  have  the  ideas  of 
particular  sorts  of  substances,  by  collecting  such  com- 
binations of  simple  ideas  as  are  by  experience  and 
observation  of  men's  senses  taken  notice  of  to  exist 
together,  and  are  therefore  supposed  to  flow  from  the 
particular  internal  constitution  or  unknown  essence 
of  that  substance.  Thus  we  come  to  have  the  ideas 
of  a  man,  horse,  gold,  water,  etc.,  of  which  substances, 
whether  any  one  has  any  other  clear  idea,  farther 
than  of  certain  simple  ideas  co-existing  together,  I 
appeal  to  every  one's  own  experience.  It  is  the  ordi- 
nary qualities  observable,  in  iron  or  a  diamond,  put 
together,  that  make  the  true  complex  idea  of  those 
substances,  which  a  smith  or  a  jeweller  commonly 
knows  better  than  a  philosopher  ;  who,  whatever  sub- 
stantial forms  he  may  talk  of,  has  no  other  idea  of 
those  substances  than  what  is  framed  by  a  collection 
of  those  simple  ideas  which  are  to  be  found  in  them. 
Only  we  must  take  notice,  that  our  complex  ideas  of 
substances,  besides  all  these  simple  ideas  they  are 
made  up  of,  have  always  the  confused  idea  of  some- 
thing to  which  they  belong  and  in  which  they  subsist. 

Hence,  when  we  talk  or  think  of  any  particular  sort 
of  corporeal  substances,  as 


So  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

the  idea  we  have  of  either  of  them  be  but  the  compli- 
cation or  collection  of  those  several  simple  ideas  of 
sensible  qualities  which  we  used  to  find  united  in  the 
thing  called  "  horse  "  or  "  stone  ;  "  yet  because  we  can- 
not conceive  how  they  should  subsist  alone,  nor  one 
in  another,  we  suppose  them  existing  in,  and  sup- 
ported by,  some  common  subject ;  which  support  we 
denote  by  the  name  "  substance,"  though  it  be  certain 
we  have  no  clear  or  distinct  idea  of  that  thing  we 
suppose  a  support. 

The  same  happens  concerning  the  operations  of  the 
mind  ;  viz.,  thinking,  reasoning,  fearing,  etc.,  which  we 
concluding  not  to  subsist  of  themselves,  nor  appre- 
hending how  they  can  belong  to  body,  or  be  produced 
by  it,  we  are  apt  to  think  these  the  actions  of  some 
other  substance,  which  we  call  "  spirit  ;  "  whereby  yet 
it  is  evident,  that  having  no  other  idea  or  notion  of 
matter,  but  something  wherein  those  many  sensible 
qualities  which  affect  our  senses  do  subsist ;  by  sup- 
posing a  substance  wherein  thinking,  knowing,  doubt- 
ing, and  a  power  of  moving,  etc.,  do  subsist  ;  we  have 
as  clear  a  notion  of  the  substance  of  spirit  as  we  have 
of  body :  the  one  being  supposed  to  be  (without 
knowing  what  it  is)  the  substratum  to  those  simple 
ideas  we  have  from  without  ;  and  the  other  supposed 
(with  a  like  ignorance  of  what  it  is)  to  be  the  sub- 
stratum to  those  operations  which  we  experiment  in 
ourselves  within. 

For  our  idea  of  substance  is  equally  obscure,  or 
none  at  all,  in  both  ;  it  is  but  a  supposed  I  know-not- 
what,  to  support  those  ideas  we  call  "  accidents."  It 
is  for  want  of  reflection  that  we  are  apt  to  think  that 
our  senses  show  us  nothing  but  material  things. 


CH.  XXIII.]     THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  8l 

Every  act  of  sensation,  when  duly  considered,  gives 
us  an  equal  view  of  both  parts  of  nature,  the  corporeal 
and  spiritual.  For,  whilst  I  know,  by  seeing  or  hear- 
ing, etc.,  that  there  is  some  corporeal  being  without 
me,  the  object  of  that  sensation,  I  can  more  certainly 
know  that  there  is  some  spiritual  being  within  me 
that  sees  and  hears.  This  I  must  be  convinced  can- 
not be  the  action  of  bare  insensible  matter,  nor  even 
could  be  without  an  immaterial  thinking  being. 

The  ideas  that  make  our  complex  ones  of  corporeal 
substances  are  of  these  three  sorts.  First,  The  ideas 
of  the  primary  qualities  of  things  which  are  discovered  I 
by  our  senses,  and  are  in  them  even  when  we  perceive 
them  not  :  such  are  the  bulk,  figure,  number,  situa- 
tion, and  motion  of  the  parts  of  bodies,  which  are 
really  in  them,  whether  we  take  notice  of  them  or  no. 
Secondly,  The  sensible  secondary  qualities  which,  i 
depending  on  these,  are  nothing  but  the  powers  those 
substances  have  to  produce  several  ideas  in  us  by  our 
senses  ;  which  ideas  are  not  in  the  things  themselves 
otherwise  than  as  anything  is  in  its  cause.  Thirdly,! 
The  aptness  we  consider  in  any  substance  to  give  or 
receive  such  alterations  of  primary  qualities  as  that 
the  substance  so  altered  should  produce  in  us  different 
ideas  from  what  it  did  before  ;  these  are  called 
"  active  and  passive  powers  : "  all  which  powers,  as  far 
as  we  have  any  notice  or  notion  of  them,  terminate 
only  in  sensible  simple  ideas. 

And  thus  we  have  seen  what  kind  of  ideas  we  have 
of  substances  of  all  kinds,  wherein  they  consist,  and 
how  we  come  by  them.  From  whence,  I  think,  it  is 
very  evident  : 

First.     That  all  our  ideas  of  the  several  sorts  of 


8, 


THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 


substances  are  nothing  but  collections  of  simple  ideas, 
with  a  supposition  of  something  to  which  they  belong, 
and  in  which  they  subsist;  though  of  this  supposed 
something  we  have  no  clear  distinct  idea  at  all. 

Secondly.  That  all  the  simple  ideas  that,  thus 
united  in  one  common  substratum,  make  up  our  com- 
plex ideas  of  several  sorts  of  substances,  are  no  other 
but  such  as  we  have  received  from  sensation  or  re- 
flection. So  that  even  in  those  which  we  think  are 
most  intimately  acquainted  with,  and  come  nearest 
the  comprehension  of  our  most  enlarged  conceptions, 
we  cannot  reach  beyond  those  simple  ideas.  And 
even  in  those  which  seem  most  remote  from  all  we 
have  to  do  with,  and  do  infinitely  surpass  anything 
we  can  perceive  in  ourselves  by  reflection,  or  discover 
by  sensation  in  other  things,  we  can  attain  to  nothing 
but  those  simple  ideas  which  we  originally  received 
from  sensation  or  reflection  ;  as  is  evident  in  the  com- 
plex ideas  we  have  of  angels,  and  particularly  of  God 
himself. 

^  Thirdly.  That  most  of  the  simple  ideas  that  make 
up  our  complex  ideas  of  substances,  when  truly  con- 
sidered, are  only  powers,  however  we  are  apt  to  take 
them  for  positive  qualities  :  v.  g.,  the  greatest  part  of 
the  ideas  that  make  our  complex  idea  of  gold  are 
yellowness,  great  weight,  ductility,  fusibility,  and 
solubility  in  aqua  regia,  etc.,  all  united  together  in 
an  unknown  substratum  ;  all  which  ideas  are  noth- 
ing else  but  so  many  relations  to  other  substances, 
and  are  not  really  in  the  gold  considered  barely  in 
itself,  though  they  depend  on  those  real  and  primary 
qualities  of  its  internal  constitution,  whereby  it  has  a 


CH.  XXIV.,  XXV.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  83 

fitness  differently  to  operate  and  be  operated  on  by 
several  other  substances. 

Besides  these  complex  ideas  of  several  single  sub- 
stances, as  of  man,  horse,  gold,  violet,  apple,  etc.,  the 
mind  hath  also  "  complex  collective  ideas  "  of  sub- 
stances ;  which  I  so  call,  because  such  ideas  are  made 
up  of  many  particular  substances  considered  together, 
as  united  into  one  idea,  and  which  so  joined  are 
looked  on  as  one  ;  v.  g.,  the  idea  of  such  a  collection 
of  men  as  make  an  army,  though  consisting  of  a  great 
number  of  distinct  substances,  is  as  much  one  idea  as 
the  idea  of  a  man  :  and  the  great  collective  idea  of 
all  bodies  whatsoever,  signified  by  the  name  "  world," 
is  as  much  one  idea  as  the  idea  of  any  the  least  particle 
of  matter  in  it  ;  it  sufficing  to  the  unity  of  any  idea, 
that  it  be  considered  as  one  representation  or  picture, 
though  made  up  of  ever  so  many  particulars. 

These  collective  ideas  of  substances  the  mind  makes 
by  its  power  of  composition,  and  uniting,  severally, 
either  simple  or  complex  ideas  into  one,  as  it  does  by 
the  same  faculty  make  the  complex  ideas  of  particular 
substances,  consisting  of  an  aggregate  of  divers  simple 
ideas  united  in  one  substance  :  and  as  the  mind,  by 
putting  together  the  repeated  ideas  of  unity,  makes  the 
collective  mode  or  complex  idea  of  any  number,  as  a 
score,  or  a  gross,  etc.,  so  by  putting  together  several 
particular  substances,  it  makes  collective  ideas  of  sub- 
stances, as  a  troop,  an  army,  a  swarm,  a  city,  a  fleet : 
each  of  which  every  one  finds  that  he  represents  to  his 
own  mind  by  one  idea,  in  one  view ;  and  so  under 
that  notion  considers  those  several  things  as  perfectly 
one,  as  one  ship,  or  one  atom. 


84  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

The  Idea  of  Relation. 

Besides  the  ideas,  whether  simple  or  complex,  that 
the  mind  has  of  things,  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
there  are  others  it  gets  from  their  comparison  one  \ 
with  another.  The  understanding,  in  the  considera- 
tion of  any  thing,  is  not  confined  to  that  precise  ob- 
ject :  it  can  carry  any  idea,  as  it  were,  beyond  itself, 
or,  at  least,  look  beyond  it  to  see  how  it  stands  in 
conformity  to  any  other.  When  the  mind  so  consid- 
ers one  thing,  that  it  does,  as  it  were,  bring  it  to  and 
set  it  by  another,  and  carry  its  view  from  one  to  the 
other  :  this  is,  as  the  words  import,  "  relation"  and 
"  respect ;  "  and  the  denominations  given  to  positive 
things,  intimating  that  respect,  and  serving  as  marks 
to  lead  the  thoughts  beyond  the  subject  itself  denom- 
inated to  something  distinct  from  it,  are  what  we  call 
"  relatives  ; "  and  the  things  so  brought  together,  "  re- 
lated." 

The  Idea  of  Relation — How  Formed. 

This  farther  may  be  observed,  that  the  ideas  of  re- 
lation may  be  the  same  in  men  who  have  far  different 
ideas  of  the  things  that  are  related,  or  that  are  thus 
compared  :  v.  g.,  those  who  have  far  different  ideas 
of  a  man,  may  yet  agree  in  the  notion  of  a  father  : 
which  is  a  notion  superinduced  to  the  substance,  or 
man,  and  refers  only  to  an  act  of  that  thing  called 
"  man,"  whereby  he  contributed  to  the  generation  of 
one  of  his  own  kind,  let  man  be  what  it  will. 

Relation  and  Things  Related. 

The  nature  therefore  of  relation  consists  in  the  re-j 
ferring  or  comparing  two  things  one  to  another  ;  from' 
which  comparison  one  or  both  comes  to  be  denomi- 


CH.  XXV. -XXVI.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  85 

nated.  And  if  either  of  those  things  be  removed  or 
cease  to  be,  the  relation  ceases,  and  the  denomination 
consequent  to  it,  though  the  other  receive  in  itself  no 
alteration  at  all  :  v.g.,  Caius,  whom  I  consider  to-day 
as  a  father,  ceases  to  be  so  to-morrow,  only  by  the 
death  of  his  son,  without  any  alteration  made  in  him- 
self. Nay,  barely  by  the  mind's  changing  the  object, 
to  which  it  compares  any  thing,  the  same  thing  is 
capable  of  having  contrary  denominations  at  the  same 
time  :  v.  g.,  Caius,  compared  to  several  persons,  may 
truly  be  said  to  be  older  and  younger,  stronger  and 
weaker,  etc. 

i.   The  Idea  of  Cause  and  Effect. 

Having  laid  down  these  premises  concerning  rela- 
tion in  general,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show  in  some 
instances,  how  all  the  ideas  we  have  of  relation  are 
made  up,  as  the  others  are,  only  of  simple  ideas  ;  and 
that  they  all,  how  refined  or  remote  from  sense  soever 
they  seem,  terminate  at  last  in  simple  ideas.  I  shall 
begin  with  the  most  comprehensive  relation,  wherein 
all  things  that  do  or  can  exist  are  concerned  ;  and 
that  is  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  The  idea 
whereof,  how  derived  from  the  two  fountains  of  all 
our  knowledge,  sensation  and  reflection,  I  shall  in  the 
next  place  consider. 

In  the  notice  that  our  senses  take  of  the  constant 
vicissitude  of  things,  we  cannot  but  observe  that 
several  particular  qualities  and  substances  begin  to 
exist  ;  and  that  they  receive  this  their  existence  from 
the  due  application  and  operation  of  some  other  be- 
ing. From  this  observation  we  get  our  ideas  of  cause 
and  effect.  LThat  which  produces  any  simple  or  com- 


86  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

plex  idea,  we  denote  by  the  general  name  "  cause  ; " 
and  that  which  is  produced,  "  effect.!  Thus  finding 
that  in  that  substance  which  we  call  '  wax"  fluidity, 
which  is  a  simple  idea  that  was  not  in  it  before,  is 
constantly  produced  by  the  application  of  a  certain 
degree  of  heat,  we  call  the  simple  idea  of  heat,  in  re- 
lation to  fluidity  in  wax,  the  cause  of  it,  and  fluidity 
the  effect. 

2.   The  Ideas  of  Identity  and  Diversity. 

Another  occasion  the  mind  often  takes  of  compar- 
ing, is,  the  very  being  of  things,  when,  considering 
any  thing  as  existing  at  any  determined  time  and 
place,  we  compare  it  with  itself  existing  at  another 
time,  and  thereon  form  the  ideas  of  identity  and 
diversity.  When  we  see  any  thing  to  be  in  any  place 
in  any  instant  of  time,  we  are  sure  (be  it  what  it  will) 
that  it  is  that  very  thing,  and  not  another,  which  at 
that  same  time  exists  in  another  place,  how  like  and 
undistinguishable  soever  it  may  be  in  all  other  re- 
spects :  and  in  this  consists  identity,  when  the  ideas 
it  is  attributed  to,  vary  not  at  all  from  what  they 
were  that  moment  wherein  we  consider  their  former 
existence,  and  to  which  we  compare  the  present.  For 
we  never  finding,  nor  conceiving  it  possible,  that  two 
things  of  the  same  kind  should  exist  in  the  same  place 
at  the  same  time,  we  rightly  conclude  that  whatever 
exists  any  where  at  any  time,  excludes  all  of  the  same 
kind,  and  is  there  itself  alone.  When  therefore  we 
demand  whether  any  thing  be  the  same  or  no,  it  re- 
fers always  to  something  that  existed  such  a  time  in 
such  a  place,  which  it  was  certain  at  that  instant  was| 
the  same  with  itself  and  no  oth^r  :  from  whence  it 


CH.  XXVII. ]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  87 

follows,  that  one  thing  cannot  have  two  beginnings  of 
existence,  nor  two  things  one  beginning,  it  being  im- 
possible for  two  things  of  the  same  kind  to  be  or 
exist  in  the  same  instant,  in  the  very  same  place,  or 
one  and  the  same  thing  in  different  places.  For  ex- 
ample :  Could  two  bodies  be  in  the  same  place  at  the 
same  time,  then  those  two  parcels  of  matter  must  be 
one  and  the  same,  take  them  great  or  little  ;  nay,  all  J 
bodies  must  be  one  and  the  same.  For  by  the  same 
reason  that  two  particles  of  matter  may  be  in  one 
place,  all  bodies  may  be  in  one  place  :  which,  when 
it  can  be  supposed,  takes  away  the  distinction  of 
identity  and  diversity,  of  one  and  more,  and  renders 
it  ridiculous. 

This,  though  it  seems  easier  to  conceive  in  simple 
substances  or  modes,  yet,  when  reflected  on,  is  not 
more  difficult  in  compounded  ones,  if  care  be  taken 
to  what  it  is  applied;  v.  ,*f.,let  us  suppose  an  atom, 
/.  e.,  a  continued  body  under  one  immutable  super- 
ficies, existing  in  a  determined  time  and  place ;  it  is 
evident,  that,  considered  in  any  instant  of  its  exist- 
ence, it  is,  in  that  instant,  the  same  with  itself.  For, 
being  at  that  instant  what  it  is  and  nothing  else,  it  is 
the  same,  and  so  must  continue  as  long  as  its  exist- 
ence is  continued  ;  for  so  long  it  will  be  the  same 
and  no  other.  In  like  manner,  if  two  or  more  atoms 
be  joined  together  into  the  same  mass,  every  one  of 
those  atoms  will  be  the  same,  by  the  foregoing  rule  : 
and  whilst  they  exist  united  together,  the  mass,  con- 
sisting of  the  same  atoms,  must  be  the  same  mass, 
or  the  same  body,  let  the  parts  be  ever  so  differ- 
ently jumbled  :  but  if  one  of  these  atoms  be  taken 
away,  or  one  new  one  added,  it  is  no  longer  the 


"I 

•I 


88  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

same  mass,  or  the  same  body.  In  the  state  of  living 
creatures,  their  identity  depends  not  on  a  mass  of  the 
same  particles,  but  on  something  else.  For  in  them 
the  variation  of  great  parcels  of  matter  alters  not  the 
identity  ;  an  oak,  growing  from  a  plant  to  a  great  tree, 
and  then  lopped,  is  still  the  same  oak  :  and  a  colt 
grown  up  to  a  horse,  sometimes  fat,  sometimes  lean 
is  all  the  while  the  same  horse  :  though,  in  both  these 
cases,  there  may  be  a  manifest  change  of  the  parts  ; 
so  that  truly  they  are  not  either  of  them  the  same 
masses  of  matter,  though  there  be  truly  one  of  them 
the  same  oak,  and  the  other  the  same  horse.  The 
reason  whereof  is,  that,  in  these  two  cases  of  a  mass 
of  matter  and  a  living  body,  identity  is  not  applied  to 
the  same  thing. 

We  must  therefore  consider  wherein  an  oak  differs 
from  a  mass  of  matter ;  and  that  seems  to  me  to  be 
in  this  :  That  the  one  is  only  the  cohesion  of  particles^ 
of  matter  any  how  united  :  the  other  such  a  disposi- 
tion of  them  as  constitutes  the  parts  of  an  oak,  and 
such  an  organization  of  those  parts  as  is  fit  to  receive 
and  distribute  nourishment,  so  as  to  continue  and 
frame  the  wood,  bark,  and  leaves,  etc.,  of  an  oak,  in 
which  consists  the  vegetable  life.  That  being  then 
one  plant  which  has  such  an  organization  of  parts  in 
one  coherent  body,  partaking  of  one  common  life,  it 
continues  to  be  the  same  plant  as  long  as  it  partakes 
of  the  same  life,  though  that  life  be  communicated  to 
new  particles  of  matter  vitally  united  to  the  living 
plant  in  a  like  continued  organization,  comformable 
to  that  sort  of  plants. 

This  also  shows  wherein   the  identity  of  the  same 


CH.  XXVIL]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  89 

man  consists  ;  viz.,  in  nothing  but  a  participation  of  f 
the  same  continued  life,  by  constantly  fleeting  particles  * 
of  matter,  in  succession  vitally  united  to  the  same 
organized  body.  He  that  shall  place  the  identity  of 
man  in  anything  else,  but,  like  that  of  other  animals, 
in  one  fitly  organized  body,  taken  in  any  one  instant, 
and  from  thence  continued  under  one  organization 
of  life  in  several  successively  fleeting  particles  of 
matter  united  to  it,  will  find  it  hard  to  make  an 
embryo  one  of  years,  mad,  and  sober,  the  same  man, 
by  any  supposition  that  will  not  make  it  possible  for 
Seth,  Ishmael,  Socrates,  Pilate,  St.  Austin,  and  Caesar 
Borgia,  to  be  the  same  man. 

It  is  not  therefore  unity  of  substance  that  compre- 
hends all  sorts  of  identity,  or  will  determine  it  in 
every  case  :  but,  to  conceive  and  judge  of  it  aright, 
we  must  consider  what  idea  the  word  it  is  applied  to 
tands  for  :  it  being  one  thing  to  be  the  same  sub- 
stance, another  the  same  man,  and  a  third  the  same 
person,  if  "person,  man,  and  substance,"  are  three 
names  standing  for  three  different  ideas  ;  for  such  as 
is  the  idea  belonging  to  that  name,  such  must  be  the 
identity :  which,  if  it  had  been  a  little  more  carefully 
attended  to,  would  possibly  have  prevented  a  great 
deal  of  that  confusion  which  often  occurs  about  this 
matter,  with  no  small  seeming  difficulties,  especially 
concerning  personal  identity,  which  therefore  we  shall 
in  the  next  place  a  little  consider. 

This   being    premised,    to    fine   wherein    personal 
identity  consists,  we  must   consider  what  "  person  " 
stands  for  ;  which,  I  think,  is  a  thinking  intelligent  I 
being,  that  has  reason  and  reflection,  and  can  consider  ' 


90  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

itself  as  itself,  the  same  thinking  thing,  in  different 
times  and  places ;  which  it  does  only  by  that  con- 
sciousness which  is  inseparable  from  thinking,  and  it 
seems  to  me  essential  to  it  :  it  being  impossible  for 
any  one  to  perceive,  without  perceiving  that  he  does 
perceive.  When  we  see,  hear,  smell,  taste,  feel, 
meditate,  or  will  any  thing,  we  know  that  we  do  so. 
Thus  it  is  always  as  to  our  present  sensations  and 
perceptions  :  and  by  this  every  one  is  to  himself  that 
which  he  calls  "  self  ;  "  it  not  being  considered,  in  this 
case,  whether  the  same  self  be  continued  in  the  same 
or  diverse  substances.  For  since  consciousness  always 
accompanies  thinking,  and  it  is  that  that  makes  every  | 
one  to  be  what  he  calls  "  self,"  and  thereby  dis-  I 
tinguishes  himself  from  all  other  thinking  things  ;  in 
this  alone  consists  personal  identity,  /.  ^.,  the  same- 1 
ness  of  a  rational  being  :  and  as  far  as  this  conscious- 
ness can  be  extended  backwards  to  any  past  action 
or  thought,  so  far  reaches  the  identity  of  that  person  ; 
it  is  the  same  self  now  it  was  then  ;  and  it  is  by  the 
same  self  with  this  present  one  that  now  reflects  on 
it,  that  that  action  was  done.. 

But  it  is  farther  inquired,  whether  it  be  the  same 
identical  substance  ?  This,  few  would  think  they  had 
reason  to  doubt  of,  if  these  perceptions,  with  their 
consciousness,  always  remained  present  in  the  mind, 
whereby  the  same  thinking  thing  would  be  always 
consciously  present,  and,  as  would  be  thought,  evi- 
dently the  same  to  itself.  But  that  which  seems  to 
make  the  difficulty  is  this,  that  this  consciousness 
being  interrupted  always  by  forgetfulness,  there  being 
no  moment  of  our  lives  wherein  we  have  the  whole 


CH.  XXVII. J    THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  9! 

train  of  all  our  past  actions  before  our  eyes  in  one 
view  ;  but  even  the  best  memories  losing  the  sight 
of  one  part  whilst  they  are  viewing  another ;  and  we 
sometimes,  and  that  the  greatest  part  of  our  lives, 
not  reflecting  on  our  past  selves,  being  intent  on  our 
present  thoughts,  and,  in  sound  sleep,  having  no 
thoughts  at  all,  or,  at  least,  none  with  that  conscious- 
ness which  remarks  our  waking  thoughts  :  I  say,  in 
all  these  cases,  our  consciousness  being  interrupted, 
and  we  losing  the  sight  of  our  past  selves,  doubts  are 
raised  whether  we  are  the  same  thinking  thing,  /'.  e., 
the  same  substance,  or  no  ?  For  it  being  the  same 
consciousness  that  makes  a  man  be  himself  to  him- 
self, personal  identity  depends  on  that  only,  whether  it 
be  annexed  only  to  one  individual  substance,  or  can 
be  continued  in  a  succession  of  several  substances. 
For  as  far  as  any  intelligent  being  can  repeat  the  idea 
of  any  past  action  with  the  same  consciousness  it  had 
of  it  at  first,  and  with  the  same  consciousness  it  has 
of  any  present  action  ;  so  far  it  is  the  same  personal 
self.  For  it  is  by  the  consciousness  it  has  of  its 
present  thoughts  and  actions  that  it  is  self  to  itself 
now,  and  so  will  be  the  same  self,  as  far  as  the  same 
consciousness  can  extend  to  actions  past  or  to  come  ; 
and  would  be  by  distance  of  time,  or  change  of  sub- 
stance, no  more  two  persons  than  a  man  be  two  men, 
by  wearing  other  clothes  to-day  than  he  did  yester- 
day, with  a  long  or  short  sleep  between  :  the  same 
consciousness  uniting  those  distant  actions  into  the" 
same  person,  whatever  substances  contributed  to  their 
production. 

But  the  question  is,  Whether,  if  the  same  substance. 


92  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

which  thinks  be  changed,  it  can  be  the  same  person, 
or  remaining  the  same,  it  can  be  different  persons  ? 

And  to  this  I  answer,  First,  This  can  be  no  ques- 
tion at  all  to  those  who  place  thought  in  a  purely 
material,  animal  constitution,  void  of  an  immaterial 
substance.  For,  whether  their  supposition  be  true  or 
no,  it  is  plain  they  conceive  personal  identity  pre- 
served in  something  else  than  identity  of  substance  ; 
as  animal  identity  is  preserved  in  identity  of  life,  and 
not  of  substance.  And  therefore  those  who  place 
thinking  in  an  immaterial  substance  only,  before  they 
can  come  to  deal  with  these  men,  must  show  why 
personal  identity  cannot  be  preserved  in  the  change 
of  immaterial  substances,  or  variety  of  particular  im- 
material substances,  as  well  as  animal  identity  is  pre- 
served in  the  change  of  material  substances,  or  variety 
of  particular  bodies  :  unless  they  will  say,  it  is  one 
immaterial  spirit  that  makes  the  same  life  in  brutes, 
as  it  is  one  immaterial  spirit  that  makes  the  same  per- 
son in  men,  which  the  Cartesians  at  least  will  not 
admit,  for  fear  of  making  brutes  thinking  things  too. 

But  next,  as  to  the  first  part  of  the  question, 
Whether,  if  the  same  thinking  substance  (supposing 
immaterial  substances  only  to  think)  be  changed,  it 
can  be  the  same  person  ?  I  answer,  That  cannot  be 
resolved  but  by  those  who  know  what  kind  of  sub- 
stances they  are  that  do  think,  and  whether  the  con- 
sciousness of  past  actions  can  be  transferred  from  one 
thinking  substance  to  another.  I  grant,  were  the 
same  consciousness  the  same  individual  action,  it 
could  not ;  but  it  being  but  a  present  representation  of 
a  past  action,  why  it  may  not  be  possible  that  that  may 


CH.  XXVII.]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  93 

be  represented  to  the  mind  to  have  been  which  really 
never  was,  will  remain  to  be  shown.  But  that  which 
we  call  "  the  same  consciousness"  not  being  the  same 
individual  act,  why  one  intellectual  substance  may 
not  have  represented  to  it  as  done  by  itself  what  it 
never  did,  and  was  perhaps  done  by  some  other 
agent  ;  why,  I  say,  such  a  representation  may  not 
possibly  be  without  reality  of  matter  of  fact,  as  well 
as  several  representations  in  dreams  are,  which  yet, 
whilst  dreaming,  we  take  for  true,  will  be  difficult  to 
conclude  from  the  nature  of  things.  But  yet,  to  re- 
turn to  the  question  before  us,  it  must  be  allowed, 
that  if  the  same  consciousness  (which,  as  has  been 
shown,  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  the  same  nu- 
merical figure  or  motion  in  body)  can  be  transferred 
from  one  thinking  substance  to  another,  it  will  be 
possible  that  two  thinking  substances  may  make  but 
one  person.  For  the  same  consciousness  being  pre- 
served, whether  in  the  same  or  different  substances, 
the  personal  identity  is  preserved. 

Self  is  that  conscious  thinking  thing  (whatever  sub- 
stance made  up  of,  whether  spiritual  or  material,  sim-j 
pie  or  compounded,  it  matters  not)  which  is  sensibl< 
or  conscious  of  pleasure  and  pain,  capable  of  happi- 
ness or  misery,  and  so  is  concerned  for  itself,  as 
as  that  consciousness  extends.  That  with  which  the 
consciousness  of  this  present  thinking  thing  can  join 
itself  makes  the  same  person,  and  is  one  self  with  it, 
and  with  nothing  else  ;  and  so  attributes  to  itself  and 
owns  all  the  actions  of  that  thing  as  its  own,  as  far  as 
that  consciousness  reaches,  and  no  farther  ;  as  every 
one  who  reflects  will  perceive. 


94  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 


SOME  FURTHER  OBSERVATIONS  UPON  OUR  IDEAS. 


i.  Clear  and  Obscure  Ideas. 

Our  simple  ideas  are  clear,  when  they  are  such  as 
the  objects  themselves,  from  whence  they  were  taken, 
did  or  might,  in  a  well-ordered  sensation  or  percep- 
tion, present  them.  Whilst  the  memory  retains  them 
thus,  and  can  produce  them  to  the  mind  whenever  it 
has  occasion  to  consider  them,  they  are  clear  ideas. 
So  far  as  they  either  want  any  thing  of  that  original 
exactness,  or  have  lost  any  of  their  first  freshness,  and 
are,  as  it  were,  faded  or  tarnished  by  time,  so  far  are 
they  obscure.  Complex  ideas,  as  they  are  made  up 
of  simple  ones,  so  they  are  clear  when  the  ideas  that 
go  to  their  composition  are  clear  :  and  the  number 
and  order  of  those  simple  ideas,  that  are  the  ingredi- 
ents of  any  complex  one,  is  determinate  and  certain. 

The  cause  of  obscurity  in  simple  ideas  seems  to  be 
either  dull  organs  or  very  slight  and  transient  impres- 
sions made  by  the  objects,  or  else  a  weakness  in  the 
memory,  not  able  to  retain  them  as  received.  If  the 
organs  or  faculties  of  perception,  like  wax  over-hard- 
ened with  cold,  will  not  receive  the  impression  of  the 
seal,  from  the  usual  impulse  wont  to  imprint  it  ;  or, 
like  wax  of  a  temper  too  soft,  will  not  hold  it  well 
when  well  imprinted  ;  or  else  supposing  the  wax  of  a 


CH.  XXIX.,  XXX.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  95 

temper  fit,  but  the  seal  not  applied  with  a  sufficient 
force  to  make  a  clear  impression  :  in  any  of  these 
cases,  the  print  left  by  the  seal  will  be  obscure. 

2.  Real  and  Fantastical  Ideas. 

Besides  what  we  have  already  mentioned  concern- 
ing ideas,  other  considerations  belong  to  them,  in 
reference  to  things  from  whence  they  are  taken,  or 
which  they  may  be  supposed  to  represent  ;  and  thus, 
I  think,  they  may  come  under  a  threefold  distinction. 

First,  Our  simple  ideas  are  all  real,  all  agree  to  the 
reality  of  things  ;  not  that  they  are  all  of  them  the 
images  or  representations  of  what  does  exist  ;  but 
being  in  us  the  effects  of  powers  in  things  without  us, 
ordained  by  our  Maker  to  produce  in  us  such  sensa- 
tions, they  are  real  ideas  in  us  whereby  we  distinguish 
the  qualities  that  are  really  in  things  themselves. 

Secondly,  Mixed  modes  and  relations  having  no 
other  reality  but  what  they  have  in  the  minds  of  men, 
there  is  nothing  more  required  to  those  kinds  of  ideas 
to  make  them  real  but  that  they  be  so  framed  that 
there  be  a  possibility  of  existing  conformable  to 
them.  These  ideas,  being  themselves  archetypes, 
cannot  differ  from  their  archetypes,  and  so  cannot  be 
chimerical,  unless  any  one  will  jumble  together  in 
them  inconsistent  ideas.  Indeed,  as  any  of  them 
have  the  names  of  a  known  language  assigned  to 
them,  by  which  he  that  has  them  in  his  mind  would 
signify  them  to  others,  so  bare  possibility  of  existing 
is  not  enough  ;  they  must  have  a  conformity  to  the 
ordinary  signification  of  the  name  that  is  given  them, 
that  they  may  not  be  thought  fantastical  :  as  if  a  man 


96  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

would  give  the  name  of  "justice"  to  that  idea  which 
common  use  calls  "  liberality."  But  this  fantastical- 
ness  relates  more  to  propriety  of  speech,  than  reality 
of  ideas.  For  a  man  to  be  undisturbed  in  danger, 
sedately  to  consider  what  is  fittest  to  be  done,  and  to 
execute  it  steadily,  is  a  mixed  mode  or  a  complex 
idea  of  an  action  which  may  exist.  But  to  be  undis- 
turbed in  danger,  without  using  one's  reason  or  in- 
dustry, is  what  is  also  possible  to  be  ;  and  so  is  as  real 
an  idea  as  the  other.  Though  the  first  of  these,  hav- 
ing the  name  "  courage  "  given  to  it,  may,  in  respect 
of  that  name,  be  a  right  or  wrong  idea  :  but  the  other, 
whilst  it  has  not  a  common  received  name  of  any 
known  language  assigned  to  it,  is  not  capable  of  any 
deformity,  being  made  with  no  reference  to  anything 
but  itself. 

Thirdly,  Our  complex  ideas  of  substances,  being 
made  all  of  them  in  reference  to  things  existing  with- 
out us,  and  intended  to  be  representations  of  sub- 
stances as  they  really  are,  are  no  farther  real  than  as 
they  are  such  combinations  of  simple  ideas  as  are 
really  united,  and  co-exist  in  things  without  us. 

3.   Adequate  and  Inadequate  Ideas. 

Of  our  real  ideas,  some  are  adequate,  and  some  are 
inadequate.  Those  I  call  "  adequate "  which  per- 
fectly represent  those  archetypes  which  the  mind  sup- 
poses them  taken  from  ;  which  it  intends  them  to 
stand  for,  and  to  which  it  refers  them.  Inadequate 
ideas  are  such  which  are  but  a  partial  or  incomplete 
representation  of  those  archetypes  to  which  they  are 
referred.  Upon  which  account  it  is  plain, 


CH.  XXXL]      THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  97 

First,  That  all  our  simple  ideas  are  adequate.  Be- 
cause being  nothing  but  the  effects  of  certain  powers 
in  things,  fitted  and  ordained  by  God  to  produce  such 
sensations  in  us,  they  cannot  but  be  correspondent 
and  adequate  to  those  powers  :  and  we  are  sure  they 
agree  to  the  reality  of  things. 

Secondly,  Our  complex  ideas  of  modes,  being  vol- 
untary collections  of  simple  ideas  which  the  mind 
puts  together,  without  reference  to  any  real  arche- 
types or  standing  patterns  existing  any  where,  are  and 
cannot  but  be  adequate  ideas. 

Therefore  these  complex  ideas  of  modes,  when  they 
are  referred  by  the  mind,  and  intended  to  correspond, 
to  the  ideas  in  the  mind  of  some  other  intelligent  be- 
ing, expressed  by  the  names  we  apply  to  them,  they 
may  be  very  deficient,  wrong,  and  inadequate  ;  be- 
cause they  agree  not  to  that  which  the  mind  designs 
to  be  their  archetype  and  pattern  ;  in  which  respect 
only  an  idea  of  modes  can  be  wrong,  imperfect,  or 
inadequate.  And  on  this  account,  our  ideas  of  mixed 
modes  are  the  most  liable  to  be  faulty  of  any  other  ; 
but  this  refers  more  to  proper  speaking,  than  knowing 
right. 

Thirdly,  What  ideas  we  have  of  substances,  I  have 
above  showed.  Now,  those  ideas  have  in  the  mind  a 
double  reference  :  (i.)  Sometimes  they  are  referred 
to  a  supposed  real  essence  of  each  species  of  things. 
(2.)  Sometimes  they  are  only  designed  to  be  pictures 
and  representations  in  the  mind  of  things  that  do 
exist  by  ideas  of  those  qualities  that  are  discoverable 
in  them.  In  both  which  ways,  these  copies  of  those 
originals  and  archetypes  are  imperfect  and  inadequate. 


98  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  II. 

For  since  the  powers  or  qualities  that  are  observ- 
able by  us  are  not  the  real  essence  of  that  substance, 
but  depend  on  it,  and  flow  from  it,  any  collection 
whatsoever  of  these  qualities  cannot  be  the  real  es- 
sence of  that  thing.  Whereby  it  is  plain  that  our 
ideas  of  substances  are  not  adequate  ;  are  not  what 
the  mind  intends  them  to  be.  Besides,  a  man  has  no 
idea  of  substance  in  general,  nor  knows  what  sub- 
stance is  in  itself. 


CH.  XXXIII.]    THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  99 


THE  ASSOCIATION  OF  IDEAS. 

Some  of  our  ideas  have  a  natural  correspondence 
and  connection  one  with  another  ;  it  is  the  office  and 
excellency  of  our  reason  to  trace  these,  and  hold  them 
together  in  that  union  and  correspondence  which  is 
founded  in  their  peculiar  beings.  Besides  these,  there 
is  another  connection  of  ideas  wholly  owing  to  chance 
or  custom  :  ideas  that  in  themselves  are  not  at  all  of 
kin,  come  to  be  so  united  in  some  men's  minds  that 
it  is  very  hard  to  separate  them  ;  they  always  keep  in 
company,  and  the  one  no  sooner  at  any  time  comes 
into  the  understanding  but  its  associate  appears  with 
it  ;  and  if  they  are  more  than  two  which  are  thus 
united,  the  whole  gang,  always  inseparable,  show 
themselves  together. 

This  strong  combination  of  ideas,  not  allied  by 
nature,  the  mind  makes  in  itself  either  voluntarily  or 
by  chance  ;  and  hence  it  comes  in  different  men  to  be 
very  different,  according  to  their  different  inclina- 
tions, educations,  interests,  etc.  Custom  settles  habits 
of  thinking  in  the  understanding,  as  well  as  of  deter- 
mining in  the  will,  and  of  motions  in  the  body ;  all 
which  seem  to  be  but  trains  of  motion  in  the  animal 
spirits,  which,  once  set  a-going,  continue  in  the  same 
steps  they  have  been  used  to,  which,  by  often  tread- 
ing, are  worn  into  a  smooth  path,  and  the  motion  in 


100  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.    [CH. XXXIII. 

it  becomes  easy,  and  as  it  were  natural.  As  far  as  we 
can  comprehend  thinking,  thus  ideas  seem  to  be  pro- 
duced in  our  minds  ;  or  if  they  are  not,  this  may  serve 
to  explain  their  following  one  another  in  an  habitual 
train,  when  once  they  are  put  into  that  track,  as  well 
as  it  does  to  explain  such  motions  of  the  body. 

This  wrong  connection  in  our  minds  of  ideas,  in 
themselves  loose  and  independent  one  of  another,  has 
such  an  influence,  and  is  of  so  great  force,  to  set  us 
awry  in  our  actions,  as  well  moral  as  natural,  passions, 
reasonings,  and  notions  themselves,  that  perhaps  there 
is  not  any  one  thing  that  deserves  more  to  be  looked 
after. 

A  man  receives  a  sensible  injury  from  another, 
thinks  on  the  man  and  that  action  over  and  over,  and, 
by  ruminating  on  them  strongly  or  much  in  his  mind, 
so  cements  those  two  ideas  together,  that  he  makes 
them  almost  one  ;  never  thinks  on  the  man,  but  the 
pain  and  displeasure  he  suffered  conies  into  his  mind 
with  it,  so  that  he  scarce  distinguishes  them,  but  has 
as  much  an  aversion  for  the  one  as  the  other.  Thus 
hatreds  are  often  begotten  from  slight  and  almost 
innocent  occasions,  and  quarrels  propagated  and  con- 
tinued in  the  world. 

Ideas  in  our  minds,  when  they  are  there,  will  oper- 
ate according  to  their  natures  and  circumstances  :  and 
here  we  see  the  cause  why  time  cures  certain  affec- 
tions, which  reason,  though  in  the  right  and  allowed 
to  be  so,  has  not  power  over,  nor  is  able  against  them 
to  prevail  with  those  who  are  apt  to  hearken  to  it  in 
other  cases. 


BK.  III.— CH.  II.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF'L0C'ks.  V  Ifct 


UPON  WORDS. 

Having  thus  given  an  account  of  the  original  sorts 
and  extent  of  our  ideas,  with  several  other  considera- 
tions about  these  (I  know  not  whether  I  may  say)  in- 
struments, or  materials,  of  our  knowledge;  the  method 
I  at  first  proposed  to  myself,  would  now  require  that 
I  should  immediately  proceed  to  show  what  use  the 
understanding  makes  of  them,  and  what  knowledge 
we  have  by  them.  This  was  that  which,  in  the  first 
general  view  I  had  of  this  subject,  was  all  that  I 
thought  I  should  have  to  do  :  but  upon  a  nearer 
approach,  I  find  that  there  is  so  close  a  connection 
between  ideas  and  words,  and  our  abstract  ideas  and 
general  words  have  so  constant  a  relation  one  to 
another,  that  it  is  impossible  to  speak  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly of  our  knowledge,  which  all  consists  in  propo- 
sitions, without  considering  first  the  nature,  use,  and 
signification  of  language  ;  which  therefore  must  be  the 
business  of  the  next  book. 

i.   The  Use  of  Language. 

Man,  though  he  have  great  variety  of  thoughts,  and 
such  from  which  others  as  well  as  himself  might 
receive  profit  and  delight,  yet  they  are  all  within  his 
own  breast,  invisible,  and  hidden  from  others,  nor  can 
of  themselves  be  made  appear.  The  comfort  and 
advantage  of  society  not  being  to  be  had  without 


102  THte   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  III. 

communication;  of  thoughts,  it  was  necessary  that  man 
should  find  out  some  external  sensible  signs,  whereby 
those  invisible  ideas  which  his  thoughts  are  made  up 
of  might  be  made  known  to  others.  For  this  purpose 
nothing  was  so  fit,  either  for  plenty  or  quickness,  as 
those  articulate  sounds  which,  with  so  much  ease  and 
variety,  he  found  himself  able  to  make.  Thus  we 
may  conceive  how  words,  which  were  by  nature  so 
well  adapted  to  ihat  purpose,  come  to  be  made  use  of 
by  men  as  the  signs  of  their  ideas  ;  not  by  any  natural 
connection  that  there  is  between  particular  articulate 
sounds  and  certain  ideas,  for  then  there  would  be  but 
one  language  amongst  all  men  ;  but  by  a  voluntary 
imposition,  whereby  such  a  word  is  made  arbitrarily 
the  mark  of  such  an  idea.  The  use,  then,  of  words  is 
to  be  sensible  marks  of  ideas,  and  the  ideas  they  stand 
for  are  their  proper  and  immediate  signification. 

The  use  men  have  of  these  marks  being  either  to 
record  their  own  thoughts  for  the  assistance  of  their 
own  memory,  or,  as  it  were,  to  bring  out  their  ideas, 
and  lay  them  before  the  view  of  others  :  words  in 
their  primary  or  immediate  signification  stand  for 
nothing  but  the  ideas  in  the  mind  of  him  that  uses 
them,  how  imperfectly  soever  or  carelessly  those  ideas 
are  collected  from  the  things  which  they  are  supposed 
to  represent.  When  a  man  speaks  to  another,  it  is 
that  he  may  be  understood  ;  and  the  end  of  speech  is, 
that  those  sounds,  as  marks,  may  make  known  his 
ideas  to  the  hearer.  That,  then,  which  words  are  the 
marks  of  are  the  ideas  of  the  speaker  :  nor  can  any 
one  apply  them,  as  marks,  immediately  to  any  thing 
else  but  the  ideas  that  he  himself  hath. 


CHS,  II.-IV.]    THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  103 

2.    The  Signification  of  Names. 

Though  all  words,  as  I  have  shown,  signify  nothing 
immediately  but  the  ideas  in  the  mind  of  the  speaker, 
yet,  upon  a  nearer  survey,  we  shall  find  that  the 
names  of  simple  ideas,  mixed  modes  (under  which  I 
comprise  relations  too),  and  natural  substances,  have- 
each  of  them  something  peculiar,  and  different  from 
the  other. 

First,  The  names  of  simple  ideas  and  substances, 
with  the  abstract  ideas  in  the  mind  which  they  imme- 
diately signify,  intimate  also  some  real  existence, 
from  which  was  derived  their  original  pattern.  But 
the  names  of  mixed  modes  terminate  in  the  idea  that 
is  in  the  mind,  and  lead  not  the  thoughts  any  further, 
as  we  shall  see  more  at  large  in  the  following  chapter. 

Secondly,  The  names  of  simple  ideas  and  modes 
signify  always  the  real  as  well  as  nominal  essence  of 
their  species.  But  the  names  of  natural  substances 
signify  rarely,  if  ever,  any  thing  but  barely  the  nom- 
inal essences  of  those  species,  as  we  shall  show  in  the 
chapter  that  treats  of  the  names  of  substances  in  par- 
ticular. 

Thirdly,  The  names  of  simple  ideas  are  not  capa- 
ble of  any  definitions;  the  names  of  all  complex  ideas 
are.  It  has  not,  that  I  know,  hitherto  been  taken 
notice  of  by  any  body,  what  words  are,  and  what  are 
not,  capable  of  being  defined  :  the  want  whereof  is 
(as  I  am  apt  to  think)  not  seldom  the  occasion  of 
great  wrangling  and  obscurity  of  men's  discourses, 
whilst  some  demand  definitions  of  terms  that  cannot 
be  defined ;  and  others  think  they  ought  to  rest 


104  THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  III. 

satisfied  in  an  explication  made  by  a  more  general 
word  and  its  restriction  (or,  to  speak  in  terms  of  art, 
by  a  genus  and  difference),  when  even  after  such 
definition  made  according  to  rule,  those  who  hear  it 
have  often  no  more  a  clear  conception  of  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  than  they  had  before. 

This  being  premised,  I  say,  that  "  the  names  of 
simple  ideas,"  and  those  only,  "  are  incapable  of 
being  defined."  The  reason  whereof  is  this,  that  the 
several  terms  of  a  definition  signifying  several  ideas, 
they  can  all  together  by  no  means  represent  an  idea 
which  has  no  composition  at  all :  and  therefore  a  defi- 
nition (which  is  properly  nothing  but  the  showing  the 
meaning  of  one  word  by  several  others. not  signifying 
each  the  same  thing)  can  in  the  names  of  simple  ideas 
have  no  place. 

And  therefore  he  that  has  not  before  received  into 
his  mind,  by  the  proper  inlet,  the  simple  idea  which 
any  word  stands  for,  can  never  come  to  know  the  sig- 
nification of  that  word  by  any  other  words  or  sounds 
whatsoever,  put  together  according  to  any  rules  of 
definition.  The  only  way  is  by  applying  to  his  senses 
the  proper  object  ;  and  so  producing  that  idea  in  him 
for  which  he  has  learned  the  name  already.  But 
though  the  names  of  simple  ideas  have  not  the  help 
or  definition  to  determine  their  signification,  yet  that 
hinders  not  but  that  they  are  generally  less  doubtful 
and  uncertain  than  those  of  mixed  modes  and  sub- 
stances ;  because  they  standing  only  for  one  simple 
perception,  men,  for  the  most  part,  easily  and  per- 
fectly agree  in  their  signification,  and  there  is  little 
room  for  mistake  and  wrangling  about  their  meaning. 
There  is  neither  a  multiplicity  of  simple  ideas  to  be 


CH.  IV., III.]    THE    PHILOSPOHY    OF    LOCKE.  105 

put  together,  which  makes  the  doubtfulness  in  the 
names  of  mixed  modes  ;  nor  a  supposed,  but  an  un- 
known, real  essence,  with  properties  depending 
thereon,  the  precise  number  whereof  are  also  un- 
known, which  makes  the  difficulty  in  the  names  of 
substances.  But,  on  the  contrary,  in  simple  ideas  the 
whole  signification  of  the  name  is  known  at  once,  and 
consists  not  of  parts,  whereof  more  or  less  being  put 
in,  the  idea  may  be  varied,  and  so  the  signification  of 
its  name  be  obscure  or  uncertain. 

The  names  of  simple  ideas,  substances,  and  mixed 
modes  have  also  this  difference,  that  those  of  mixed 
modes  stand  for  ideas  perfectly  arbitrary  :  those  of 
substances  are  not  perfectly  so,  but  refer  to  a  pattern, 
though  with  some  latitude  :  and  those  of  simple  ideas 
are  perfectly  taken  from  the  existence  of  things,  and 
are  not  arbitrary  at  all. 

All  things  that  exist  being  particulars,  it  may  per- 
haps be  thought  reasonable  that  words,  which  ought 
to  be  conformed  to  things,  should  be  so  too,  I  mean 
in  their  signification  :  but  yet  we  find  the  quite  con- 
trary. The  far  greatest  part  of  words,  that  make  all 
languages,  are  general  terms  :  which  has  not  been  the 
effect  of  neglect  or  chance,  but  of  reason  and  neces- 
sity. 

First,  It  is  impossible  that  every  particular  thing 
should  have  a  distinct  peculiar  name.  For  the  signi- 
fication and  use  of  words  depending  on  that  connec- 
tion which  the  mind  makes  between  its  ideas  and  the 
sounds  it  uses  as  signs  of  them,  it  is  necessary,  in  the 
application  of  names  to  things,  that  the  mind  should 
have  distinct  ideas  of  the  things,  and  retain  also  the 
particular  name  that  belongs  to  every  one,  with  its 


106  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  III. 

peculiar  appropriation  to  that  idea.  But  it  is  beyond 
the  power  of  human  capacity  to  frame  and  retain  dis- 
tinct ideas  of  all  the  particular  things  we  meet  with  : 
every  bird  and  beast  men  saw,  every  tree  and  plant 
that  affected  the  senses,  could  not  find  a  place  in  the 
most  capacious  understanding.  If  it  be  looked  on  as 
an  instance  of  a  prodigious  memory,  that  some  gen- 
erals have  been  able  to  call  every  soldier  in  their 
army  by  his  proper  name,  we  may  easily  find  a  reason 
why  men  have  never  attempted  to  give  names  to 
each  sheep  in  their  flock,  or  crow  that  flies  over  their 
heads  ;  much  less  to  call  every  leaf  of  plants  or  grain 
of  sand  that  came  in  their  way  by  a  peculiar  name. 

Secondly,  If  it  were  possible,  it  would  yet  be  useless, 
because  it  would  not  serve  to  the  chief  end  of  language. 
Men  would  in  vain  heap  up  names  of  particular  things, 
that  would  not  serve  them  to  communicate  their 
thoughts. 

Thirdly,  But  yet  granting  this  also  feasible  (which 
I  think  is  not),  yet  a  distinct  name  for  every  particular 
thing  would  not  be  of  any  great  use  for  the  improve- 
ment of  knowledge  :  which,  though  founded  in  particu- 
lar things,  enlarges  itself  by  general  views  :  to  which 
things  reduced  into  sorts  under  general  names,  are 
properly  subservient. 

The  next  thing  to  be  considered  is,  how  general 
words  come  to  be  made.  For,  since  all  things  that 
exist  are  only  particulars,  how  come  we  by  general 
terms,  or  where  find  we  those  general  natures  they  are 
supposed  to  stand  for?  Words  become  general  by 
being  made  the  signs  of  general  ideas  :  and  ideas  be- 
come general  by  separating  from  them  the  circum- 
stances of  time,  and  place,  and  any  other  ideas  that 


CH.  III.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  107 

may  determine  them  to  this  or  that  particular  exist- 
ence. By  this  way  of  abstraction  they  are  made  capa- 
ble of  representing  more  individuals  than  one  ;  each 
of  which,  having  in  it  a  conformity  to  that  abstract 
idea,  is  (as  we  call  it)  of  that  sort. 

But,  to  deduce  this  a  little  more  distinctly,  it  will 
not  perhaps  be  amiss  to  trace  our  notions  and  names 
from  their  beginning,  and  observe  by  what  degrees  we 
proceed,  and  by  what  steps  we  enlarge  our  ideas  from 
our  first  infancy.  There  is  nothing  more  evident  than 
that  the  ideas  of  the  persons  children  converse  with 
(to  instance  in  them  alone),  are,  like  the  persons  them- 
selves, only  particular.  The  ideas  of  the  nurse  and 
the  mother  are  well  framed  in  their  minds  ;  and,  like 
pictures  of  them  there,  represent  only  those  individ- 
uals. The  names  they  first  gave  to  them  are  confined 
to  these  individuals  ;  and  the  names  of  "  nurse"  and 
"  mamma"  the  child  uses,  determine  themselves  to 
those  persons.  Afterwards,  when  time  and  a  larger 
acquaintance  has  made  them  observe  that  there  are  a 
great  many  other  things  in  the  world,  that,  in  some 
common  agreements  of  shape  and  several  other  quali- 
ties, resemble  their  father  and  mother,  and  those  per- 
sons they  have  been  used  to,  they  frame  an  idea  which 
they  find  those  many  particulars  do  partake  in  ;  and 
to  that  they  give,  with  others,  the  name  "  man,"  for 
example.  And  thus  they  come  to  have  a  general 
name,  and  a  general  idea.  Wherein  they  make  noth- 
ing new,  but  only  leave  out  of  the  complex  idea  they 
had  of  Peter  and  James,  Mary  and  Jane,  that  which 
is  peculiar  to  each,  and  retain  only  what  is  common 
to  them  all. 

For,  let  any  one  reflect,  and  then  tell  me  wherein 


108  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  III. 

does  his  idea  of  "  man"  differ  from  that  of  "  Peter  " 
and  "  Paul,"  or  his  idea  of  "  horse"  from  that  of 
"  Bucephalus,"  but  in  the  leaving  out  something  that 
is  peculiar  to  each  individual,  and  retaining  so  much 
of  those  particular  complex  ideas  of  several  particular 
existences  as  they  are  found  to  agree  in  ?  Of  the  com- 
plex ideas  signified  by  the  names  "  man"  and  "  horse," 
leaving  out  but  those  particulars  wherein  they  differ, 
and  retaining  only  those  wherein  they  agree,  and  of 
those  making  a  new  distinct  complex  idea,  and  giving 
the  name  "  animal "  to  it,  one  has  a  more  general  term, 
that  comprehends  with  man  several  other  creatures. 

The  next  thing  therefore  to  be  considered,  is,  what 
kind  of  signification  it  is  that  general  words  have. 
For  as  it  is  evident  that  they  do  not  signify  barely 
one  particular  thing,  for  then  they  would  not  be  gen- 
eral terms,  but  proper  names ;  so  on  the  other  side  it 
is  as  evident  they  do  not  signify  a  plurality  ;  for, 
"  man"  and  "  men"  would  then  signify  the  same  and 
the  distinction  of  "  numbers"  (as  grammarians  call 
them)  would  be  superfluous  and  useless.  That  then 
which  general  words  signify,  is  a  sort  of  things  ;  and 
each  of  them  does  that  by  being  a  sign  of  an  abstract 
idea  in  the  mind  ;  to  which  idea  as  things  existing  are 
found  to  agree,  so  they  come  to  be  ranked  under 
that  name  ;  or  which  is  all  one,  be  of  that  sort. 
Whereby  it  is  evident,  that  the  essences  of  the  sorts, 
or  (if  the  Latin  word  pleases  better)  species  of  things, 
are  nothing  else  but  these  abstract  ideas.  For  the 
having  the  essence  of  any  species,  being  that  which 
makes  anything  to  be  of  that  species,  and  the  con- 
formity to  the  idea  to  which  the  name  is  annexed  be- 


CHS.  III.  AND  VI.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  IOQ 

ing  that  which  gives  a  right  to  that  name,  the  having 
the  essence,  and  the  having  that  conformity,  must 
needs  be  the  same  thing  :  since  to  be  of  any  species, 
and  to  have  a  right  to  the  name  of  that  species,  is  all 
one.  As,  for  example  :  to  be  a  man  or  of  the  species 
man,  and  to  have  right  to  the  name  "  man"  is  the 
same  thing.  Again  :  to  be  a  man,  or  of  the  species 
man,  and  have  the  essence  of  a  man,  is  the  same  thing. 
Now,  since  nothing  can  be  a  man,  or  have  a  right  to 
the  name  "  man"  but  what  has  a  conformity  to  the 
abstract  idea  the  name  "  man"  stands  for  ;  nor  any 
thing  be  a  man,  or  have  a  right  to  the  species  man, 
but  what  has  the  essence  of  that  species  ;  it  follows, 
that  the  abstract  idea  for  which  the  name  stands,  and 
the  essence  of  the  species,  is  one  and  the  same. 
From  whence  it  is  easy  to  observe,  that  the  essences 
of  the  sorts  of  things,  and  consequently  the  sorting  of 
this,  is  the  workmanship  of  the  understanding  that 
abstracts  and  makes  those  general  ideas. 

The  common  names  of  substances,  as  well  as  other 
general  terms,  stand  for  sorts  :  which  is  nothing  else 
but  the  being  made  signs  of  such  complex  ideas, 
wherein  several  particular  substances  do  or  might 
agree,  by  virtue  of  which  they  are  capable  of  being 
comprehended  in  one  common  conception,  and  be 
signified  by  one  name. 

The  measure  and  boundary  of  each  sort  or  species 
whereby  it  is  constituted  that  particular  sort  and  dis- 
tinguished from  others,  is  that  we  call  its  "  essence," 
which  is  nothing  but  that  abstract  idea  to  which  the 
name  is  annexed  :  so  that  everything  contained  in 
that  idea  is  essential  to  that  sort. 


110  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  III. 

That  "  essence,"  in  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word, 
relates  to  sorts,  and  that  it  is  considered  in  particular 
beings  no  farther  than  they  are  ranked  into  sorts, 
appears  from  hence  :  that  take  but  away  the  abstract 
ideas  by  which  we  sort  individuals,  and  rank  them 
under  common  names,  and  then  the  thought  of  any 
thing  essential  to  any  of  them  instantly  vanishes  :  we 
have  no  notion  of  the  one  without  the  other :  which 
plainly  shows  their  relation. 

It  is  impossible  therefore  that  any  thing  should 
determine  the  sorts  of  things  which  we  rank  under 
general  names,  but  that  idea  which  that  name  is  de- 
signed as  a  mark  for  ;  which  is  that,  as  has  been 
shown,  which  we  call  the ''nominal  essence."  Why 
do  we  say,  "  This  is  a  horse,  and  that  a  mule  ;  this  is 
an  animal,  that  an  herb  ?"  How  comes  any  particular 
thing  to  be  of  this  or  that  sort,  but  because  it  has 
that  nominal  essence,  or,  which  is  all  one,  agrees  to 
that  abstract  idea  that  name  is  annexed  to  ?  That 
our  ranking  and  distinguishing  natural  substances  into 
species,  consists  in  the  nominal  essences  the  mind 
makes,  and  not  in  the  real  essences  to  be  found  in 
the  things  themselves,  is  farther  evident  from  our 
ideas  of  spirits.  For,  the  mind  getting,  only  by  re- 
flecting on  its  own  operations,  those  simple  ideas 
which  it  attributes  to  spirits,  it  hath  or  can  have  no 
other  notion  of  spirit  but  by  attributing  all  those 
operations  it  finds  in  itself  to  a  sort  of  beings,  without 
consideration  of  matter. 

Since,  then,  it  is  evident  that  we  sort  and  name 
substances  by  their  nominal,  and  not  by  their  real, 
essences  ;  the  next  thing  to  be  considered  is,  how  and 


CH.  VI.]      THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.          Ill 

by  whom  these  essences  come  to  be  made.  As  to 
the  latter,  it  is  evident  they  are  made  by  the  mind, 
and  not  by  nature  :  for  were  they  nature's  workman- 
ship, they  could  not  be  so  various  and  different  in 
several  men,  as  experience  tells  us  they  are.  For  if 
we  will  examine  it,  we  shall  not  find  the  nominal 
essence  of  any  one  species  of  substance  in  all  men 
the  same  ;  no,  not  of  that  which  of  all  others  we  are 
the  most  intimately  acquainted  with. 

But  though  these  nominal  essences  of  substances 
are  made  by  the  mind,  they  are  not  yet  made  so 
arbitrarily  as  those  of  mixed  modes.  To  the  making 
of  any  nominal  essence,  it  is  necessary,  First,  That 
the  ideas  whereof  it  consists,  have  such  an  union  as 
to  make  but  one  idea,  how  compounded  soever. 
Secondly,  That  the  particular  ideas  so  united  be 
exactly  the  same,  neither  more  nor  less. 

This,  then,  in  short,  is  the  case  :  nature  makes 
many  particular  things  which  do  agree  one  with  an- 
other in  many  sensible  qualities,  and  probably,  too, 
in  their  internal  frame  and  constitution  ;  but  it  is  not 
this  real  essence  that  distinguishes  them  into  species  ; 
it  is  men,  who  taking  occasion  from  the  qualities  they 
find  united  in  them,  and  wherein  they  observe  often 
several  individuals  to  agree,  range  them  into  sorts  in 
order  to  their  naming,  for  the  convenience  of  compre- 
hensive signs  ;  under  which,  individuals,  according  to 
their  conformity  to  this  or  that  abstract  idea,  come  to 
be  ranked  as  under  ensigns  ;  so  that  this  is  of  the  blue, 
that  the  red,  regiment  ;  this  is  a  man,  that  a  drill  : 
and  in  this,  I  think,  consists  the  whole  business  of 
genus  and  species. 


112       /  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 


ON   KNOWLEDGE  AND   BELIEF. 

Since  the  mind,  in  all  its  thoughts  and  reasonings, 
hath  no  other  immediate  object  but  its  own  ideas, 
which  it  alone  does  or  can  contemplate,  it  is  evident 
that  our  knowledge  is  only  conversant  about  them. 

Knowledge  then  seems  to  me  to  be  nothing  but 
the  perception  of  the  connection  and  agreement,  or 
disagreement  and  repugnancy,  of  any  of  our  ideas. 
In  this  alone  it  consists.  Where  this  perception  is, 
there  is  knowledge  ;  and  where  it  is  not,  there,  though 
we  may  fancy,  guess,  or  believe,  yet  we  always  come 
short  of  knowledge. 

But,  to  understand  a  little  more  distinctly  wherein 
this  agreement  or  disagreement  consists,  I  think  we 
may  reduce  it  all  to  these  four  sorts  :  (i.)  Identity, 
or  diversity.  (2.)  Relation.  (3.)  Co-existence,  or 
necessary  connection.  (4.)  Real  existence. 

First,  As  to  the  first  sort  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment, viz.,  identity  or  diversity.  It  is  the  first  act  of 
the  mind,  when  it  has  any  sentiments  or  ideas  at  all, 
to  perceive  its  ideas,  and,  so  far  as  it  perceives  them, 
to  know  each  what  it  is,  and  thereby  also  to  perceive 
their  difference,  and  that  one  is  not  another.  This  is 
so  absolutely  necessary,  that  without  it  there  could 
be  no  knowledge,  no  reasoning,  no  imagination,  no 
distinct  thoughts  at  all.  This,  then,  is  the  first  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  which  the  mind  perceives  in 
its  ideas,  which  it  always  perceives  at  first  sight ;  and 
if  there  ever  happen  any  doubt  about  it,  it  will  always 
be  found  to  be  about  the  names,  and  not  the  ideas 
themselves,  whose  identity  and  diversity  will  always 


CH.  I.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  113 

be  perceived  as  soon  and  as  clearly  as  the  ideas  them- 
selves are,  nor  can  it  possibly  be  otherwise. 

Secondly,  The  next  sort  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment the  mind  perceives  in  any  of  its  ideas  may,  I 
think,  be  called  "relative,"  and  is  nothing  but  the 
perception  of  the  relation  between  any  two  ideas,  of 
what  kind  soever,  whether  substances,  modes,  or  any 
other.  For,  since  all  distinct  ideas  must  eternally  be 
known  not  to  be  the  same,  and  so  be  universally  and 
constantly  denied  one  of  another  :  there  could  be  no 
room  for  any  positive  knowledge  at  all,  if  we  could 
not  perceive  any  relation  between  our  ideas,  and  find 
out  the  agreement  or  disagreement  they  have  one  with 
another,  in  several  ways  the  mind  takes  of  comparing 
them. 

Thirdly,  The  third  sort  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment to  be  found  in  our  ideas,  which  the  percep- 
tion of  the  mind  is  employed  about,  is  co-existence, 
or  non-co-existence  in  the  same  subject ;  and  this 
belongs  particularly  to  substances.  Thus  when  we 
pronounce  concerning  "gold"  that  it  is  fixed,  our 
knowledge  of  this  truth  amounts  to  no  more  but  this, 
that  fixedness,  or  a  power  to  remain  in  the  fire  un- 
consumed,  is  an  idea  that  always  accompanies  and  is 
joined  with  that  particular  sort  of  yellowness,  weight, 
fusibility,  malleableness  and  solubility  in  aqua  regia, 
which  makes  our  complex  idea,  signified  by  the  word 
"gold." 

Fourthly,  The  fourth  and  last  sort  is  that  of  actual 
real  existence  agreeing  to  any  idea.  Within  these 
four  sorts  of  agreement  or  disagreement  is,  I  suppose, 
contained  all  the  knowledge  we  have  or  are  capable 
of ;  for,  all  the  inquiries  that  we  can  make  concern- 


114  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

ing  any  of  our  ideas,  all  that  we  know  or  can  affirm 
concerning  any  of  them,  is,  that  it  is  or  is  not  the 
same  with  some  other  ;  that  it  does  or  does  not  always  - 
co-exist  with  some  other  idea  in  the  same  subject ; 
that  it  has  this  or  that  relation  to  some  other  idea  ; 
or  that  it  has  a  real  existence  without  the  mind. 

"  What  is  truth  ? "  was  an  inquiry  many  ages  since  ; 
and  it  being  that  which  all  mankind  either  do  or  pre- 
tend to  search  after,  it  cannot  but  be  worth  our  while 
carefully  to  examine  wherein  it  consists ;  and  so 
acquaint  ourselves  with  the  nature  of  it,  as  to  observe 
how  the  mind  distinguishes  it  from  falsehood. 

Truth  then  seems  to  me,  in  the  proper  import  of 
the  word,  to  signify  nothing  but  the  joining  or  separat- 
ing of  signs,  as  the  things  signified  by  them  do  agree 
or  disagree  one  with  another.  The  joining  or  separat- 
ing of  signs  here  meant,  is  what  by  another  name  we 
call  "  proposition." 

When  ideas  are  so  put  together  or  separated  in  the 
mind,  as  they  or  the  things  they  stand  for  do  agree 
or  not,  that  is,  as  I  may  call  it  "mental  truth."  But 
truth  of  words  is  something  more,  and  that  is  the 
affirming  or  denying  of  words  one  of  another,  as  the 
ideas  they  stand  for  agree  or  disagree :  and  this  again 
is  twofold  ;  either  purely  verbal  or  trifling,  which  I 
shall  speak  of  (chap,  x.)  or  real  and  instructive,  which 
is  the  object  of  that  real  knowledge  which  we  have 
spoken  of  already. 

i.   The  Degrees  of  Our  Knowledge. 

All  our  knowledge  consisting,  as  I  have  said,  in  the 
view  the  mind  has  of  its  own  ideas,  which  is  the 


CH.  II.]  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  H5 

utmost  light  and  greatest  certainty  we,  with  our  facul- 
ties and  in  our  way  of  knowledge,  are  capable  of,  it 
%nay  not  be  amiss  to  consider  a  little  the  degrees  of  its 
evidence.  The  different  clearness  of  our  knowledge 
seems  to  me  to  lie  in  the  different  way  of  perception 
the  mind  has  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  any 
of  its  ideas.  For  if  we  will  reflect  on  our  own  ways 
of  thinking,  we  shall  find  that  sometimes  the  mind 
perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas 
immediately  by  themselves,  without  the  intervention 
of  any  other  :  and  this,  I  think,  we  may  call  "  intuitive 
knowledge."  For  in  this  the  mind  is  at  no  pains  of 
proving  or  examining,  but  perceives  the  truth,  as  the 
eye  doth  light,  only  by  being  directed  towards  it. 
Thus  the  mind  perceives  that  white  is  not  black,  that 
a  circle  is  not  a  triangle  ;  that  three  are  more  than 
two,  and  equal  to  one  and  two.  Such  kind  of  truths 
the  mind  perceives  at  the  first  sight  of  the  ideas  to- 
gether, by  bare  intuition,  without  the  intervention  of 
any  other  idea  ;  and  this  kind  of  knowledge  is  the 
clearest  and  most  certain  that  human  frailty  is  capa- 
ble of.  This  part  of  knowledge  is  irresistible,  and, 
like  bright  sunshine,  forces  itself  immediately  to  be 
perceived  as  soon  as  ever  the  mind  turns  its  view  that 
way  ;  and  leaves  no  room  for  hesitation,  doubt,  or 
examination,  but  the  mind  is  presently  filled  with  the 
clear  light  of  it.  It  is  on  this  intuition  that  depends 
all  the  certainty  and  evidence  of  all  our  knowledge  ; 
which  certainty  every  one  finds  to  be  so  great,  that  he 
cannot  imagine,  and  therefore  not  require,  a  greater  : 
for  a  man  cannot  conceive  himself  capable  of  a 
greater  certainty,  than  to  know  that  any  idea  in  his 


Il6  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  VI. 

mind  is  such  as  he  perceives  it  to  be  :  and  that  two 
ideas,  wherein  he  perceives  a  difference,  are  different, 
and  not  precisely  the  same.  He  that  demands 
greater  certainty  than  this  demands  he  knows  not 
what,  and  shows  only  that  he  has  a  mind  to  be  a 
sceptic  without  being  able  to  be  so.  Certainty  de- 
pends so  wholly  on  this  intuition,  that  in  the  next  de- 
gree of  knowledge,  which  I  call  "  demonstrative,"  this 
intuition  is  necessary  in  all  the  connections  of  the 
intermediate  ideas,  without  which  we  cannot  attain 
knowledge  and  certainty. 

The  next  degree  of  knowledge  is,  where  the  mind 
perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  any  ideas, 
but  not  immediately.  Though  wherever  the  mind 
perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  any  of  its 
ideas,  there  be  certain  knowledge  ;  yet  it  does  not 
always  happen  that  the  mind  sees  that  agreement  or 
disagreement  which  there  is  between  them,  even 
where  it  is  discoverable  ;  and  in  that  case  remains  in 
ignorance,  and  at  most  gets  no  farther  than  a  probable 
conjecture.  The  reason  why  the  mind  cannot  always 
perceive  presently  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 
two  ideas,  is,  because  those  ideas  concerning  whose 
agreement  or  disagreement  the  inquiry  is  made,  cannot 
by  the  mind  be  so  put  together  as  to  show  it.  In  this 
case  then,  when  the  mind  cannot  so  bring  its  ideas 
together  as,  by  their  immediate  comparison  and,  as  it 
were,  juxtaposition  or  application  one  to  another,  to 
perceive  their  agreement  or  disagreement,  it  is  fain, 
by  the  intervention  of  other  ideas  (one  or  more,  as  it 
happens),  to  discover  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
which  it  searches  ;  and  this  is  that  which  we  call 
"  reasoning." 


CH.  II.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  I  17 

Thus  the  mind,  being  willing  to  know  the  agreement 
or  disagreement  in  bigness  between  the  three  angles  of 
a  triangle  and  two  right  ones,  cannot,  by  an  immediate 
view  and  comparing  them,  do  it :  because  the  three 
angles  of  a  triangle  cannot  be  brought  at  once,  and  be 
compared  with  any  one  or  two  angles  ;  and  so  of  this 
the  mind  has  no  immediate,  no  intuitive  knowledge. 
In  this  case  the  mind  is  fain  to  find  out  some  other 
angles,  to  which  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  have 
an  equality  ;  and  finding  those  equal  to  two  right 
ones,  comes  to  know  their  equality  to  two  right  ones. 

Those  intervening  ideas  which  serve  to  show  the 
agreement  of  any  two  others,  are  called  "  proofs "  ;| 
and  where  the  agreement  or  disagreement  is  by  this 
means  plainly  and  clearly  perceived,  it  is  called] 
"  demonstration,"  it  being  shown  to  the  understand- 
ing^ami  the  mind  made  to  see  that  it  is  so. 

This  knowledge  by  intervening  proofs,  though  it  be 
certain,  yet  the  evidence  of  it  is  not  altogether  so 
clear  and  bright,  nor  the  assent  so  ready,  as  in  intu- 
itive knowledge.  For  though  in  demonstration  the 
mind  does  at  last  perceive  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  the  ideas  it  considers,  yet  it  is  not  without 
pains  and  attention  :  there  must  be  more  than  one 
transient  view  to  find  it. 

Another  difference  between  intuitive  and  demon- 
strative knowledge,  is,  that  though  in  the  latter  all 
doubt  be  removed,  when  by  the  intervention  of  the 
intermediate  ideas  the  agreement  or  disagreement  is 
perceived ;  yet  before  the  demonstration  there  was  a 
doubt  ;  which  in  intuitive  knowledge  cannot  happen 
to  the  mind  that  has  its  faculty  of  perception  left  to  a 
degree  capable  of  distinct  ideas,  no  more  than  it  can 


Il8  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

be  a  doubt  to  the  eye  (that  can  distinctly  see  white 
and  black),  whether  this  ink  and  this  paper  be  all  of  a 
color.  If  there  be  sight  in  the  eyes,  it  will  at  first 
glimpse,  without  hesitation,  perceive  the  words  printed 
on  this  paper,  different  from  the  color  of  the  paper. 

Now,  in  every  step  reason  makes  in  demonstrative 
knowledge,  there  is  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  that 
agreement  or  disagreement  it  seeks  with  the  next  in- 
termediate idea,  which  it  uses  as  a  proof  :  for  if  it 
were  not  so,  that  yet  would  need  a  proof ;  since  with- 
out the  perception  of  such  agreement  or  disagreement 
there  is  no  knowledge  produced.  If  it  be  perceived 
by  itself,  it  is  intuitive  knowledge  :  if  it  cannot  be 
perceived  by  itself,  there  is  need  of  some  intervening 
idea,  as  a  common  measure,  to  show  their  agreement 
or  disagreement. 

2,   The  Extent  of  Human   Knowledge. 

Knowledge,  as  has  been  said,  lying  in  the  percep- 
tion of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  any  of  our 
ideas,  it  follows  from  hence,  that, 

—  First,  We  can  have  knowledge  no  farther  than  we 
have  ideas. 

—  Secondly,  That  we  can  have  no  knowledge  farther 
than  we  can  have  perception   of  that  agreement  or 
disagreement :  which  perception  being,  (i.)  Either  by 
intuition,  or  the  immediate  comparing  any  two  ideas  ; 
o  ,  (2.)  By  reason,  examining  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  two  ideas  by  the  intervention  of  some 
others  ;  or,   (3.)  By  sensation,  perceiving  the  exist- 
ence of  particular  things  :  hence  it  also  follows, 

^  Thirdly,  That  we  cannot  have  an  intuitive  knowl- 


CH.  III.]  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  IIQ 

edge  that  shall  extend  itself  to  all  our  ideas,  and  all 
that  we  would  know  about  them  ;  because  we  cannot 
examine  and  perceive  all  the  relations  they  have  one 
to  another  by  juxtaposition,  or  an  immediate  com- 
parison one  with  another.  Thus  having  the  ideas  of 

'  an  obtuse  and  an  acute  angled  triangle,  both  drawn 
from  equal  bases,  and  between  parallels,  I  can  by  in- 
tuitive knowledge  perceive  the  one  not  to  be  the 
other  ;  but  cannot  that  way  know  whether  they  be 
equal  or  no  :  because  their  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment in  equality  can  never  be  perceived  by  an  imme- 
diate comparing  them  ;  the  difference  of  figure  makes 
their  parts  uncapable  of  an  exact  immediate  applica- 
tion ;  and  therefore  there  is  need  of  some  intervening 
quantities  to  measure  them  by,  which  is  demonstra- 
tion or  rational  knowledge. 

Fourthly,  It  follows  also,  from  what  is  above  ob- 
served, that  our  rational  knowledge  cannot  reach  to 
the  whole  extent  of  our  ideas  :  because  between  two 
different  ideas  we  would  examine,  we  cannot  always 
find  such  mediums  as  we  can  connect  one  to  another 
with  an  intuitive  knowledge,  in  all  the  parts  of  the 
deduction  ;  and  wherever  that  fails,  we  come  short  of 
knowledge  and  demonstration. 

—  Fifthly,  Sensitive  knowledge,  reaching  no  farther 
than  the  existence  of  things  actually  present  to  our 
senses,  is  yet  much  narrower  than  either  of  the 
former. 

We  have  the  ideas  of  matter  and  thinking,  but  pos- 
sibly shall  never  be  able  to  know  whether  any  mere 
material  being  thinks  or  no  ;  it  being  impossible  for 
us,  by  the  contemplation  of  our  own  ideas  without 


120  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

revelation,  to  discover  whether  Omnipotency  has  not 
given  to  some  systems  of  matter,  fitly  disposed,  a 
power  to  perceive  and  think,  or  else  joined  and  fixed 
to  matter,  so  disposed,  a  thinking  immaterial  sub- 
stance :  it  being,  in  respect  of  our  notions,  not  much 
more  remote  from  our  comprehension  to  conceive 
that  God  can,  if  he  pleases,  superadd  to  matter  a 
faculty  of  thinking,  than  that  he  should  superadd  to  it 
another  substance  with  a  faculty  of  thinking  ;  since  we 
know  not  wherein  thinking  consists,  nor  to  what  sort 
of  substances  the  Almighty  has  been  pleased  to  give 
that  power  which  cannot  be  in  any  created  being  but 
merely  by  the  good  pleasure  and  bounty  of  the 
Creator.  For  I  see  no  contradiction  in  it,  that  the 
first  eternal  thinking  Being  should,  if  he  pleased,  give 
to  certain  systems  of  created  senseless  matter,  put  to- 
gether as  he  thinks  fit,  some  degrees  of  sense,  percep- 
tion, and  thought  :  though,  as  I  think  I  have  proved, 
(lib.  iv.  chap,  x.),  it  is  no  less  than  a  contradiction  to 
suppose  matter  (which  is  evidently  in  its  own  nature 
void  of  sense  and  thought)  should  be  that  eternal 
first  thinking  being.  It  is  a  point  which  seems  to  me 
to  be  put  out  of  the  reach  of  our  knowledge  :  and  he 
who  will  give  himself  leave  to  consider  freely,  and 
look  into  the  dark  and  intricate  part  of  each  hypoth- 
esis, will  scarce  find  his  reason  able  to  determine 
him  fixedly  for  or  against  the  soul's  materiality  ;  since 
on  which  side  soever  he  views  it,  either  as  an  unex- 
tended  substance,  or  as  a  thinking  extended  matter, 
the  difficulty  to  conceive  either  will,  whilst  either 
alone  is  in  his  thoughts,  still  drive  him  to  the  contrary 
side  :  an  unfair  way  which  some  men  take  with 


CH.  III.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  121 

themselves  ;  who,  because  of  the  unconceivableness 
of  something  they  find  in  one,  throw  themselves  vio- 
lently into  the  contrary  hypothesis,  though  altogether 
as  unintelligible  to  an  unbiassed  understanding. 

Secondly,  As  to  the  second  sort,  which  is  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  our  ideas  of  co-existence,  in 
this  our  knowledge  is  very  short,  though  in  this  con- 
sists the  greatest  and  most  material  part  of  our  knowl- 
edge concerning  substances.  For  our  ideas  of  the 
species  of  substances  being,  as  I  have  showed,  nothing 
but  certain  collections  of  simple  ideas  united  in  one 
subject,  and  so  co-existing  together  ; — v.  g.,  our  idea 
of  "flame"  is  a  body  hot,  luminous,  and  moving 
upward  ;  of  "  gold,"  a  body  heavy  to  a  certain  degree, 
yellow,  malleable,  and  fusible.  These,  or  some  such 
complex  ideas  as  these  in  men's  minds,  do  these  two 
names  of  the  different  substances,  "  flame "  and 
"  gold,"  stand  for.  When  we  would  know  any  thing 
farther  concerning  these,  or  any  other  sort  of  sub- 
stances, what  do  we  inquire  but  what  other  qualities 
or  powers  these  substances  have  or  have  not  ?  which 
is  nothing  else  but  to  know  what  other  simple  ideas 
do  or  do  not  co-exist  with  those  that  make  up  that 
complex  idea. 

Our  knowledge  in  all  these  inquiries  reaches  very 
little  farther  than  our  experience.  Indeed  some 
few  of  the  primary  qualities  have  a  necessary  depend- 
ence and  visible  connection  one  with  another,  as 
figure  necessarily  supposes  extension,  receiving  or 
communicating  motion  by  impulse  supposes  solidity. 
But  though  these  and  perhaps  some  others  of  our 
ideas  have,  yet  there  are  so  few  of  them  that  have,  a 


122  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

visible  connection  one  with  another,  that  we  can  by 
intuition  or  demonstration  discover  the  co-existence 
of  very  few  of  the  qualities  are  to  be  found  united  in 
substances  :  and  we  are  left  only  to  the  assistance  of 
our  senses  to  make  known  to  us  what  qualities  they 
contain.  For,  of  all  the  qualities  that  are  co-existent 
in  any  subject,  without  this  dependence  and  evident 
connection  of  their  ideas  one  with  another,  we  cannot 
know  certainly  any  two  to  co-exist  any  farther  than 
experience,  by  our  senses,  informs  us.  Thus  though 
we  see  the  yellow  color,  and  upon  trial  find  the  weight, 
malleableness,  fusibility,  and  fixedness  that  are  united 
in  a  piece  of  gold  ;  yet,  because  no  one  of  these  ideas 
has  any  evident  dependence  or  necessary  connection 
with  the  other,  we  cannot  certainly  know  that  where 
any  four  of  these  are  the  fifth  will  be  there  also,  how 
highly  probable  soever  it  may  be  :  because  the  highest 
probability  amounts  not  to  certainty ;  without  which 
there  can  be  no  true  knowledge.  For  this  co-exist- 
ence can  be  no  farther  known  than  it  is  perceived  : 
and  it  cannot  be  perceived  but  either  in  particular 
subjects  by  the  observation  of  our  senses,  or  in  general 
by  the  necessary  connection  of  the  ideas  themselves. 

The  names  of  substances,  then,  whenever  made  to 
stand  for  species  which  are  supposed  to  be  constituted 
by  real  essences  which  we  know  not,  are  not  capable 
to  convey  certainty  to  the  understanding :  of  the 
truth  of  general  propositions  made  up  of  such  terms 
we  cannot  be  sure.  The  reason  whereof  is  plain. 
For,  how  can  we  be  sure  that  this  or  that  quality  is  in 
gold,  when  we  know  not  what  is  or  is  not  gold  ?  since 
in  this  way  of  speaking  nothing  is  gold  but  what  par- 
takes of  an  essence,  which  we  not  knowing  cannot  know 


CH.  VI.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY     OF    LOCKE.  123 

where  it  is  or  is  not,  and  so  cannot  be  sure  that  any 
parcel  of  matter  in  the  world  is  or  is  not  in  this  sense 
gold  ;  being  incurably  ignorant  whether  it  has  or  has 
not  that  which  makes  any  thing  to  be  called  "  gold," 
/.  e.,  that  real  essence  of  gold  whereof  we  have  no  idea 
at  all :  this  being  as  impossible  for  us  to  know,  as  it  is 
for  a  blind  man  to  tell  in  what  flower  the  color  of  a 
pansy  is  or  is  not  to  be  found,  whilst  he  has  no  idea 
of  the  color  of  a  pansy  at  all.  Or  if  we  could  (which 
is  impossible)  certainly  know  where  a  real  essence 
which  we  know  not,  is,  v.  g.,  in  what  parcels  of  mat- 
ter the  real  essence  of  gold  is,  yet  could  we  not  be 
sure  that  this  or  that  quality  could  with  truth  be 
affirmed  of  gold  :  since  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  know 
that  this  or  that  quality  of  idea  has  a  necessary  con- 
nection with  a  real  essence,  of  which  we  have  no  idea 
at  all,  whatever  species  that  supposed  real  essence 
may  be  imagined  to  constitute. 

The  complex  ideas  that  our  names  of  the  species  of 
substances  properly  stand  for,  are  collections  of  such 
qualities  as  have  been  observed  to  co-exist  in  an  un- 
known substratum  which  we  call  "  substance  ;  "  but 
what  other  qualities  necessarily  co-exist  with  such 
combinations,  we  cannot  certainly  know,  unless  we 
can  discover  their  natural  dependence  ;  which  in  their 
primary  qualities  we  can  go  but  a  very  little  way  in  ; 
and  in  all  their  secondary  qualities  we  can  discover 
no  connection  at  all,  for  the  reasons  mentioned, 
(chap,  iii.)  viz.,  (i.)  Because  we  know  not  the  real 
constitutions  of  substances,  on  which  each  secondary 
quality  particularly  depends.  (2.)  Did  we  know  that 
it  would  serve  us  only  for  experimental  (not  universal) 
knowledge  ;  and  reach  with  certainty  no  farther  than 


124  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

that  bare  instance  :  because  our  understandings  can 
discover  no  conceivable  connection  between  any  sec- 
ondary quality,  and  any  modification  whatsoever  of 
any  of  the  primary  ones.  And  therefore  there  are 
very  few  general  propositions  to  be  made  concerning 
substances  which  can  carry  with  them  undoubted 
certainty. 

And  therefore  I  am  apt  to  doubt,  that  how  far 
soever  human  industry  may  advance  useful  and  ex- 
perimental philosophy  in  physical  things,  scientifical 
will  still  be  out  of  our  reach  ;  because  we  want  perfect 
and  adequate  ideas  of  those  very  bodies  which  are 
nearest  to  us,  and  most  under  our  command.  Those 
which  we  have  ranked  into  classes  under  names,  and 
we  think  ourselves  best  acquainted  with,  we  have  but 
very  imperfect  and  incomplete  ideas  of.  Distinct 
ideas  of  the  several  sorts  of  bodies  that  fall  under  the 
examination  of  our  senses  perhaps  we  may  have  ;  but 
adequate  ideas,  I  suspect,  we  have  not  of  any  one 
amongst  them. 

"  All  gold  is  fixed,"  is  a  proposition  whose  truth  we 
cannot  be  certain  of,  how  universally  soever  it  be  be- 
lieved. For  if,  according  to  the  useless  imagination 
of  the  Schools,  any  one  supposes  the  term  "gold  "  to 
stand  for  a  species  of  things  set  out  by  nature  by  a 
real  essence  belonging  to  it,  it  is  evident  he  knows  not 
what  particular  substances  are  of  that  species  ;  and 
so  cannot,  with  certainty,  affirm  any  thing  universally 
of  gold.  For  the  chief  part  of  our  knowledge  con- 
cerning substances  is  not,  as  in  other  things,  barely  of 
the  relation  of  two  ideas  that  may  exist  separately  ; 
but  is  of  the  necessary  connection  and  co-existence  of 


CH.  VI.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  125 

several  distinct  ideas  in  the  same  subject,  or  of  their 
repugnances  so  to  co-exist.  Could  we  begin  at  the 
other  end,  and  discover  what  it  was  therein  that  color 
consisted,  what  made  a  body  lighter  or  heavier,  what 
texture  of  parts  made  it  malleable,  fusible,  and  fixed, 
and  fit  to  be  dissolved  in  this  sort  of  liquor,  and  not 
in  another ;  if  (I  say)  we  had  such  an  idea  as  this  of 
bodies,  and  could  perceive  wherein  all  sensible  quali- 
ties originally  consist,  and  how  they  are  produced,  we 
might  frame  such  abstract  ideas  of  them  as  would 
furnish  us  with  matter  of  more  general  knowledge, 
and  enable  us  to  make  universal  propositions  that 
should  carry  general  truth  and  certainty  with  them. 

We  are  not  therefore  to  wonder  if  certainty  be  to 
be  found  in  very  few  general  propositions  made  con- 
cerning substances  ;  our  knowledge  of  their  qualities 
and  properties  go  very  seldom  farther  than  our  senses 
reach  and  inform  us.  Possibly  inquisitive  and  ob- 
serving men  may,  by  strength  of  judgment,  penetrate 
farther  ;  and  on  probabilities  taken  from  wary  obser- 
vation, and  hints  well  laid  together,  often  guess  right 
at  what  experience  has  not  yet  discovered  to  them. 
But  this  is  but  guessing  still  ;  it  amounts  only  to 
opinion,  and  has  not  that  certainty  which  is  requisite 
to  knowledge.  For  all  general  knowledge  lies  only  in 
our  own  thoughts,  and  consists  barely  in  the  contem- 
plation of  our  own  abstract  ideas. 

To  conclude  :  general  propositions,  of  what  kind 
soever,  are  then  only  capable  of  certainty,  when  the 
terms  used  in  them  stand  for  such  ideas  whose  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  as  there  expressed  is  capable  to 
be  discovered  by  us.  And  we  are  then  certain  of 


/V      Of  THB    ^¥^ 


126  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

their  truth  or  falsehood,  when  we  perceive  the  ideas 
the  terms  stand  for  to  agree  or  not  agree,  according  as 
they  are  affirmed  or  denied  one  of  another.  Whence 
we  may  take  notice,  that  general  certainty  is  never  to 
be  found  but  in  our  ideas.  Whenever  we  go  to  seek 
it  elsewhere  in  experiment  or  observations  without 
us,  our  knowledge  goes  not  beyond  particulars.  It  is 
the  contemplation  of  our  own  abstract  ideas  that 
alone  is  able  to  afford  us  general  knowledge. 

If  we  are  at  a  loss  in  respect  of  the  powers  and 
operations  of  bodies,  I  think  it  is  easy  to  conclude 
we  are  much  more  in  the  dark  in  reference  to  spirits, 
whereof  we  naturally  have  no  ideas  but  what  we  draw 
from  that  of  our  own,  by  reflecting  on  the  operations 
of  our  own  souls  within  us,  as  far  as  they  can  come 
within  our  observation.  But  how  inconsiderable 
rank  the  spirits  that  inhabit  our  bodies  hold  amongst 
those  various,  and  possibly  innumerable,  kinds  of 
nobler  beings  ;  and  how  far  short  they  come  of  the 
endowments  and  perfections  of  cherubims  and  sera- 
phims,  and  infinite  sorts  of  spirits  above  us,  is  what 
by  a  transient  hint,  in  another  place,  I  have  offered  to 
my  reader's  consideration. 

As  to  the  fourth  sort  of  our  knowledge,  viz.,  of  the 
real  actual  existence  of  things,  we  have  an  intuitive 
knowledge  of  our  own  existence  ;  a  demonstrative 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  God  ;  of  the  exist- 
ence of  any  thing  else,  we  have  no  other  but  a  sensi- 
tive knowledge,  which  extends  not  beyond  the  objects 
present  to  our  senses. 

Our  knowledge  being  so  narrow,  as  I  have  showed, 
it  will,  perhaps,  give  us  some  light  into  the  present 


CHS. III. -VI.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  127 

state  of  our  minds,  if  we  look  a  little  into  the  dark 
side,  and  take  a  view  of  our  ignorance  :  which,  being 
infinitely  larger  than  our  knowledge,  may  serve  much 
to  the  quieting  of  disputes  and  improvement  of  useful 
knowledge,  if,  discovering  how  far  we  have  clear  and 
distinct  ideas,  we  confine  out  thoughts  within  the 
contemplation  of  those  things  that  are  within  the 
reach  of  our  understandings,  and  launch  not  out  into 
that  abyss  of  darkness  (where  we  have  not  eyes  to 
see,  nor  faculties  to  perceive  any  thing),  out  of  a  pre- 
sumption that  nothing  is  beyond  our  comprehension. 

We  shall  the  less  wonder  to  find  it  so  when  we  con- 
sider the  causes  of  our  ignorance,  which,  from  what 
has  been  said,  I  suppose,  will  be  found  to  be  chiefly 
these  three  : 

FIRST,  Want  of  ideas. 

SECONDLY,  Want  of  a  discoverable  connection 
between  the  ideas  we  have. 

THIRDLY,  Want  of  tracing  and  examining  our 
ideas. 

FIRST.  There  are  some  things,  and  those  not  a 
few,  that  we  are  ignorant  of  for  want  of  ideas. 

First.  All  the  simple  ideas  we  have  are  confined 
(as  I  have  shown)  to  those  we  receive  from  corporeal 
objects  by  sensation,  and  from  the  operations  of  our 
own  minds  as  the  objects  of  reflection.  But  how 
much  these  few  and  narrow  inlets  are  disproportionate 
to  the  vast  whole  extent  of  all  beings,  will  not  be  hard 
to  persuade  those  who  are  not  so  foolish  as  to  think 
their  span  the  measure  of  all  things.  What  other 
simple  ideas  it  is  possible  the  creatures  in  other  parts 
of  the  universe  may  have  by  the  assistance  of  senses 


128  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

and  faculties  more  or  perfecter  than  we  have,  or  dif- 
ferent from  ours,  it  is  not  for  us  to  determine  ;  but  to 
say  or  think  there  are  no  such  because  we  conceive 
nothing  of  them,  is  no  better  an  argument  than  if  a 
blind  man  should  be  positive  in  it,  that  there  was  no 
such  thing  as  sight  and  colors  because  he  had  no 
manner  of  idea  of  any  such  thing,  nor  could  by  any 
means  frame  to  himself  any  notions  about  seeing. 

Secondly,  Another  great  cause  of  ignorance  is  the 
want  of  ideas  we  are  capable  of.  As  the  want  of 
ideas  which  our  faculties  are  not  able  to  give  us  shuts 
us  wholly  from  those  views  of  things  which  it  is  rea- 
sonable to  think  other  beings,  perfecter  than  we,  have, 
of  which  we  know  nothing  ;  so  the  want  of  ideas  I 
now  speak  of  keeps  us  in  ignorance  of  things  we  con- 
ceive capable  of  being  known  to  us.  Bulk,  figure, 
and  motion,  we  have  ideas  of.  But  though  we  are  not 
without  ideas  of  these  primary  qualities  of  bodies  in 
general,  yet  not  knowing  what  is  the  particular  bulk, 
figure,  and  motion  of  the  greatest  part  of  the  bodies 
of  the  universe,  we  are  ignorant  of  the  several  powers, 
efficacies,  and  ways  of  operation,  whereby  the  effects 
which  we  daily  see  are  produced.  These  are  hid  from 
us  in  some  things  by  being  too  remote  ;  and,  in  others, 
by  being  too  minute. 

I  doubt  not  but  if  we  could  discover  the  figure, 
size,  texture,  and  motion  of  the  minute  constituent 
parts  of  any  two  bodies,  we  should  know  without  trial 
several  of  their  operations  one  upon  another,  as  we  do 
now  the  properties  of  a  square  or  a  triangle.  Did  we 
know  the  mechanical  affections  of  the  particles  of 
rhubarb,  hemlock,  opium,  and  a  man,  as  a  watch- 


CH.  III.,  IV.]    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  129 

maker  does  those  of  a  watch,  whereby  it  performs  its 
operations,  and  of  a  file,  which,  by  rubbing  on  them, 
will  alter  the  figure  of  any  of  the  wheels,  we  should 
be  able  to  tell  beforehand  that  rhubarb  will  purge, 
hemlock  kill,  and  opium  make  a  man  sleep,  as  well  as 
a  watchmaker  can,  that  a  little  piece  of  paper  laid  on 
the  balance  will  keep  the  watch  from  going  till  it  be 
removed  ;  or  that  some  small  part  of  it  being  rubbed 
by  a  file,  the  machine  would  quite  lose  its  motion,  and 
the  watch  go  no  more. 

SECONDLY,  What  a  small  part  of  the  substantial 
beings  that  are  in  the  universe  the  want  of  ideas 
leaves  open  to  our  knowledge,  we  have  seen.  In  the 
next  place,  another  cause  of  ignorance  of  no  less  mo- 
ment is  a  want  of  a  discoverable  connection  between 
those  ideas  which  we  have.  For  wherever  we  want 
that,  we  are  utterly  uncapable  of  universal  and  certain 
knowledge  ;  and  are,  as  in  the  former  case,  left  only 
to  observation  and  experiment  ;  which  how  narrow 
and  confined  it  is,  how  far  from  general  knowledge, 
we  need  not  be  told.  I  shall  give  some  few  instances 
of  this  cause  of  our  ignorance,  and  so  leave  it.  It  is 
evident  that  the  bulk,  figure,  and  motion  of  several 
bodies  about  us,  produce  in  us  several  sensations,  as 
of  colors,  sounds,  taste,  smell,  pleasure,  and  pain,  etc. 
These  mechanical  affections  of  bodies  having  no  affin- 
ity at  all  with  those  ideas  they  produce  in  us  (there 
being  no  conceivable  connexion  between  any  impulse 
of  any  sort  of  body,  and  any  perception  of  a  color  or 
smell  which  we  find  in  our  minds),  we  can  have  no  dis- 
tinct knowledge  of  such  operations  beyond  our  expe- 
rience ;  and  can  reason  no  otherwise  about  them  than 


130  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

as  effects  produced  by  the  appointment  of  an  infi- 
nitely wise  Agent,  which  perfectly  surpass  our  com- 
prehensions. 

3.    The  Reality  of  Our  Knowledge. 

Wherever  we  perceive  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  any  of  our  ideas,  there  is  certain  knowledge  : 
and  wherever  we  are  sure  those  ideas  agree  with  the 
reality  of  things,  there  is  certain  real  knowledge. 

It  is  evident  the  mind  knows  not  things  immedi- 
ately, but  only  by  the  intervention  of  the  ideas  it  has 
of  them.  Our  knowledge  therefore  is  real  only  so  far 
as  there  is  a  conformity  between  our  ideas  and  the 
reality  of  things.  But  what  shall  be  here  the  crite- 
rion ?  How  shall  the  mind,  when  it  perceives  nothing 
but  its  own  ideas,  know  that  they  agree  with  things 
themselves  ?  This,  though  it  seems  not  to  want  diffi- 
culty, yet  I  think  there  be  two  sorts  of  ideas  that  we 
may  be  assured  agree  with  things  : 

First.  The  first  are  simple  ideas,  which  since  the 
mind,  as  has  been  shown,  can  by  no  means  make  to 
itself,  must  necessarily  be  the  product  of  things  oper- 
ating on  the  mind  in  the  natural  way,  and  producing 
therein  those  perceptions  which  by  the  wisdom  and 
will  of  our  Maker  they  are  ordained  and  adapted  to. 
From  whence  it  follows,  that  simple  ideas  are  not 
fictions  of  our  fancies,  but  the  natural  and  regular 
productions  of  things  without  us  really  operating  upon 
us  ;  and  so  carry  with  them  all  the  conformity  which 
is  intended,  or  which  our  state  requires  ;  for  they 
represent  to  us  things  under  those  appearances  which 
they  are  fitted  to  produce  in  us,  whereby  we  are 


CHS. VIII.  AND  IV.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  131 

enabled  to  distinguish  the  sorts  of  particular  sub- 
stances,' to  discern  the  states  they  are  in,  and  so  to 
take  them  for  our  necessities,  and  apply  them  to 
our  uses.  Thus  the  idea  of  whiteness  or  bitterness, 
as  it  is  in  the  mind,  exactly  answering  that  power 
which  is  in  any  body  to  produce  it  there,  has  all  the 
real  conformity  it  can  or  ought  to  have  with  things 
without  us.  And  this  conformity  between  our  simple 
ideas  and  the  existence  of  things  is  sufficient  for  real 
knowledge. 

Secondly.  All  our  complex  ideas  except  those  of 
substances  being  archetypes  of  the  mind's  own  mak- 
ing, not  intended  to  be  the  copies  of  any  thing,  nor 
referred  to  the  existence  of  any  thing,  as  to  their 
originals,  cannot  want  any  conformity  necessary  to 
real  knowledge. 

We  can  know  then  the  truth  of  two  sorts  of  propo- 
sitions with  perfect  certainty  ;  the  one  is,  of  those 
trifling  propositions  which  have  a  certainty  in  them, 
but  it  is  only  a  verbal  certainty,  but  not  instructive. 
And,  secondly,  we  can  know  the  truth,  and  so  may 
be  certain  in  propositions  which  affirm  something  of 
another,  which  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  its  pre- 
cise complex  idea,  but  not  contained  in  it  :  as  that 
"the  external  angle  of  all  triangles  is  bigger  than 
either  of  the  opposite  internal  angles ;  "  which  rela- 
.  tion  of  the  outward  angle  to  either  of  the  opposite 
internal  angles,  making  no  part  of  the  complex  idea 
signified  by  the  name  "  triangle,"  this  is  a  real  truth, 
and  conveys  with  it  instructive  real  knowledge. 

I  doubt  not  but  it  will  be  easily  granted  that  the 
knowledge  we  have  of  mathematical  truths,  is  not 


132  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

only  certain,  but  real  knowledge  ;  and  not  the  bare 
empty  vision  of  vain,  insignificant  chimeras  of  the 
brain  :  and  yet,  if  we  will  consider,  we  shall  find  that 
it  is  only  of  our  own  ideas.  The  mathematician  con- 
siders the  truth  and  properties  belonging  to  a  rect- 
angle or  circle,  only  as  they  are  in  idea  in  his  own 
mind.  For  it  is  possible  he  never  found  either 
of  them  existing  mathematically,  /'.  e.,  precisely  true 
in  his  life.  But  yet  the  knowledge  he  has  of  any 
truths  or  properties  belonging  to  a  circle,  or  any  other 
mathematical  figure,  are  nevertheless  true  and  certain 
even  of  real  things  existing  :  because  real  things 
are  no  farther  concerned,  nor  intended  to  be  meant 
by  any  such  propositions,  than  as  things  really  agree 
to  those  archetypes  in  his  mind. 

And  hence  it  follows  that  moral  knowledge  is  as 
capable  of  real  certainty  as  mathematics.  For,  cer- 
tainty being  but  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  our  ideas,  and  demonstration  nothing 
but  the  perception  of  such  agreement  by  the  inter- 
vention of  other  ideas  or  mediums,  our  moral  ideas 
as  well  as  mathematical  being  archetypes  themselves, 
and  so  adequate  and  complete  ideas,  all.  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  which  we  shall  find  in  them 
will  produce  real  knowledge,  as  well  as  in  mathemati- 
cal figures. 

Let  us  proceed  now  to  inquire  concerning  our 
knowledge  of  the -existence  of  things,  and  how  we 
come  by  it.  I  say  then,  that  we  have  the  knowledge 
of  our  own  existence  by  intuition  ;  of  the  existence 
of  God  by  demonstration  ;  and  of  other  things  by 
sensation. 


CH.  X.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  133 

As  for  our  own  existence,  we  perceive  it  so  plainly 
and  so  certainly  that  it  neither  needs  nor  is  capable 
of  any  proof.  For  nothing  can  be  more  evident  to 
us  than  our  own  existence.  I  think,  I  reason,  I  feel 
pleasure  and  pain  :  can  any  of  these  be  more  evident 
to  me  than  my  own  existence  ?  If  I  doubt  of  all 
things,  that  very  doubt  makes  me  perceive  my  own 
existence,  and  will  not  suffer  me  to  doubt  of  that. 
For,  if  I  know  I  feel  pain,  it  is  evident  I  have  as  cer- 
tain perception  of  my  own  existence,  as  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  pain  I  feel :  or  if  I  know  I  doubt,  I  have 
as  certain  perception  of  the  existence  of  the  thing 
doubting,  as  of  that  thought  which  I  call  "  doubt." 
Experience,  then,  convinces  us  that  we  have  an  intui- 
tive knowledge  of  our  own  existence,  and  an  internal 
infallible  perception  that  we  are.  In  every  act  of 
sensation,  reasoning,  or  thinking,  we  are  conscious  to 
ourselves  of  our  own  being  ;  and,  in  this  matter,  come 
not  short  of  the  highest  degree  of  certainty. 

Though  God  has  given  us  no  innate  ideas  of  him- 
self;  though  he  has  stamped  no  original  characters 
on  our  minds,  wherein  we  may  read  his  being  ;  yet, 
having  furnished  us  with  those  faculties  our  minds  are 
endowed  with,  he  hath  not  left  himself  without  wit- 
ness ;  since  we  have  sense,  perception,  and  reason, 
and  cannot  want  a  clear  proof  of  him  as  long  as  we 
carry  ourselves  about  us.  To  show,  therefore,  that  we 
are  capable  of  knowing,  /".  e.y  being  certain,  that  there 
is  a  God,  and  how  we  may  come  by  this  certainty,  I 
think  we  may  go  no  farther  than  ourselves,  and  that 
undoubted  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  existence. 

I  think  it  is  beyond  question,  that  man  has  a  clear 


IJ4  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

perception  of  his  own  being  ;  he  knows  certainly  that 
he  exists,  and  that  he  is  something.  This,  then,  I 
think  I  may  take  for  a  truth,  which  every  one's  certain 
knowledge  assures  him  of  beyond  the  liberty  of 
doubting,  viz.,  that  he  is  something  that  actually 
exists. 

In  the  next  place,  man  knows  by  an  intuitive  cer- 
tainty that  bare  nothing  can  no  more  produce  any  real 
being,  than  it  can  be  equal  to  two  right  angles.  If  a 
man  knows  not  that  nonentity,  or  the  absence  of  all 
being,  cannot  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  it  is  impos- 
sible he  should  know  any  demonstration  in  Euclid. 
If  therefore  we  know  there  is  some  real  being,  and 
that  nonentity  cannot  produce  any  real  being,  it  is  an 
evident  demonstration,  that  from  eternity  there  has 
been  something  ;  since  what  was  not  from  eternity 
had  a  beginning  ;  and  what  had  a  beginning  must  be 
produced  by  something  else. 

Next,  it  is  evident,  that  what  had  its  being  and  be- 
ginning from  another,  must  also  have  all  that  which  is 
in  and  belongs  to  its  being  from  another  too.  All  the 
powers  it  has,  must  be  owing  to  and  received  from  the 
same  source.  This  eternal  source,  then,  of  all  being, 
must  also  be  the  source  and  original  of  all  power  : 
and  so  this  Eternal  Being  must  be  also  the  most  pow- 
erful. 

Again  :  a  man  finds  in  himself  perception  and 
knowledge.  We  have  then  got  one  step  farther  ;  and 
we  are  certain  now  that  there  is  not  only  some  being, 
but  some  knowing,  intelligent  being  in  the  world. 

There  was  a  time,  then,  when  there  was  no  knowing 
being,  and  when  knowledge  began  to  be  ;  or  else  there 


CH.  X.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  135 

has  been  also  a  knowing  Being  from  eternity.  If  it 
be  said,  "There  was  a  time  when  no  being  had  any 
knowledge,  when  that  Eternal  Being  was  void  of  all 
understanding  ;  "  I  reply,  that  then  it  was  impossible 
there  should  ever  have  been  any  knowledge  ;  it  being 
as  impossible  that  things  wholly  void  of  knowledge, 
and  operating  blindly  and  without  any  perception, 
should  produce  a  knowing  being,  as  it  is  impossible 
that  a  triangle  should  make  itself  three  angles  bigger 
than  two  right  ones.  For  it  is  as  repugnant  to  the 
idea  of  senseless  matter  that  it  should  put  into  itself 
sense-perception,  and  knowledge,  as  it  is  repugnant  to 
the  idea  of  a  triangle  that  it  should  put  into  itself 
greater  angles  than  two  right  ones. 

Thus  from  the  consideration  of  ourselves,  and  what 
we  infallibly  find  in  our  own  constitutions,  our  reason 
leads  us  to  the  knowledge  of  this  certain  and  evident 
truth,  that  there  is  an  eternal,  most  powerful,  and 
most  knowing  Being,  which  whether  any  one  will 
please  to  call  "  God,"  it  matters  not.  The  thing  is 
evident  ;  and  from  this  idea  duly  considered,  will 
easily  be  deducted  all  those  other  attributes  which  we 
ought  to  ascribe  to  this  Eternal  Being.  Though  our 
own  being  furnishes  us,  as  I  have  shown,  with  an 
evident  and  incontestable  proof  of  a  Deity  ;  and  I 
believe  nobody  can  avoid  the  cogency  of  it  who  will 
but  as  carefully  attend  to  it  as  to  any  other  dem- 
onstration of  so  many  parts ;  yet  this  being  so  fun- 
damental a  truth,  and  of  that  consequence  that  all 
religion  and  genuine  morality  depend  thereon,  I  doubt 
not  but  I  shall  be  forgiven  by  my  reader  if  I  go  over 
some  parts  of  this  argument  again,  and  enlarge  a 
little  more  upon  them. 


136  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

There  is  no  truth  more  evident  than  that  something 
must  be  from  eternity. 

It  being  then  unavoidable  for  all  rational  creatures 
to  conclude  that  something  has  existed  from  eternity, 
let  its  next  see  what  kind  of  thing  that  must  be. 

There  are  but  two  sorts  of  beings  in  the  world  that 
man  knows  or  conceives  : — 

First,  Such  as  are  purely  material,  without  sense, 
perception,  or  thought,  as  the  clippings  of  our  beards 
and  parings  of  our  nails. 

Secondly,  Sejisi^le,  thinking,  perceiving  beings, 
such  as  we  find  ourselves  to  be  ;  which,  if  you  please, 
we  will  hereafter  call  "  cogitative  and  incogitative 
beings  ;  "  which  to  our  present  purpose,  if  for  nothing 
else,  are  perhaps  better  terms  than  "material  and 
immaterial." 

If  then  there  must  be  something  sternal,  let  us  see 
what  sort  of  being  it  must  be.  And  to  that  it  is  very 
obvious  to  reason,  that  it  must  necessarily  be  a  c_Qgi= 
tative  being.  For  it  is  as  impossible  to  conceive  that 
ever  bare  incogitative  matter  should  produce  a  think- 
ing intelligent  being,  as  that  nothing  should  of  itself 
produce  matter. 

I  appeal  to  every  one's  own  thoughts,  whether  he 
cannot  as  easily  conceive  matter  produced  by  noth- 
ing, as  thought  to  be  produced  by  pure  matter,  when 
before  there  was  no  such  thing  as  thought  or  an  in- 
telligent being  existing.  If  matter  were  the  eternal 
first  cogitative  being,  there  would  not  be  one  eternal 
infinite  cogitative  being,  but  an  infinite  number  of 
eternal  finite  cogitative  beings  independent  one  of 
another,  of  limited  force  and  distinct  thoughts,  which 


CH.  XL]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  137 

could  never  produce  that  order,  harmony,  and  beauty, 
which  is  to  be  found  in  nature.  Since,  therefore, 
whatsoever  is  the  first  eternal  being  must  necessarily 
be  cogitative  ;  and  whatsoever  is  first  of  all  things 
must  necessarily  contain  in  it,  and  actually  have,  at 
least,  all  the  perfections  that  can  ever  after  exist  ;  nor 
can  it  ever  give  to  another  any  perfection  that  it  hath 
not,  either  actually  in  itself  or  at  least  in  a  higher  de- 
gree :  it  necessarily  follows,  that  the  first  eternal  being 
cannot  be  matter. 

If,  therefore,  it  be  evident  that  something  neces- 
sarily must  exist  from  eternity,  it  is  also  as  evident 
that  that  something  must  necessarily  be  a  cogitative 
Jbging  :  for  it  is  as  impossible  that  incogitative  matter 
should  produce  a  cogitative  being,  as  that  nothing,  or 
the  negation  of  all  being,  should  produce  a  positive 
being  or  matter. 

The  knowledge  of  our  own  being  we  have  by  intui- 
tion. The  existence  of  a  God  reason  clearly  makes 
known  to  us,  as  has  been  shown. 

The  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  any  other  thing, 
we  can  have  only  by  sensation  :  for,  there  being  no 
necessary  connection  of  real  existence  with  any  idea 
a  man  hath  in  his  memory,  nor  of  any  other  existence 
but  that  of  God  with  the  existence  of  any  particular 
man,  no  particular  man  can  know  the  existence  of  any 
other  being,  but  only  when  by  actual  operating  upon 
him  it  makes  itself  perceived  by  him.  For,  the  hav- 
ing the  idea  of  any  thing  in  our  mind  no  more  proves 
the  existence  of  that  thing  than  the  picture  of  a  man 
evidences  his  being  in  the  world,  or  the  visions  of  a 
dream  make  thereby  a  true  history. 


138  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

It  is  therefore  the  actual  receiving  of  ideas  from 
without  that  gives  us  notice  of  the  existence  of  other 
things,  and  makes  us  know  that  something  doth  exist 
at  that  time  without  us  which  causes  that  idea  in  us, 
though  perhaps  we  neither  know  nor  consider  how  it 
does  it :  for  it  takes  not  from  the  certainty  of  our 
senses,  and  the  ideas  we  receive  by  them,  that  we 
know  not  the  manner  wherein  they  are  produced  ; 
v.  g.,  whilst  I  write  this,  I  have,  by  the  paper  affecting 
my  eyes,  that  idea  produced  in  my  mind  which  what- 
ever object  causes,  I  call  "  white  ; "  by  which  I  know 
that  that  quality  or  accident  (/.  ^.,  whose  appearance 
before  my  eyes  always  causes  that  idea)  doth  really 
exist  and  hath  a  being  without  me. 

The  notice  we  have  by  our  senses  of  the  existing  of 
things  without  us,  though  it  be  not  altogether  so  cer- 
tain as  our  intuitive  knowledge,  or  the  deductions  of 
our  reason  employed  about  the  clear  abstract  ideas  of 
our  own  minds  ;  yet  it  is  an  assurance  that  deserves 
the  name  of  knowledge.  If  we  persuade  ourselves 
that  our  faculties  act  and  inform  us  right  concerning 
the  existence  of  those  objects  that  affect  them,  it 
cannot  pass  for  an  ill-grounded  confidence  :  for  I 
think  nobody  can,  in  earnest,  be  so  sceptical  as  to  be 
uncertain  of  the  existence  of  those  things  which  he 
sees  and  feels. 

This  is  certain,  the  confidence  that  our  faculties 
do  not  herein  deceive  us  is  the  greatest  assurance  we 
are  capable  of  concerning  the  existence  of  material 
beings.  For  we  cannot  act  any  thing  but  by  our  fac- 
ulties, nor  talk  of  knowledge  itself  but  by  the  help 
of  those  faculties  which  are  fitted  to  apprehend  even 


CH.  XI.]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  139 

what  knowledge  is.  But,  besides  the  assurance  we 
have  from  our  senses  themselves,  that  they  do  not  err 
in  the  information  they  give  us  of  the  existence  of 
things  without  us,  when  they  are  affected  by  them,  we 
are  farther  confirmed  in  this  assurance  by  other  coix- 
current  reasons. 

First,  It  is  plain  those  perceptions  are  produced 
in  us  by  exterior  causes  affecting  our  senses,  because 
those  that  want  the  organs  of  any  sense  never  can 
have  the  ideas  belonging  to  that  sense  produced  in 
their  minds. 

Secondly,  Because  sometimes  I  find  that  I  cannot 
avoid  the  having  those  ideas  produced  in  my  mind  ; 
for  though  when  my  eyes  are  shut,  or  windows  fast,  I 
can  at  pleasure  recall  to  my  mind  the  ideas  of  light  or 
the  sun,  which  former  sensations  had  lodged  in  my 
memory  ;  so  I  can  at  pleasure  lay  by  that  idea,  and 
take  into  my  view  that  of  the  smell  of  a  rose,  or  taste 
of  sugar.  But  if  I  turn  my  eyes  at  noon  towards  the 
sun,  I  cannot  avoid  the  ideas  which  the  light  or  sun 
then  produces  in  me.  So  that  there  is  a  manifest 
difference  between  the  ideas  laid  up  in  my  memory 
(over  which,  if  they  were  there  only,  I  should  have 
constantly  the  same  power  to  dispose  of  them,  and 
lay  them  by  at  pleasure),  and  those  which  force  them- 
selves upon  me  and  I  cannot  avoid  having.  And 
therefore  it  must  needs  be  some  exterior  cause,  and 
the  brisk  acting  of  some  objects  without  me,  whose 
efficacy  I  cannot  resist,  that  produces  those  ideas  in 
my  mind,  whether  I  will  or  no. 

Fourthly,  Our  senses,  in  many  cases,  bear  witness  to 
the  truth  of  each  other's  report  concerning  the  exist- 


140  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

ence  of  sensible  things  without  us.  He  that  sees  a 
fire  may,  if  he  doubt  whether  it  be  any  thing  more 
than  a  bare  fancy,  feel  it  too,  and  be  convinced  by 
putting  his  hand  in  it  ;  which  certainly  could  never  be 
put  into  such  exquisite  pain  by  a  bare  idea  or  phan- 
tom, unless  that  the  pain  be  a  fancy  too  :  which  yet 
he  cannot,  when  the  burn  is  well,  by  raising  the  idea 
of  it,  bring  upon  himself  again. 

So  that  this  evidence  is  as  great  as  we  can  desire, 
being  as  certain  to  us  as  our  pleasure  or  pain,  i.e., 
happiness  or  misery  ;  beyond  which  we  have  no  con- 
cernment either  of  knowing  or  being.  Such  an  assur- 
ance of  the  existence  of  things  without  us,  is  sufficient 
to  direct  us  in  the  attaining  the  good  and  avoiding 
the  evil  which  is  caused  by  them,  which  is  the  impor- 
tant concernment  we  have  of  being  made  acquainted 
with  them. 

In  fine,  then,  when  our  senses  do  actually  convey 
into  our  understandings  any  idea,  we  cannot  but  be 
satisfied  that  there  doth  something  at  that  time  really 
exist  without  us  which  doth  affect  our  senses,  and  by 
them  give  notice  of  itself  to  our  apprehensive  facul- 
ties, and  actually  produce  that  idea  which  we  then 
perceive  :  and  we  cannot  so  far  distrust  their  testi- 
mony as  to  doubt  that  such  collections  of  simple  ideas 
as  we  have  observed  by  our  senses  to  be  united 
together,  do  really  exist  together.  But  this  knowledge 
extends  as  far  as  the  present  testimony  of  our  senses, 
employed  about  particular  objects  that  do  then  affect 
them,  and  no  farther.  For  if  I  saw  such  a  collection 
of  simple  ideas  as  is  wont  to  be  called  "  man  "  existing 
together  one  minute  since,  and  am  now  alone  ;  I  can- 


CHS.XIV.ANDXV.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.         141 

not  be  certain  that  the  same  man  exists  now,  since 
there  is  no  necessary  connection  of  his  existence  a 
minute  since,  with  his  existence  now  :  by  a  thousand 
ways  he  may  cease  to  be,  since  I  had  the  testimony  of 
my  senses  for  his  existence. 

As,  when  our  senses  are  actually  employed  about 
any  object,  we  do  not  know  that  it  does  exist,  so  by 
our  memory  we  may  be  assured  that  heretofore  things 
that  affected  our  senses  have  existed.  And  thus  we 
have  knowledge  of  the  past  existence  of  several  things, 
whereof  our  senses  having  informed  us,  our  memories 
still  retain  the  ideas  ;  and  of  this  we  are  past  all  doubt 
so  long  as  we  remember  well.  But  this  knowledge 
also  reaches  no  farther  than  our  senses  have  formerly 
assured  us. 

Of  Judgment  and  Probability. 

The  understanding  faculties  being  given  to  man, 
not  barely  for  speculation,  but  also  for  the  conduct  of 
his  life,  man  would  be  at  a  great  loss  if  he  had  noth- 
ing to  direct  him  but  what  has  the  certainty  of  true 
knowledge.  For,  that  being  very  short  and  scanty,  as 
we  have  seen,  he  would  be  often  utterly  in  the  dark, 
and  in  most  of  the  actions  of  his  life  perfectly  at  a 
stand,  had  he  nothing  to  guide  him  in  the  absence  of 
clear  and  certain  knowledge.  He  that  will  not  eat  till 
he  has  demonstration  that  it  will  nourish  him,  he  that 
will  not  stir  till  he  infallibly  knows  the  business  he 
goes  about  will  succeed,  will  have  little  else  to  do  but 
sit  still  and  perish. 

The  faculty  which  God  has  given  man  to  supply  the 
want  of  clear  andi  certain  knowledge,  in  cases  where 


142  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

that  cannot  be  had,  is  judgment  :  whereby  the  mind 
takes  its  ideas  to  agree  or  disagree  ;  or,  which  is  the 
same,  any  proposition  to  be  true  or  false,  without  per- 
ceiving a  demonstrative  evidence  in  the  proofs. 

This  faculty  of  the  mind,  when  it  is  exercised  im- 
mediately about  things,  is  called  "judgment  ; "  when 
about  truths  delivered  in  words,  is  most  commonly 
called  "  assent  "  or  "  dissent :  "  which  being  the  most 
usual  way  wherein  the  mind  has  occasion  to  employ 
this  faculty,  I  shall,  under  these  terms,  treat  of  it  as 
least  liable  in  our  language  to  equivocation. 

Thus  the  mind  has  two  faculties  conversant  about 
truth  and  falsehood, — 

First,  Knowledge,  whereby  it  certainly  perceives, 
and  is  undoubtedly  satisfied  of  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  any  ideas. 

Secondly,  Judgment,  which  is  the  putting  ideas 
together,  or  separating  them  from  one  another  in  the 
mind,  when  their  certain  agreement  or  disagreement  is 
not  perceived,  but  presumed  to  be  so  ;  which  is,  as 
the  word  imports,  taken  to  be  so  before  it  certainly 
appears.  And  if  it  so  unites  or  separates  them  as  in 
reality  things  are,  it  is  right  judgment. 

As  demonstration  is  the  showing  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  two  ideas  by  the  intervention  of  one 
or  more  proofs,  which  have  a  constant,  immutable,  and 
visible  connection  one  with  another  ;  so  probability  is 
nothing  but  the  appearance  of  such  an  agreement  or 
disagreement  by  the  intervention  of  proofs,  whose 
connection  is  not  constant  and  immutable,  or  at  least 
is  not  perceived  to  be  so  ;  but  is,  or  appears  for  the 
most  part  to  be  so,  and  is  enough  to  induce  the  mind 


CH.XV.,XVL]  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  143 

to  judge  the  proposition  to  be  true  or  false,  rather 
than  the  contrary. 

Probability  is  likeliness  to  be  true  ;  the  very  nota- 
tion of  the  word  signifying  such  a  proposition  for 
which  there  be  arguments  or  proofs  to  make  it  pass, 
or  be  received,  for  true.  The  entertainment  the  mind 
gives  this  sort  of  propositions  is  called  "  belief," 
"  assent,"  or  "  opinion,"  which  is  the  admitting  or  re- 
ceiving any  proposition  for  true,  upon  arguments  or 
proofs  that  are  found  to  persuade  us  to  receive  it  as 
true,  without  certain  knowledge  that  it  is  so.  And 
herein  lies  the  difference  between  probability  and  cer- 
tainty, faith  and  knowledge,  that  in  all  the  parts  of 
knowledge  there  is  intuition  ;  each  immediate  idea, 
each  step,  has  its  visible  and  certain  connection  :  in 
belief  not  so.  That  which  makes  me  believe,  is 
something  extraneous  to  the  thing  I  believe  ;  some- 
thing not  evidently  joined  on  both  sides  to,  and  so 
not  manifestly  showing  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  those  ideas  that  are  under  consideration. 

Probability,  then,  being  to  supply  the  defect  of  our 
knowledge,  and  to  guide  us  where  that  fails,  is  always 
conversant  about  propositions  whereof  we  have  no 
certainty,  but  only  some  inducements  to  receive  them 
for  true.  The  grounds  of  it  are,  in  short,  these  two 
following  : 

First.  The  conformity  of  any  thing  with  our  own 
knowledge,  observation,  and  experience. 

Secondly.  The  testimony  of  others,  vouching  their 
observation  and  experience.  In  the  testimony  of 
others,  is  to  be  considered,  (i.)  The  number.  (2.) 
The  integrity.  (3.)  The  skill  of  the  witnesses.  (4.) 


144  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

The  design  of  the  author,  where  it  is  a  testimony  out 
of  a  book  cited.  (5.)  The  consistency  of  the  parts 
and  circumstances  of  the  relation.  (6.)  Contrary  tes- 
timonies. 

Upon  these  grounds  depends  the  probability  of  any 
proposition  :  and  as  the  conformity  of  our  knowledge, 
as  the  certainty  of  observations,  as  the  frequency  and 
constancy  of  experience,  and  the  number  and  credi- 
bility of  testimonies  do  more  or  less  agree  or  disagree 
with  it,  so  is  any  proposition  in  itself  more  or  less 
probable. 

The  grounds  of  probability  we  have  laid  down  in 
the  foregoing  chapter,  as  they  are  the  foundations  on 
which  our  assent  is  built,  so  are  they  also  the  measure 
whereby  its  several  degrees  are  or  ought  to  be  regu- 
lated :  only  we  are  to  take  notice,  that  whatever 
grounds  of  probability  there  may  be,  they  yet  operate 
no  further  on  the  mind,  which  searches  after  truth 
and  endeavors  to  judge  right,  than  they  appear  at 
least  in  the  first  judgment  or  search  that  the  mind 
makes. 

But,  to  return  to  the  grounds  of  assent,  and  the 
several  degrees  of  it :  we  are  to  take  notice  that  the 
propositions  we  receive  upon  inducements  of  proba- 
bility are  of  two  sorts  ;  either  concerning  some  par- 
ticular existence,  or,  as  it  is  usually  termed,  "  matter- 
of-fact,"  which,  falling  under  observation,  is  capable 
of  human  testimony  ;  or  else  concerning  things  which, 
being  beyond  the  discovery  of  our  senses,  are  not 
capable  of  any  such  testimony. 

Concerning  the  first  of  these,  viz.,  particular  matter- 
of-fact  ; — 


CH.  XVI.]          THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  145 

First,  Where  any  particular  thing,  consonant  to  the 
constant  observation  of  ourselves  and  others  in  the 
like  case,  comes  attested  by  the  concurrent  reports  of 
all  that  mention  it,  we  receive  it  as  easily  and  build 
as  firmly  upon  it  as  if  it  were  certain  knowledge  ;  and 
we  reason  and  act  thereupon  with  as  little  doubt  as  if 
it  were. 

The  first,  therefore,  and  highest  degree  of  proba- 
bility is,  when  the  general  consent  of  all  men  in  all 
ages,  as  far  as  it  can  be  known,  concurs  with  a  man's 
constant  and  never-failing  experience  in  like  cases, 
to  confirm  the  truth  of  any  particular  matter-of-fact 
attested  by  fair  witnesses  ;  such  are  all  the  stated  con- 
stitutions and  properties  of  bodies,  and  the  regular 
proceedings  of  causes  and  effects  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  nature. 

Secondly,  The  next  degree  of  probability  is,  when 
I  find  by  my  own  experience,  and  the  agreement  of 
all  orders  that  mention  it,  a  thing  to  be  for  the  most 
part  so  ;  and  that  the  particular  instance  of  it  is 
attested  by  many  and  undoubted  witnesses  ;  v.  g., 
history  giving  us  such  an  account  of  men  in  all  ages, 
and  my  own  experience,  as  far  as  I  had  an  opportu- 
nity to  observe,  confirming  it,  that  most  men  prefer 
their  private  advantage  to  the  public  ;  if  all  historians 
that  write  of  Tiberius  say,  that  Tiberius  did  so,  it  is 
extremely  probable.  And  in  this  case,  our  assent  has 
a  sufficient  foundation  to  raise  itself  to  a  degree  which 
we  may  call  "confidence." 

Thirdly,  In  things  that  happen  indifferently,  as 
"  that  a  bird  should  fly  this  or  that  way,"  "  that  it 
should  thunder  on  a  man's  right  or  left  hand,"  etc., 


146  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

when  any  particular  matter-of-fact  is  vouched  by  the 
concurrent  testimony  of  unsuspected  witnesses,  there 
our  assent  is  also  unavoidable. 

The  difficulty  is,  when  testimonies  contradict  com- 
mon experience,  and  the  reports  of  history  and  wit- 
nesses clash  with  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  or 
with  one  another  ;  there  it  is  where  diligence,  atten- 
tion, and  exactness  is  required  to  form  a  right  judg- 
ment, and  to  proportion  the  assent  to  the  different 
evidence  and  probability  of  the  thing,  which  rises  and 
falls  according  as  those  two  foundations  of  credi- 
bility, viz.,  common  observation  in  like  cases,  and  par- 
ticular testimonies  in  that  particular  instance,  favor 
or  contradict  it. 

The  probabilities  we  have  hitherto  mentioned  are 
only  such  as  concern  matter-of-fact,  and  such  things 
as  are  capable  of  observation  and  testimony.  There 
remains  that  other  sort  concerning  which  men  enter- 
tain opinions  with  variety  of  assent,  though  the  things 
be  such  that,  falling  not  under  the  reach  of  our  senses, 
they  are  not  capable  of  testimony.  Such  are,  (i.) 
The  existence,  nature,  and  operations  of  finite  imma- 
terial beings  without  us,  as  spirits,  angels,  devils,  etc., 
or  the  existence  of  material  beings,  which,  either  from 
their  smallness  in  themselves  or  remoteness  from  us, 
our  senses  Cannot  take  notice  of  :  as  whether  there  be 
any  plants,  animals,  and  intelligent  inhabitants  in 
the  planets  and  other  mansions  of  the  vast  universe. 
(2)  Concerning  the  manner  of  operation  in  most  parts 
of  the  works  of  nature  ;  wherein,  though  we  see  the 
sensible  effects,  yet  their  causes  are  unknown,  and  we 


CH.  XVI.]          THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  147 

perceive  not  the  ways  and  manner  how  they  are  pro- 
duced. 

Though  the  common  experience  and  the  ordinary 
course  of  things  have  justly  a  mighty  influence  on  the 
minds  of  men  to  make  them  give  or  refuse  credit  to 
any  thing  proposed  to  their  belief  ;  yet  there  is  one 
case  wherein  the  strangeness  of  the  fact  lessens  not 
the  assent  to  a  fair  testimony  given  of  it.  For,  where 
such  supernatural  events  are  suitable  to  ends  aimed 
at  by  Him  who  has  the  power  to  change  the  course 
of  nature,  there,  under  such  circumstances,  they  may 
be  the  fitter  to  procure  belief,  by  how  much  the  more 
they  are  beyond  or  contrary  to  ordinary  observation. 
This  is  the  proper  case  of  miracles  ;  which,  well  at- 
tested, do  not  only  find  credit  themselves,  but  give  it 
also  to  other  truths  which  need  such  confirmation. 

Besides  those  we  have  hitherto  mentioned,  there  is 
one  sort  of  propositions  that  challenge  the  highest  de- 
gree of  our  assent,  upon  bare  testimony,  whether  the 
thing  proposed  agree  or  disagree  with  common  expe- 
rience and  the  ordinary  course  of  things  or  no.  The 
reason  whereof  is,  because  the  testimony  is  of  such  an 
one  as  cannot  deceive  nor  be  deceived,  and  that  is  of 
God  himself.  This  carries  with  it  assurance  beyond 
doubt,  evidence  beyond  exception.  This  is  called  by 
a  peculiar  name,  "  revelation,"  and  our  assent  to  it, 
"  faith  ;  "  which  as  absolutely  determines  our  minds 
and  as  perfectly  excludes  all  wavering,  as  our  knowl- 
edge itself :  and  we  may  as  well  doubt  of  our  own 
being  as  we  can  whether  any  revelation  from  God  be 
true. 


148  THF   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 


REASON    AND   REASONING. 

If  general  knowledge,  as  has  been  shown,  consists 
in  a  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 
our  own  ideas,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
all  things  without  us  (except  only  of  a  God,  whose 
existence  every  man  may  certainly  know  and  demon- 
strate to  himself  from  his  own  existence)  be  had  only 
by  our  senses  ;  what  room  then  is  there  for  the  exer- 
cise of  any  other  faculty  but  outward  sense  and  in- 
ward perception  ?  What  need  is  there  of  reason  ? 
Very  much  ;  both  for  the  enlargement  of  our  knowl- 
edge and  regulating  our  assent  :  forTTrTath  to  do  both 
in  knowledge  and  opinion,  and  is  necessary  and  as- 
sisting to  all  our  other  intellectual  faculties,  and  in- 
deed contains  two  of  them,  viz.,  sagacity  and  illation. 
By  the  one  it  finds  out,  and  by  the  other  it  so  orders, 
the  intermediate  ideas  as  to  discover  what  connection 
there  is  in  each  link  of  the  chain,  whereby  the  ex- 
tremes are  held  together  ;  and  thereby,  as  it  were,  to 
draw  into  view  the  truth  sought  for,  which  is  that  we 
call  "  illation"  or  "  inference,"  and  consists  in  nothing 
but  the  perception  of  the  connection  there  is  between 
the  ideas  in  each  step  of  the  deduction,  whereby  the 
mind  comes  to  see  either  the  certain  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  any  two  ideas,  as  in  demonstration,  in 
which  it  arrives  at  knowledge  ;  or  their  probable  con- 
nection, on  which  it  gives  or  withholds  its  assent,  as 
in  opinion.  Sense  and  intuition  reach  but  a  very  little 


CH.  XVIL]       THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  149 

way.  The  greatest  part  of  our  knowledge  depends 
upon  deductions  and  intermediate  ideas  :  and  in  those 
cases  where  we  are  fain  to  substitute  assent  instead  of 
knowledge,  and  take  propositions  for  true  without 
being  certain  they  are  so,  we  have  need  to  find  out, 
examine,  and  compare  the  grounds  of  their  probabil- 
ity. In  both  these  cases  the  faculty  which  finds  out 
the  means,  and  rightly  applies  them  to  discover  cer- 
tainty in  the  one  and  probability  in  the  other,  is  that 
which  we  call  "  reason."  For,  as  reason  perceives  the 
necessary  and  indubitable  connection  of  all  the  ideas 
or  proofs  one  to  another  in  each  step  of  any  demon- 
stration that  produces  knowledge,  so  it  likewise  per- 
ceives the  probable  connection  of  all  the  ideas  or 
proofs  one  to  another,  in  every  step  of  a  discourse  to 
which  it  will  think  assent  due.  This  is  the  lowest  de- 
gree of  that  which  can  be  truly  called  "  reason."  For, 
where  the  mind  does  not  perceive  this  probable  con- 
nection, where  it  does  not  discern  whether  there  be 
any  such  connection  or  no,  there  men's  opinions  are 
not  the  product  of  judgment  or  the  consequence  of 
reason,  but  the  effects  of  chance  and  hazard,  of  a 
mind  floating  at  all  adventures,  without  choice  and 
without  direction. 

So  that  we  may  in  reason  consider  these  fco^  do* «. 
grees  :  The  first_and  highest  is  the  discovering  and 
firiormgjaut  of  proofs  ;  the  second,  the  regular  and 
methodical  disposition  of  them,  and  laying  them  in  a 
clear  and  fit  order,  to  make  their  connection  and  force 
be  plainly  and  easily  perceived  ;  the  third  is  the  per- 
ceiving th£ir_connecdon  ;  and  the  fourth,  a  makin^_a. 
right  conclusion.  These  several  degrees  may  be  ob- 


150  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

served  in  any  mathematical  demonstration  :  it  being 
one  thing,  to  perceive  the  connection  of  each  part  as 
the  demonstration  is  made  by  another  ;  another,  to 
perceive  the  dependence  of  the  conclusion  on  all  the 
parts  ;  a  third,  to  make  out  a  demonstration  clearly 
and  neatly  one's  self  ;  and  something  different  from 
all  these,  to  have  first  found  out  those  intermediate 
ideas  or  proofs  by  which  it  is  made. 

There  is  one  thing  more  which  I  shall  desire  to  be 
considered  concerning  reason  ;  and  that  is,  whether 
syllogism,  as  is  generally  thought,  be  the  proper  instru- 
ment of  it,  and  the  usefullest  way  of  exercising  this 
faculty.  The  causes  I  have  no  doubt  are  these  : — 

First,  Because  syllogism  serves  our  reason  but  in 
one  only  of  the  fore-mentioned  parts  of  it  ;  and  that 
is,  to  show  the  connection  of  the  proofs  in  any  one 
instance  and  no  more  ;  but  in  this  it  is  of  no  great 
use,  since  the  mind  can  perceive  such  connection, 
where  it  really  is  as  easily,  nay  perhaps  better,  with- 
out it. 

If  we  will  observe  the  actings  of  our  own  minds, 
we  shall  find  that  we  reason  best  and  clearest  when 
we  only  observe  the  connection  of  the  proof,  without 
reducing  our  thoughts  to  any  rule  of  syllogism.  And 
therefore  we  may  take  notice  that  there  are  many 
men  that  reason  exceeding  clear  and  rightly,  who 
know  not  how  to  make  a  syllogism. 

\But  God  has  not  been  so  sparing  to  men  to  make 
them  barely  two-legged  creatures,  and  left  it  to  Aris- 
totle to  make  them  rationa^ ;  /.  ^.,  those  few  of  them 
that  he  could  get  so  to  examine  the  grounds  of  syllo- 
gisms as  to  see  that  in  above  threescore  ways  that  three 


CH,  XVII.]       THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   LOCKE.  151 

propositions  may  be  laid  together,  there  are  but  about 
fourteen  wherein  one  may  be  sure  that  the  conclusion 
is  right,  and  upon  what  ground  it  is  that  in  these  few 
the  conclusion  is  certain,  and  in  the  other  not.  God 
has  been  more  bountiful  to  mankind  than  so  ;  he  has 
given  them  a  mind  that  can  reason  without  being  in- 
structed in  methods  of  syllogism  :  the  understanding 
is  not  taught  to  reason  by  these  rules  ;  it  has  a  native 
faculty  to  perceive  the  coherence  or  incoherence  of 
its  ideas  and  can  range  them  right  without  any  such 
perplexing  repetitions. 

Inference  is  looked  on  as  the  great  act  of  the 
rational  faculty  ;  and  so  it  is  when  it  is  rightly  made : 
but  the  mind,  either  very  desirous  to  enlarge  its 
knowledge,  or  very  apt  to  favor  the  sentiments  it  has 
once  imbibed,  is  very  forward  to  make  inferences, 
and  therefore  often  makes  too  much  haste  before  it 
perceives  the  connection  of  the  ideas  that  must  hold 
the  extremes  together. 

To  infer  is  nothing  but,  by  virtue  of  one  proposi- 
tion laid  down  as  true,  to  draw  in  another  as  true ; 
/.  e.,  to  see  or  suppose  such  a  connection  of  the  two 
ideas  of  the  inferred  proposition.  V.  g.,  let  this  be 
the  proposition  laid  down,  "  Men  shall  be  punished 
in  another  world,"  and  from  thence  be  inferred  this 
other,  "  Then  men  can  determine  themselves."  The 
question  now  is  to  know  whether  the  mind  has  made 
this  inference  right  or  no  ;  if  it  has  made  it  by  finding 
out  the  intermediate  ideas,  and  taking  a  view  of  the 
connection  of  them  placed  in  a  due  order,  it  has  pro- 
ceeded rationally,  and  made  a  right  inference.  If  it 
has  done  it  without  such  a  view,  it  has  not  so  much 


152  THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

made  an  inference  that  will  hold,  or  an  inference  of 
right  reason,  as  shown  a  willingness  to  have  it  be  or 
be  taken  for  such.  But  in  neither  case  is  it  syllogism 
that  discovered  those  ideas,  or  showed  the  connection 
of  them  ;  for  they  must  be  both  found  out,  and  the 
connection  everywhere  perceived,  before  they  can  ra- 
tionally be  made  use  of  in  syllogism. 

Another  reason  that  makes  me  doubt  whether  syllo- 
gism be  the  only  proper  instrument  of  reason  in  the 
discovery  of  truth,  is,  that  of  whatever  use  mode  and 
figure  is  pretended  to  be  in  the  laying  open  of  fallacy 
(which  has  been  above  considered),  those  scholastic 
forms  of  discourse  are  not  less  liable  to  fallacies  than 
the  plainer  ways  of  argumentation  ;  and  for  this  I 
appeal  to  common  observation,  which  has  always 
found  these  artificial  methods  of  reasoning  more 
adapted  to  catch  and  entangle  the  mind  than  to  in- 
struct and  inform  the  understanding. 

The  rules  of  syllogism  serve  not  to  furnish  the 
mind  with  those  intermediate  ideas  that  may  show 
the  connection  of  remote  ones.  This  way  of  reason- 
ing discovers  no  new  proofs,  but  is  the  art  of  mar- 
shalling and  ranging  the  old  ones  we  have  already. 
The  forty-seventh  proposition  of  the  first  book  of 
Euclid  is  very  true  ;  but  the  discovery  of  it,  I  think, 
not  owing  to  any  rules  of  common  logic.  A  man 
knows  first,  and  then  he  is  able  to  prove  syllogis- 
tically  :  so  that  syllogism  comes  after  knowledge  ; 
and  then  a  man  has  little  or  no  need  of  it. 

It  is  fit  before  I  leave  this  subject,  to  take  notice  of 
one  manifest  mistake  in  the  rules  of  syllogism  ;  viz., 
"  that  no  syllogistical  reasoning  can  be  right  and 


CH.  XVII.]       THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF   LOCKE.  153 

conclusive  but  what  has,  at  least,  one  general  proposi- 
tion in  it ;"  as  if  we  could  not  reason  and  have  knowl- 
edge about  particulars  :  whereas,  in  truth,  the  matter 
rightly  considered,  the  immediate  object  of  all  our 
reasoning  and  knowledge  is  nothing  but  particulars. 
Every  man's  reasoning  and  knowledge  is  only  about 
the  ideas  existing  in  his  own  mind,  which  are  truly, 
every  one  of  them,  particular  existences  ;  and  our 
knowledge  and  reasoning  about  other  things  is  only  as 
they  correspond  with  those  our  particular  ideas.  So 
that  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
of  our  particular  ideas,  is  the  whole  and  utmost  of  all 
our  knowledge.  Universality  is  but  accidental  to  it, 
and  consists  only  in  this,  that  the  particular  ideas 
about  which  it  is  are  such  as  more  than  one  particular 
thing  can  correspond  with  and  be  represented  by. 
But  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
of  any  two  ideas,  and  consequently  our  knowledge,  is 
equally  clear  and  certain,  whether  either,  or  both,  or 
neither  of  those  ideas  be  capable  of  representing  more 
real  beings  than  one,  or  no. 

Faith  and  Reason. 

It  has  been  above  shown,  (i.)  That  we  are  of  neces- 
sity ignorant,  and  want  knowledge  of  all  sorts  where 
we  want  ideas.  (2.)  That  we  are  ignorant,  and  want 
rational  knowledge  where  we  want  proofs.  (3.)  That 
we  want  general  knowledge  and  certainty  as  far  as  we 
want  clear  and  determined  specific  ideas.  (4.)  That 
we  want  probability  to  direct  our  assent  in  matters 
where  we  have  neither  knowledge  of  our  own  nor  tes- 
timony of  other  men  to  bottom  our  reason  upon. 


154  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

From  these  things  thus  premised,  I  think  we  may 
come  to  lay  down  the  measures  and  boundaries  be- 
tween faith  and  reason  ;  the  want  whereof  may  possi- 
bly have  been  the  cause,  if  not  of  great  disorders,  yet 
at  least  of  great  disputes,  and  perhaps  mistakes,  in 
the  world. 

I  think  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  take  notice,  that, 
however  faith  be  opposed  to  reason,  faith  is  nothing 
but  a  firm  assent  of  the  mind  ;  which,  if  it  be  regu- 
lated, as  is  our  duty,  cannot  be  afforded  to  any  thing 
but  upon  good  reason,  and  so  cannot  be  opposite  to 
it.  He  that  believes  without  having  any  reason  for 
believing,  may  be  in  love  with  his  own  fancies  ;  but 
neither  seeks  truth  as  he  ought,  nor  pays  the  obedience 
due  to  his  Maker,  who  would  have  him  use  those  dis- 
cerning faculties  he  has  given  him  to  keep  him  out  of 
mistake  and  error.  He  that  does  not  this  to  the  best 
of  his  power,  however  he  sometimes  lights  on  truth,  is 
in  the  right  but  by  chance  ;  and  I  know  not  whether 
the  luckiness  of  the  accident  will  excuse  the  irregu- 
larity of  his  proceeding. 

Reason  therefore  here,  as  contradistinguished  to 
faith,  I  take  to  be  the  discovery  of  the  certainty  or 
probability  of  such  propositions  or  truths  which  the 
mind  arrives  at  by  deduction  made  from  such  ideas 
which  it  has  got  by  the  use  of  its  natural  faculties,  viz., 
by  sensation  or  reflection. 

Faith,  on  the  other  side,  is  the  assent  to  any  propo- 
sition, not  thus  made  out  by  the  deductions  of  reason, 
but  upon  the  credit  of  the  proposer,  as  coming  from 
God  in  some  extraordinary  way  of  communication. 


., XVIII.]  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LOCKE.  155 

This  way  of  discovering  truths  to  men  we  call  "  reve- 
lation." 

Whatsoever  truth  we  come  to  the  clear  discovery 
of,  from  the  knowledge  and  contemplation  of  our  own 
ideas,  will  always  be  certainer  to  us  than  those  which 
are  conveyed  to  us  by  traditional  revelation  :  for  the 
knowledge  we  have  that  this  revelation  came  at  first 
from  God,  can  never  be  so  sure  as  the  knowledge  we 
have  from  the  clear  and  distinct  perception  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  own  ideas  :  v.  g.,  if 
it  were  revealed  some  ages  since,  that  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  were  equal  to  two  right  ones,  I  might 
assent  to  the  truth  of  that  proposition  upon  the  credit 
of  the  tradition  that  it  was  revealed  :  but  that  would 
never  amount  to  so  great  a  certainty  as  the  knowledge 
of  it  upon  the  comparing  and  measuring  my  own  ideas 
of  two  right  angles,  and  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle. 
The  like  holds  in  matter-of-fact,  knowable  by  our 
senses  :  v.  g.,  the  history  of  the  deluge  is  conveyed  to 
us  by  writings  which  had  their  original  from  revela- 
tion ;  and  yet  nobody,  I  think,  will  say  he  has  as  cer- 
tain and  clear  a  knowledge  of  the  flood  as  Noah,  that 
saw  it,  or  that  he  himself  would  have  had,  had  he 
then  been  alive  and  seen  it.  For  he  has  no  greater 
an  assurance  than  that  of  his  senses,  that  it  is  writ  in 
the  book  supposed  writ  by  Moses  inspired  :  but  he 
has  not  so  great  an  assurance  that  Moses  writ  that 
book  as  if  he  had  seen  Moses  write  it.  So  that  the 
assurance  of  its  being  a  revelation  is  less  still  than  the 
assurance  of  his  senses. 

In  propositions,  then,  whose  certainty  is  built  upon 
the  clear  perception  of   the  agreement   or  disagree- 


156  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  [BK.  IV. 

ment  of  our  ideas,  attained  either  by  immediate  in- 
tuition, as  in  self-evident  propositions,  or  by  evident 
deductions  of  reason  in  demonstrations,  we  need  not 
the  assistance  of  revelation  as  necessary  to  gain  our 
assent  and  introduce  them  into  our  minds  ;  because 
the  natural  ways  of  knowledge  could  settle  them 
there,  or  had  done  it  already,  which  is  the  greatest 
assurance  we  can  possibly  have  of  any  thing,  unless 
where  God  immediately  reveals  it  to  us  ;  and  thereto 
our  assurance  can  be  no  greater  than  our  knowledge 
is,  that  it  is  a  revelation  from  God.  But  yet  nothing, 
I  think,  can  under  that  title  shake  or  overrule  plain 
knowledge,  or  rationally  prevail  with  any  man  to 
admit  it  for  true,  in  a  direct  contradiction  to  the 
clear  evidence  of  his  own  understanding. 

For  since  no  evidence  of  our  faculties  by  which 
we  receive  such  revelations  can  exceed,  if  equal,  the 
certainty  of  our  intuitive  knowledge,  we  can  never  re- 
ceive for  a  truth  any  thing  that  is  directly  contrary  to 
our  clear  and  distinct  knowledge.  And  therefore  no 
proposition  can  be  received  for  divine  revelation,  or 
obtain  the  assent  due  to  all  such,  if  it  be  contradic- 
tory to  our  clear  intuitive  knowledge,  because  this 
would  be  to  subvert  the  principles  and  foundations 
of  all  knowledge,  evidence,  and  assent  whatsoever  : 
and  there  would  be  left  no  difference  between  truth 
and  falsehood,  no  measures  of  credible  and  incredible 
in  the  world,  if  doubtful  propositions  shall  take  place 
before  self-evident,  and  what  we  certainly  know  give 
way  to  what  we  may  possibly  be  mistaken  in. 

Whatever  God  hath  revealed  is  certainly  true ;  no 
doubt  can  be  made  of  it.  This  is  the  proper  object 


CH.  XVIII.]      THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LOCKE.  157 

of  faith  :  but  whether  it  be  a  divine  revelation  or  no, 
reason  must  judge  ;  which  can  never  permit  the  mind 
to  reject  a  greater  evidence  to  embrace  what  is  less 
evident,  nor  allow  it  to  entertain  probability  in  oppo- 
sition to  knowledge  and  certainty.  There  can  be  no 
evidence  that  any  traditional  revelation  is  of  divine 
original,  in  the  words  we  receive  it,  and  in  the  sense 
we  understand  it,  so  clear  and  so  certain  as  that  of 
the  principles  of  reason  :  and  therefore  nothing  that 
is  contrary  to,  and  inconsistent  with,  the  clear  and 
self-evident  dictates  of  reason  has  a  right  to  be  urged 
or  assented  to  as  a  matter  of  faith,  wherein  reason 
hath  nothing  to  do.  Whatsoever  is  divine  revelation 
ought  to  over-rule  all  our  opinions,  prejudices,  and 
interests,  and  hath  a  right  to  be  received  with  full 
assent  :  such  a  submission  as  this  of  our  reason  to 
faith  takes  not  away  the  land-marks  of  knowledge. 
This  shakes  not  the  foundations  of  reason  but  leaves 
us  that  use  of  our  faculties,  for  which  they  were  given 
us. 


INDEX. 


Abstraction,  abstract  ideas,  how 
formed,  106,  107;  the  mean 
ing  of  such  ideas,  108. 

Assent,  distinguished  from 
knowledge,  141;  degrees  of, 
144-147. 

Association,  nature  of,  99;  in- 
fluence of,  upon  our  judg- 
ments, 100. 

Being,  136,   138. 

Cause,  origin  of  the  idea,  85,  86. 

Certainty,  where  found,  125; 
distinguished  from  probabil- 
ity, 132. 

Comparison,  54. 

Compounding,  55. 

Duration,  idea  of,  63,  64;  mean- 
ing of,  65;  duration  and  time 
and  space,  67,  69. 

Essence,  meaning  of,  108,  109; 
real  and  nominal,  1 10  ff . ;  our 
knowledge  of,  iioff.,  122,123. 

Eternity,  idea  of,  how  obtained, 
65;  our  knowledge  of,  72,  73; 
relation  to  time,  73. 

Existence,  idea  of,  44  ;  our 
knowledge  of,  132  ff.,  140,141. 

Extension,  idea  of,  60;  relation 
to  space,  60;  relation  to  body, 
61-63;  distinguished  from 
solidity,  62. 

External  objects,  our  knowledge 
of,  133,  140  ff. 

Faith,  faith  and  knowledge,  143; 
nature  of,  153;  relation  to 
reason,  155  ff . ;  faith  and  reve- 
lation, 155  ff. 


God,  proofs  of  his  existence, 
133  ff- 

Ideas,  definition  of,  32,  52; 
ideas  not  innate,  32  ff. ;  ideas 
from  experience  only,  35;  sim- 
ple ideas,  39  ff . ;  ideas  of  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  36;  ideas 
and  qualities,  45,  46;  pri- 
mary and  secondary  ideas,  45 
ff  ;  complex  ideas,  52  ff. ; 
clear  and  obscure  ideas,  94; 
real  and  fantastical  ideas,  95; 
adequate  and  inadequate  ideas, 
96,  97;  ideas  and  knowledge, 
112,  113. 

Identity,  idea  of,  how  formed, 
86,  87;  material  identity,  87; 
identity  of  living  being,  88  ff. ; 
personal  identity,  90  ff. 

Inference,  nature  of,  151;  infer- 
ence and  syllogism,  151. 

Infinity,  idea  of,  70;  negative 
and  positive  idea  of,  70  ff. ;  in- 
finity and  space,  71,  72. 

Judgment,  definition  of,  141; 
relation  to  knowledge,  142, 
143;  judgment  and  probabil- 
ity, 143  ff. 

Knowledge,  source  of,  32,  35; 
knowledge  and  ideas,  112; 
nature  of,  112,  113;  degrees 
of,  115;  intuitive  knowledge, 
115  ff. ;  demonstrative  knowl- 
edge, 117;  extent  of  knowl- 
edge. n8ff. ;  sensitive  knowl- 
edge, 126,  138;  reality  of 
knowledge,  129  ff. ;  knowl- 
edge of  self,  134;  of  God, 


i6o 


INDEX. 


133    ff. ;    of    external   object, 
137  ff. 
Language,  lor,  102. 

Matter,  not  first  cause,  137,  138; 

matter  and  thought,  139. 
Memory,  nature  of,   52,   failure 

of,  53:  aids  to,  53. 
Miracles,  146. 
Mocles    and    bimple    ideas,    58; 

Dimple  and  mixed  modes,  58, 

76 ;     modes     of     space,     60 ; 

modes  of  thinking,  74  ff. 

Names,  use  of,  103;  meaning, 
103  ff. ;  names  of  substan- 
ces, 108,  109  ff. ;  names  and 
essences,  nominal  and  real, 
109,  no  ff. 

Nature,  our  knowledge  of,  123, 
124. 

Number,  69-71. 

Opinion,  143. 

Perception,  nature  of,  42:  ideas 
of,  50,  51;  original  and  ac- 
quired, 50,  51. 

Person,  91,  92;  personal  iden- 
tity, 91  ff. ;  what  makes  per- 
sonal identity,  91,  92. 

Place,  6j. 

Power,  our  knowledge  of,  44, 
75;  power  and  relition,  76; 
power  and  qualities  of  bodies, 
76- 

Probability,  definition  of,  143; 
grounds  of,  143;  degrees  of, 
146,  147. 

Proposition,  definition  of.  114; 
verbal,  trifling,  and  significant, 
114,  131;  true  and  false  propo- 
sitions, 123,  124. 

Qualities  and  ideas,  45,  46;  dis- 
tinction of  qualities,  46  ff. 


Reason,  office  of,  47;  reasoning 
and  the  syllogism,  150  fi  ; 
reason  and  faith,  153,  151; 
reason  and  revelation,  155. 

Reflection,  reflection  a  source  of 
ideas,  35;  defined,  36;  ideas 
that  are  derived  from  reflec- 
|  tion,.42  ff. 

Relation,  idea  of,  how  obtained, 
83,  84;  forms  of  relation,  85, 
86. 

Retention,  52. 

Revelation,  its  relation  to  rea- 
son, 145;  as  a  source  of 
knowledge.  154,  155;  authority 
of,  156,  157. 

Self,  93. 

Sensation,  a  source  of  knowl- 
edge, 35. 

Solidity,  simple  idea,  41;  its  re- 
lation to  space,  42. 

Soul,  35. 

i  Space,  the  idea  of,  60;  modes 
of,  61. 

Spirits,  146. 

I  Substance,  idea  of,  how  formed, 
58  ff. ;  substance  in  genera^and 
particular  substances,  79,  80; 
collective  ideas  of,  83;  sub- 
stance and  personal  identity, 
92  fi. ;  corporeal  and  thinking 
substance,  120;  our  knowl- 
edge of  substances,  120  ff. 

Succession,  idea  of,  44;  succes- 
sion and  duration,  62. 

Syllogism,  relation  to  reasoning, 
152  ff.;  objects  of,  152  ff. 

Thinking,  92,  0,3. 

Time,  61,  62. 

Truth,  relation  to  knowledge, 
114;  kinds  of,  114,  115. 

Willing,  42. 

Words,  101,  IO2. 


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